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Introduction 
 
Decision-making by physicians, including both clinical and non-clinical (e.g., 
organizational) decisions, is the subject of much research by health economists and other 
health services researchers.  In the U.S., because of the country’s relatively high expenditures 
on health care services, its high health care expenditures growth rate, and its mixed record of 
quality, this work has focused substantially on the fee-for-service payment system and other 
financial incentives contributing to these outcomes.  There are also many smaller literatures 
about the influence non-financial factors have on physician decision-making and, thereby, 
downstream outcomes of interest. 
Among these are the literatures concerned with access to health care services and the 
role of public policy in encouraging physicians and physician practices to care for indigent 
populations.  As in general, much of the work in this area concerns the effects of financial 
factors—in this case, the relatively low fees paid to most physicians who treat Medicaid 
beneficiaries.  By contrast, it is surprisingly uncommon for researchers to examine how non-
financial public policies also affect outcomes of access.  In my first chapter, I consider the 
effects of one such overlooked set of policies: regulations of licensure, scope of practice, 
prescription authority, and other dimensions of practice for non-physician clinicians, 
particularly nurse practitioners and physician assistants.  Specifically, I consider the effects of 
these laws and regulations on physician practices’ participation in Medicaid, relying on both 
cross-sectional differences and within-state changes over time in the regulations to identify my 
estimates.  My findings are informative for state policymakers evaluating the potential different 
policies may have for increasing Medicaid beneficiaries’ access to primary care, including 
alternatives to raising Medicaid fees. 
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Another literature concerns the coordination of health care services among physicians.  
Principally, the focuses of this literature have been in the outpatient setting (e.g., between 
primary care physicians and specialists) and in transitions from inpatient to outpatient care.  
The importance of coordination among physicians may be greater still for vulnerable patients 
while they remain hospitalized.  Interest in the coordination of inpatient physician services has 
grown in recent years with demonstrations of variation in the provision of consults for surgical 
inpatients (Wijeysundera et al., 2012; Stevens et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2014).  Moreover, the 
decisions physicians make regarding when and how often to order and provide consults can 
quickly precipitate the use of significant healthcare resources.  In my second dissertation 
chapter, I develop two theoretical frameworks to help explain observed patterns of consult 
provision and to consider the implications of suboptimal consult provision patterns for 
vulnerable patients’ care management.  The first is an application and extension of a well-
known game theoretical model—the Bystander Effect—and the second is derived from the law 
of diminishing marginal product.  I test these frameworks using a Medicare administrative 
claims dataset consisting of consults provided to Medicare beneficiaries undergoing coronary 
artery bypass graft or colectomy procedures in light of these patients’ numerous comorbid 
conditions and complexity. 
Finally, there are literatures concerned with observed geographic variation in physician 
decision-making and with the organizational features that may influence these decisions.  The 
Veterans Health Administration (VA), because of its relative homogeneity in clinician 
reimbursement structures and patient mix, is an attractive setting in which to assess the 
importance of certain organizational factors and how they may affect geographic variation in 
physician decisions.  In my third dissertation chapter I leverage this opportunity and the 
richness of the VA’s Clinical Data Warehouse and other survey data sources to analyze key 
determinants of variation in VA quality of care.  In particular, I explore the relevance of two 
geographic variation-based frameworks.  First, I consider how different VA facilities’ care 
resources (e.g., staff, space, IT) may enable physicians and other clinicians to render high-
quality care and may also complicate their delivery efforts except, potentially, when effectively 
coordinated.  And second, I explore the extent to which physicians who render care in two 
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different VA organizations (e.g., because they moved) render care differently in accordance 
with local care patterns and in response to local organizational structures and resource 
constraints. 
Each of these studies is intended to shed light on the relative importance of non-
financial factors in driving variation in physician decisions and, thereby, health care use and 
quality outcomes.  I seek through these chapters to inform both the academic literature on 
physician decision-making in these areas and also policy and administrative decisions that can 
shape the environments in which physicians practice.
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Chapter One 
Who Will See You Now?  How Non-physician Clinician Regulations 
Influence Medicaid Participation in Primary Care Physician Practices 
 
Abstract 
Because of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (e.g., state health insurance exchanges) 
and state Medicaid expansions, there may be as many as 21 million new Medicaid and CHIP 
enrollees by 2022 (Holahan et al. 2012).  Yet concerns are growing that primary care physicians 
(PCPs) and other providers increasingly indicate they will not accept new Medicaid patients 
(Decker, 2012; Decker, 2013).  In recent decades many states have sought to increase access in 
primary care by reforming regulations for nurse practitioners (NPs) and physician assistants 
(PAs), who may also provide primary care services.  The effects of these regulations are 
complicated, however, by the complex relationships NPs and PAs have with PCPs: PCPs often 
employ NPs and PAs in their practices, and they may also compete directly with NPs where NPs 
are permitted full practice autonomy. 
This paper explores the effects of NP and PA regulation reforms on Medicaid 
participation in PCP practices, where most primary care is provided.  I analyze these effects 
using a differences-in-differences framework and a robust, linked longitudinal data set that 
incorporates new data summarizing NP and PA regulations.  My main findings indicate that 
states relaxing these regulations, independent of other policy measures, have realized mixed 
effects on access to PCP practices in Medicaid, including significant reductions in smaller PCP 
practices’ participation in Medicaid.  If policymakers implement such regulatory changes not 
independently but rather as parts of broader, more cohesive policy packages that recognize and 
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balance their complex effects, states may experience more significant and consistent 
improvements in primary care access. 
 
Introduction 
By 2022 there may be as many as 21 million new Medicaid and CHIP enrollees (Holahan 
et al. 2012).  Much of this new enrollment will be concentrated in states taking advantage of 
the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) enhanced federal financing arrangements and expanding their 
Medicaid populations to include nearly all individuals with incomes below 133 percent of the 
Federal Poverty Level.  As of August 2014, 27 states and the District of Columbia were 
expanding their Medicaid eligibility criteria, and three more were considering doing the same 
(Advisory Board, 2014).  A stated goal of these expansions is to improve access to primary care 
and other health care services for many individuals and families; such improvements in access 
may lead to reductions in emergency room visits, inpatient hospitalizations, and mortality (Falik 
et al., 2001; Bindman et al., 2005; Laditka, Laditka, & Probst, 2005; Ansari, Laditka, & Laditka, 
2006). 
Yet concerns are growing that primary care physicians (PCPs) and other providers 
increasingly indicate they will not accept new Medicaid patients (Decker, 2012; Decker, 2013).  
Many factors have been proposed to explain this trend, including low physician fees relative to 
those paid by private insurers and Medicare, greater administrative (e.g., delayed 
reimbursement) and patient burdens, and difficulties securing specialist visits for referrals 
(Sloan, Mitchell, & Cromwell, 1978; Hadley, 1979; Davidson, 1982; Cunningham & Nichols, 
2005; Decker, 2007; Cunningham & O’Malley, 2009; Sommers, Paradise, & Miller, 2011; 
Casalino, 2013; Long, 2013; Wilk, 2013). 
The principal action Congress took to address these concerns in the ACA was to raise 
Medicaid fees for primary care services up to 100% of Medicare fee levels during 2013 and 
2014 (Sommers, Swartz, & Epstein, 2011); this measure was included despite the provision’s 
estimated $11.9 billion cost to the federal government (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012) and 
evidence that the impact of higher fee levels on PCPs’ Medicaid participation may be relatively 
small (Fanning & de Alteriis, 1993; Coburn, Long, & Marquis, 1999; Zuckerman et al., 2004; 
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Wilk, 2013).  States too have focused on fees as the principal mechanism for promoting 
Medicaid participation among their physicians.  For example, seven states have elected to 
extend the ACA’s primary care fee bump into 2015 (Galewitz, 2014; Robeznieks, 2015).  
Because the federal government will no longer fund these fee increases beginning in 2015, 
these state-funded fee increases may be cost-prohibitive in some states, especially where fee 
levels were particularly low before the ACA’s fee increase went into effect.  As examples, the 
estimated costs of such fee bump extensions were $32 million in Alabama and $451 million in 
Florida (Galewitz, 2014). 
Because of the expense of these policies and similar fee-based measures proposed prior 
to the ACA, state policymakers have explored alternative measures to improve primary care 
access.  Among these are reforms to licensure, practice autonomy, scope of practice, and 
prescription authority laws and regulations for nurse practitioners (NPs), physician assistants 
(PAs), and other non-physician clinicians (hereafter “NPC regulations”).  NPC regulations vary 
considerably across states; NP regulations concerning independent practice authority exemplify 
this variation in Figure 1.  Many states continue to debate actively whether to relax these 
regulations, weighing their capacity to improve access without sacrificing quality.  The National 
Conference of State Legislatures reports that during 2011-2012, a total of 1,795 bills related to 
scope of practice were proposed and 349 were adopted or enacted across 54 states, territories, 
and the District of Columbia, and another 178 were proposed during the first quarter of 2013 
(NCSL, 2013). 
Naturally, the arguments about NPC regulations have focused on how these regulations 
will affect Medicaid beneficiaries’ access to primary care delivered by NPCs.  This is reinforced 
by physician organizations’ warnings that care provided by independent NPCs poses a threat to 
patient health.  However, most NPCs—and all PAs—are employed in physician-operated 
practices and deliver care under physician supervision.  Moreover, with the rise of team-based 
care processes and increased training of NPs and PAs, it is expected physicians and NPCs will 
work together with increasing regularity in the coming years (Pohl, Barksdale, & Werner, 2014; 
Iglehart, 2014).  It is important to account for the complexity of the interactions between PCPs 
and NPCs, who practice both as employees of PCP practices and as independent practitioners, 
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when anticipating how relaxed NPC regulations will affect Medicaid beneficiaries’ access to 
primary care. 
This paper explores the effects of NPC regulations on Medicaid participation in PCP 
practices, where most primary care is provided.  In particular, I assess how PCP practices’ 
decisions to participate in Medicaid change following NPC regulation reforms, and I explore 
three hypothesized mechanisms that could explain these relationships.  I test these hypotheses 
using a differences-in-differences framework and a robust, linked longitudinal data set that 
incorporates new data summarizing NPC regulations.  My main findings indicate that states 
relaxing NPC regulations, independent of other policy measures, have realized mixed effects on 
access to PCP practices in Medicaid, including significant reductions in PCP practices’ 
participation in Medicaid in some cases.  By exploiting institutional differences in the practices 
of NPs and PAs (PCP practices may employ both NPs and PAs, but in states with relaxed practice 
regulations only NPs may practice independently), I am able to disentangle the conflicting 
mechanisms underlying relaxed NPC regulations that drive these mixed effects: reductions in 
PCP practices’ marginal costs of care, competition between PCPs and NPs for privately insured 
and Medicare patients, and the willingness of PCPs to care for Medicaid beneficiaries as a public 
service.  If policymakers implement NPC regulatory changes as parts of broader, more cohesive 
policy packages that recognize and effectively balance these complex effects of relaxed NPC 
regulations, they may achieve more significant and consistent improvements in primary care 
access. 
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Figure 1: Variation across States in Nurse Practitioners’ Regulatory Authority to Practice Independently, 2014 
 
  
Source: American Association of Nurse Practitioners.  http://www.aanp.org/images/documents/state-leg-
reg/stateregulatorymap.pdf. 
 
Background 
In 2010, the 56,000 NPs and 30,000 PAs in primary care represented 30% of the primary 
care workforce (AHRQ, 2012; Coplan, Cawley, & Stoehr, 2013; HRSA, 2013).  In most states, NPs 
and physicians can provide similar sets of services in primary care; typically PAs provide a 
narrower, but still substantial range of services (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2011).  NPCs’ scope 
of practice regulations have converged over time (Towers, 2003; Towers, 2005), and NPs and 
PAs tend to practice similarly even where differences in these regulations persist (Mills & 
McSweeney, 2002; Henry, Hooker, & Yates, 2011).  Combined, NPs and PAs provide at least 
11% of outpatient medical services, the majority of which is primary care (Hooker & Everett, 
2012). 
Full Practice Authority (including prescribing) 
Reduced Practice Authority (collaborative agreement required for medical practice or prescribing) 
Restricted Practice Authority (supervision, delegation, or team management required for medical practice or prescribing) 
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Today, PCPs commonly work with NPCs (Sekscenski et al., 1994; Donelan et al., 2013; 
Kuo et al., 2013).  In 2009, 55.4% of PCPs’ primary sites of care employed non-physician 
clinicians, principally NPs or PAs.  This arrangement is more common in larger and multi-
specialty group practices (Park, Cherry, & Decker, 2011), Federally Qualified Health Centers 
(FQHCs) (Hing, Hooker, & Ashman, 2011; NACHC, 2013), public sector health care providers 
such as the Veterans Health Administration and Department of Defense (Hooker & Everett, 
2012), and medical school-affiliated practices (Moote et al. 2011).1  NPCs also may be more 
likely to take on expanded roles in newer, team-based models of care such as patient-centered 
medical homes and accountable care organizations (Cassidy, 2013). 
Furthermore, it has been shown that the numbers of NPCs and the frequency of NPC 
employment in PCP practices are higher where NPC regulations are less restrictive (Sekscenski 
et al., 1994; Kuo et al., 2013).  States vary in a range of NPC regulations pertaining to terms of 
licensing, scope of practice, requirements for physician supervision, prescription authority, and 
reimbursement relative to what physicians are paid for the same services; in many states these 
regulations have changed materially over the past two decades, generally becoming more 
relaxed. 
Historically, NPCs in primary care have been more likely to care for substantial numbers 
of Medicaid beneficiaries than PCPs (Grumbach et al., 2003; Hansen-Turton et al., 2004).  This is 
largely because NPCs—NPs in particular—have been more likely to locate in health professional 
shortage areas where Medicaid patients comprise a larger percentage of patients (Moody, 
Smith, & Glenn, 1999; Grumbach et al., 2003).  If NPCs are more likely to treat Medicaid 
patients than PCPs, it follows that PCP practices that employ or are considering employing NPCs 
may look more to NPCs to help serve their Medicaid patients (McCormack, 2014) and possibly 
to increase the practice’s participation in Medicaid overall when NPC regulations are relaxed.  
This is consistent with qualitative evidence from a recent study of physician groups participating 
                                                     
 
 
1
 These types of practices are also among those more likely than average to participate in Medicaid (Wilk, 2013). 
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in Medicaid, some of whom “would consider hiring a physician assistant or nurse practitioner to 
accommodate more demand from Medicaid” (Sommers, Paradise, and Miller, 2011).  Other 
studies have provided evidence that physician practices are more likely to accept and treat 
Medicaid patients when they employ NPCs, but these studies have been descriptive (Park, 
Cherry, & Decker, 2011) or narrowly focused (Everett et al., 2013).  By contrast, Hing, Hooker, 
and Ashman (2011) found no statistically significant difference in the probability that patients 
seen by NPs, PAs, or PCPs in community health centers were insured through Medicaid. 
Research exploring the link between NPC regulations and Medicaid participation in 
physician practices has been limited.  The most germane evidence to date was presented in a 
working paper by Richards and Polsky (2014), who conducted a simulated patient study of 
appointment availability for patients varying in insurance status and the urgency of the 
identified medical issue.  They compared their findings in practices that had employed NPCs 
versus in those that had not and in states with “liberal” scope of practice laws versus in states 
with “moderate” or “restrictive” scope of practice laws.  They found, unsurprisingly, that 
Medicaid patients were less likely to be offered an appointment than privately insured patients 
overall.  However, practices with NPCs were relatively more likely to offer appointments to 
Medicaid patients.  Furthermore, they found that the appointment rate gap was reduced most 
significantly in states with liberal scope of practice laws—that is, where physician practices 
could most effectively leverage their NPCs to increase access for Medicaid patients. 
The work of Richards and Polsky has significant strengths, including its contemporary 
context and its use of an important measure of access—appointment availability.  However, the 
study’s cross-sectional design limits causal inference, and its assessments of appointment 
availability are not directly comparable to the effects on physician practices’ participation in 
Medicaid estimated for other policy interventions in previous studies.  By contrast, my study 
employs a longitudinal design and assesses effects on physician practices’ Medicaid 
participation directly.  It also examines the independent effects—as well as the aggregate 
effects—of multiple NPC practice regulations, rather than scope of practice regulations alone, 
giving policymakers a more complete picture of which regulations in particular can have 
important ramifications for access in Medicaid. 
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Theoretical Framework 
To develop baseline predictions and illustrate how relaxing non-physician clinicians’ NPC 
regulations affects physician practices’ participation in Medicaid, I follow the approaches of 
Garthwaite (2012) and Wilk (2013) and apply the simple two-market model described by Sloan, 
Mitchell, and Cromwell (1978).  In this model, physician practices maximize profits—patient 
care revenues minus the costs of care delivery—when producing medical care, measured in 
hours per week, to non-Medicaid patients (privately insured, insured through Medicare, or 
uninsured) and Medicaid patients.  As shown in Figure 2, fees per hour of care, Pm, are fixed in 
the Medicaid market, while in the non-Medicaid market the physician practice faces a 
downward sloping demand curve, MRp, the result of negotiations with heterogeneous private 
insurers and some limited price discrimination with privately insured patients and uninsured 
patients.2  The practice’s marginal costs of care increase in hours of care due to staff costs 
(hiring additional staff or paying overtime) as well as fatigue and opportunity costs; marginal 
costs may also increase if physicians selectively accept and treat patients on the basis of 
expected clinician time and effort per visit (Rowland & Salganicoff, 1994; Long, 2013). 
As in classical profit maximization, the physician practice provides additional care until 
marginal revenues equal marginal costs.  If marginal costs were small, the physician practice 
would first treat non-Medicaid patients until MRp = Pm, when the practice would begin treating 
Medicaid patients until Medicaid demand were exhausted; at this point the practice would 
resume treating non-Medicaid patients for fees below Pm.  Because in most practices marginal 
                                                     
 
 
2
 In this model, Medicare patients are included among those I classify as non-Medicaid.  Physician practices have 
no capacity to price-discriminate in the market for Medicare beneficiaries’ primary care visits, as Medicare is a 
national insurance program with a fixed fee schedule.  This could be represented in Figure 2 as a second flat curve 
segment above and to the left of Pm.  Similarly, the negatively sloped curve segments representing the non-
Medicaid market could be depicted as a series of flat curve segments, each representing an insurer with which the 
physician practice has entered into a network agreement.  Figure 2 abstracts away from this model presentation 
by assuming the physician practice faces a continuous, downward-sloping demand curve for the sake of parsimony 
and because of this paper’s focus on access to care for Medicaid beneficiaries. 
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costs are non-trivial and increasing, it is more common for practices to treat only non-Medicaid 
patients or to treat non-Medicaid patients and some Medicaid patients. 
 
Marginal Cost Reduction 
There are two principal mechanisms through which relaxing NPC regulations may affect 
the physician practice’s equilibrium production of medical care and its patient mix (Medicaid 
versus non-Medicaid).  The first of these is by reducing the marginal costs of care delivery.  As 
NPC regulations are relaxed, physician practices may reduce their marginal costs either by 
substituting NP or PA labor for physician labor in the delivery of services for which such 
substitution was not permitted previously, or by lessening physicians’ supervision duties when 
NPs or PAs provide care.  The marginal cost reductions associated with such practice decisions 
may be substantial.  Estimates of cost reductions are between 20% and 35% for NPs relative to 
PCPs (Naylor & Kurtzman, 2010) and 54% or more for PAs relative to PCPs (Grzybicki et al., 
2002; Dueker et al., 2005). 
Figure 2: Relaxing NPC Regulations Leads to Increased Participation in Medicaid among Physician Practices, 
Reduced Marginal Costs of Care Mechanism 
 
Notes: Figure draws on the model of Sloan, Mitchell, and Cromwell (1978) and the applications of Garthwaite 
(2012) and Wilk (2013). 
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Such a shift in marginal cost curves is presented in Figure 2 for Practices A and B with 
pre-reform marginal cost curves MCA and MCB, respectively, and post-reform marginal cost 
curves MCA’ and MCB’, respectively.  Before NPC regulation reform, Practice A produced Q1 
hours of medical care for non-Medicaid patients and zero hours for Medicaid patients.  After 
NPC regulation reform, Practice A produces Q3 total medical care hours, more than Q1 before, 
and those hours are split between non-Medicaid patients (Q2 hours) and a small number of 
Medicaid patients (Q3 – Q2 hours).  Correspondingly, before NPC regulation reform, Practice B 
produced Q2 hours of medical care for non-Medicaid patients and Q4 – Q2 hours for Medicaid 
patients.  And after NPC regulation reform, Practice B produces Q5 total medical care hours, 
more than Q4 before, adding only additional Medicaid patients (Q5 – Q4 hours) to its already 
split panel.  For both practices, the reduction of marginal costs of care leads to an increase in 
the number of hours allocated to Medicaid patients and either no change or an increase in total 
patient care hours—though total hours dedicated to patient care by physicians at the practice 
may decrease due to the substitution of NPC care—and hours allocated to non-Medicaid 
patients.  Notably, while the reform has led Practice A to begin accepting Medicaid patients 
when it did not before and Practice B only to accept additional Medicaid patients, it is likely 
both practices would indicate that they were “accepting new Medicaid patients” in surveys 
such as the Community Tracking Study Physician Survey. 
In states where NP practice regulations permit NPs to provide care unsupervised by 
physicians, the PCP practices that employ them still must choose the extent of physician 
supervision under which their NPs practice.  This choice often has implications for the practices’ 
marginal revenues as well as their marginal costs of care.  This is because supervised NPs bill 
Medicaid or another insurer “incident to” their physician supervisors, whereas unsupervised 
NPs bill for their own care directly, often for less than what a PCP would bill for the same 
service.  By law, Medicare pays for NP care billed directly 85% of what it pays for care billed 
incident to physicians, for example.  Such reimbursement ratios vary widely across private 
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insurers (Hansen-Turton et al., 2013; Yee et al., 2013),3 though many follow Medicare’s billing 
rules closely (Cassidy, 2013; Hansen-Turton et al., 2013), and fall between 75% and 100% across 
Medicaid programs (Naylor & Kurtzman, 2010; Kaiser Family Foundation, 2014).  Because of 
these reimbursement deficits, PCP practices may discourage their NP employees from billing 
directly (Iglehart, 2014). 
Moreover, private insurers may negotiate lower fees with PCP practices delivering a 
larger fraction of their care using NPCs if patients have a greater willingness to pay for physician 
care than they have for NPC care.  To the extent such negotiations are driven by the care 
preferences of privately insured patients, however, evidence suggests that the expressed 
preferences of patients between PCPs and NPCs tend to be flexible and context-dependent 
(Laurant et al., 2008; Dill et al., 2013). 
If profit-maximizing PCP practices face either of these two types of marginal revenue 
cuts when hiring new NPC staff or making more extensive use of existing NPC staff, which 
would shift the marginal revenue curve in Figure 2 inward, they will make NPC staffing decisions 
based on the net effects of decreased marginal revenues and decreased marginal costs.  
Whether these net effects are positive or negative can be expected to vary across practices.  As 
such, the marginal revenue reduction implications of PCP practices’ increased use of NPCs may 
moderate the effects of relaxed NPC regulations on practices’ Medicaid participation as a result 
of reductions in marginal costs of care.  Because most practices retain the authority to 
determine how much they supervise their NPs when the NPs deliver care and, thereby, how 
much revenue they receive for their NPs’ services—at least when they treat Medicaid and 
Medicare patients—I expect most PCP practices will not be deterred from making increased use 
of NPCs by any anticipated decreases in revenue. 
                                                     
 
 
3
 Hansen-Turton and colleagues (2013) reported that in 2012 primary care fees were routinely lower for NPs than 
for PCPs in 27 percent of managed care organizations (in which 74 percent of Medicaid beneficiaries were enrolled 
in 2011 [CMS, 2012]) and “sometimes lower” in another 46 percent. 
15 
 
Competition 
The second mechanism through which relaxed NPC regulations affect a PCP practice’s 
marginal revenue-marginal cost balance is by increasing competition with PCP practices.  The 
quality of NPC care is often cited by physician advocates as a reason for caution in NPC 
regulation debates.  However, the absence of evidence distinguishing physicians’ care quality 
from NPCs’ (Naylor & Kurtzman, 2010; Newhouse et al., 2012) has led others to assert that 
these advocates have been motivated rather by a desire to defend “turf” (i.e., patients) and 
“thwart competition” from NP-operated practices or PCP practices employing NPCs 
disproportionately (LeBuhn & Swankin, 2010; Donelan et al., 2013; Vestal, 2013).  In addition, 
retail clinics, where NPs are the main providers of care (Spetz et al., 2013), have expanded in 
states where regulations permit NPs full practice autonomy and permit direct reimbursement 
to retail clinics (Takach and Witgert, 2009).  That these retail clinics typically treated only 
privately insured and self-pay patients—those who could pay up front—throughout the late 
1990s and early 2000s (Pollack & Armstrong, 2009) further suggests PCP practices competed 
with NP-led practices for privately insured patients.  Thus, there is some evidence that such 
competition could be meaningful, though empirical evidence of it is mixed (Dueker et al., 2005; 
Pittman and Williams, 2012). 
In standard economic models of market competition, NPs would compete with PCPs to 
provide primary care services in states with relaxed NP practice regulations because of their 
similar service offerings.  (Since PAs do not practice independently, they may not compete with 
PCPs directly.)  Assuming the insurers cover NP services and that a substantial fraction of 
patients perceive PCPs and NPs to be substitutable under many circumstances (Laurant et al., 
2008; Dill et al., 2013), PCPs and NPs would compete first for privately insured patients, second 
for Medicare beneficiaries, and third for Medicaid patients because of the differences in 
average fee levels across payers. 
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In most markets, this introduction of competition as a result of relaxed NPC regulation 
would induce the practice’s non-Medicaid marginal revenue curve to shift to the left and to 
become more elastic.  In Figure 3 this is represented by the shift from MRp to MRp’.
4  Before 
NPC regulation reform, Practice A produced Q3 hours of medical care for non-Medicaid patients 
and zero hours for Medicaid patients.  After NPC regulation reform, Practice A produces Q2 
total medical care hours, fewer than Q3 before, and those hours are split between non-
Medicaid patients (Q1 hours) and a small number of Medicaid patients (Q2 – Q1 hours).  By 
contrast, both before and after NPC regulation reform, Practice B produced Q5 total hours of 
medical care.  Before NPC regulation reform, Practice B produced Q4 hours for non-Medicaid 
patients and Q5 – Q4 hours for Medicaid patients; after NPC regulation reform, Practice B 
produced Q1 hours for non-Medicaid patients and Q5 – Q1 hours for Medicaid patients, 
significantly increasing the Medicaid fraction of its panel.  For both practices, the introduction 
of competition leads to an increase in the number of hours allocated to Medicaid patients—and 
the probability of indicating they were accepting new Medicaid patients in order to maintain 
larger Medicaid patient panels—a reduction in hours allocated to non-Medicaid patients, and 
either no change or a decrease in total patient care hours. 
                                                     
 
 
4
 In Figure 3 I have depicted a shift in the non-Medicaid marginal revenue curve without any commensurate 
changes to the Medicaid marginal revenue curve.  It could be argued that the Medicaid market available to a given 
physician practice would shrink after the introduction of competition because some Medicaid patients would 
always seek care with the new entrant.  However, the Medicaid market may grow after the introduction of 
competition if previously uninsured individuals are more likely to take up Medicaid coverage in the presence of 
greater options for care.  While the direction of the net effect is unclear, neither meaningfully affects my 
predictions given the small numbers of physicians for whom the Medicaid market’s total patient capacity is a 
binding constraint.  In addition, as in Figure 2, Figure 3 assumes Practices A and B face the same marginal revenue 
curve MRp, though this need not be the case, for simplicity.   
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Figure 3: Relaxing NPC Regulations Leads to Increased Participation in Medicaid among Physician Practices, 
Competition Mechanism 
 
Notes: Figure draws on the model of Sloan, Mitchell, and Cromwell (1978) and the applications of Garthwaite 
(2012) and Wilk (2013). 
 
Medicaid Participation as Public Good Production 
An additional framework concerning the disposition of PCPs toward their role as safety 
net providers bears discussion in this context.  A strong health care safety net is generally 
considered to be a valuable public good.  However, physician practices providing safety net care 
face greater administrative and patient care burdens in Medicaid but do not internalize the full 
benefits of this service due to low reimbursement.  Thus, as in the classic economic model of 
public good provision (Olson, 1968; Marwell & Ames, 1981), the individual PCP practice’s 
incentive is to “free-ride” if it can be reasonably assured that the safety net will be adequately 
supported in its absence.5  Notably, experimental evidence from investigations of free-riding 
                                                     
 
 
5
 Persistent declines in Medicaid participation among physicians over the last few decades led Casalino (2013) to 
discuss the ethical and professional implications of such free-riding behavior among physicians in this context. 
P
h
ys
ic
ia
n
 P
ra
ct
ic
e 
R
ei
m
b
u
rs
em
en
t
Quantity of Medical Care (Hours)
18 
 
behavior routinely find that agents contribute more to public goods than is predicted by 
economic models strictly focusing on individual financial incentives (McGinty and Milam, 2013).  
This may explain in part why many physician practices participate in Medicaid despite low 
reimbursement levels. 
In the context of this study, the relaxation of NPC regulations may signify to PCP 
practices increases in the number of NPCs at hand with the opportunity to care for the 
Medicaid population.  Thus, the PCP practices may be assured that Medicaid beneficiaries’ 
access to care will not be significantly harmed by their decision to no longer accept Medicaid 
patients.  Furthermore, NPCs themselves may be less likely to free-ride than PCPs if patients 
sort to PCPs or NPCs by their willingness to pay or if PCPs enjoy other competitive advantages 
(e.g., patients prefer continuity of care with their PCPs to seeking care with new NPCs).  This 
intuition is consistent with recent evidence that retail clinics, which seldom participated in 
Medicaid during the late 1990s and early 2000s (Pollack & Armstrong, 2009), came to accept 
Medicaid patients as often as most PCP practices by 2008 (Rudavsky, Pollack, & Mehrotra, 
2009).  Thus relaxed NPC regulations and the presence of newly empowered NP-operated 
practices and retail clinics may cause PCP practices to withdraw from the Medicaid market; 
some practices may reallocate these patient care hours to non-Medicaid patients and also 
(because of non-Medicaid patients’ greater reimbursement) increase total patient care hours.  
These predictions contradict those of the standard competition mechanism described above.  It 
may be that PCP practices’ free-riding behavior negates any increase in Medicaid participation 
due to increased competition. 
Similarly, if physicians find caring for Medicaid beneficiaries distasteful or if they regard 
NPC care as sufficient to meet most Medicaid beneficiaries’ needs—particularly when NPC 
regulations are relaxed—they may rely on NPCs in their practices to treat these patients in their 
stead.  Specifically, they may hire additional NPCs, and they may transfer responsibility for 
Medicaid patients’ care to their NPC staff.  In this way, the predictions of the public good 
framework are consistent with those of the mechanism of reduced marginal costs. 
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Other Mechanisms 
The mechanisms described above represent short-run responses in partial equilibrium.  
There are other mechanisms consistent with general equilibrium or long-run responses to NPC 
regulation reforms that merit consideration.  Evaluating these mechanisms is beyond the scope 
of this study, though most can be investigated using available data. 
In general equilibrium, the decline in marginal costs associated with substituting NPCs 
for physicians may be partially offset if relaxed NPC regulations lead to increased NPC 
productivity and, thereby, commensurately increased NPC wages (Dueker et al., 2005; Kleiner & 
Park, 2010; Kleiner et al., 2014).  However, there are other general equilibrium effects at work 
that may dampen this offset.  Among these are NPC labor market frictions (e.g., opposing views 
of physicians and NPs regarding optimal NP utilization in primary care [Naylor & Kurtzman, 
2010; Donelan et al., 2013], leading to inertia in practices’ distribution of labor across NPCs and 
physicians), inelasticity in derived demand for NPC labor inputs, and increasing local supply of 
NPCs in response to relaxed NPC regulations (Sekscenski et al., 1994; Kuo et al., 2013).  The 
increasing local supply of NPCs may, in fact, lead to an increase in competitive effects if the 
associated perceived improvements in the probability of gaining access to primary care services 
in Medicaid persuade local Medicaid beneficiaries to increase their demand for visits or, 
perhaps, encourage a greater fraction of the local population to take up Medicaid insurance. 
There are other reasons to anticipate offsets to the predicted effects of reduced 
marginal costs.  These reductions may not be sufficient to entice PCPs to partner with NPs and 
increase their participation in Medicaid if the effects of competition include sizeable increases 
in the marginal costs of recruiting and treating patients.  Competition may also affect the mix of 
patients physician practices accept within the non-Medicaid or Medicaid markets.  If this mix 
becomes less favorable, PCPs may need to spend more time per patient or invest more in 
support staff (e.g., bilingual nurses), increasing their marginal costs of care without 
corresponding increases in revenue.  Such increases in costs may be observable through 
increases in relative value units of care expended per patient, minutes per visit, or referral rates 
to social workers or medical specialists.  In 2013 and 2014, when the ACA’s increase in fees for 
primary care services for Medicaid beneficiaries is in effect—notably, this fee increase is not 
20 
 
extended to NPCs (Cassidy, 2013)—the benefits of increasing participation in Medicaid through 
partnering with NPs are even less attractive.  Even if we assume these competitive effects are 
not as significant as the potential benefits in reduced marginal costs, however, relaxed NP 
practice regulations should still increase participation in Medicaid among those PCPs with the 
financial capacity to collaborate with NPs; these should include the larger, hospital-based, or 
medical school-affiliated practices, which Wilk (2013) identified as more likely to participate in 
Medicaid than their peers. 
 
Hypotheses 
When either PA or NP practice regulations are relaxed, PCP practices’ reduced marginal 
costs should lead to increased participation in Medicaid.  In addition, for NPs only, relaxed 
practice regulations may also induce increases in competition and further increase Medicaid 
participation relative to the effects of reduced marginal costs alone.  Alternately, relaxed NP 
practice regulations may enable free-riding behavior by PCP practices, reducing Medicaid 
participation relative to the effects of reduced marginal costs alone. 
It is not possible to separately estimate the effects of relaxed NP practice regulations 
attributable to reduced marginal costs of care because of the co-incidence of multiple resulting 
mechanisms and the limitations of available data.  However, if we assume the reduced marginal 
cost effects of relaxed NP and PA practice regulations are similar, the difference between 
observed effects of NP practice regulations and the observed effects of PA practice regulations 
may serve as an estimate of the net effects of competition and free-riding.  Therefore my 
principal hypotheses concerning the marginal effects of relaxing NPC regulations on Medicaid 
participation (M) for NPs (
𝑑𝑀
𝑑𝑁𝑃
) and PAs (
𝑑𝑀
𝑑𝑃𝐴
)—defined both in terms of the extensive margin 
(any versus none) and the intensive margin (fraction of all patient care)—are as stated below 
(H1-H2). 
H1. 
𝑑𝑀
𝑑𝑃𝐴
 > 0   (marginal cost reduction mechanism) 
H2. 
𝑑𝑀
𝑑𝑁𝑃
 > (<) 
𝑑𝑀
𝑑𝑃𝐴
   [competition dominates (is dominated by) free-riding] 
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I conduct three additional tests of the competition and free-riding mechanisms.  First, I 
examine effects of relaxing NP regulations on PCP practices’ non-Medicaid (nonM) and total 
(Tot) patient care.  As described above, reduced marginal costs may lead to increases in care for 
non-Medicaid patients and total patient care in PCP practices, though total patient care may 
also decline.  In addition, my framework suggests that increased competition may cause PCP 
practices to dedicate fewer hours to care for non-Medicaid patients and possibly fewer total 
hours of care, while free-riding behavior could bring about the opposite effects.  The testable 
hypotheses corresponding to these predictions parallel hypotheses H1-H2, as summarized 
below (H3-H6). 
H3. 
𝑑𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑀
𝑑𝑃𝐴
 > 0   (marginal cost reduction mechanism) 
H4. 
𝑑𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑀
𝑑𝑁𝑃
 < (>) 
𝑑𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑀
𝑑𝑃𝐴
    [competition dominates (is dominated by) free-riding] 
H5. 
𝑑𝑇𝑜𝑡
𝑑𝑃𝐴
 > 0   (marginal cost reduction mechanism) 
H6. 
𝑑𝑇𝑜𝑡
𝑑𝑁𝑃
 < (>) 
𝑑𝑇𝑜𝑡
𝑑𝑃𝐴
   [competition dominates (is dominated by) free-riding] 
Second, I explore whether the net effects of competition and free-riding may be 
stronger in states with lower fractions of Medicaid beneficiaries’ benefits administered through 
managed care organizations (lowMC) versus in states with greater fractions of Medicaid 
beneficiaries in managed care (hiMC).  This hypothesis is stated below (H7).  Managed care 
penetration may attenuate competition and free-riding effect estimates where managed care 
organizations do not credential NPs as primary care providers (Schiff, 2012); Hansen-Turton, 
Ritter, and Torgan (2008) found that only half of surveyed managed care organizations 
credentialed NPs as primary care providers in 2007.  Such policies effectively inhibit NPs from 
practicing independently and competing (or supporting the safety net in the place of PCPs), 
though PCP practices may still hire NPs and thereby reduce their average marginal costs of care 
in response to relaxed regulations. 
H7. |
𝑑(𝑀|𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑀𝐶)
𝑑𝑁𝑃
 – 
𝑑(𝑀|𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑀𝐶)
𝑑𝑃𝐴
| > |
𝑑(𝑀|ℎ𝑖𝑀𝐶)
𝑑𝑁𝑃
 – 
𝑑(𝑀|ℎ𝑖𝑀𝐶)
𝑑𝑃𝐴
| 
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Third, additional evidence of the competition and free-riding effects may be obtained 
comparing the effects of relaxing NP practice regulations on PCP practices’ Medicaid 
participation in markets with a higher density of NP-operated care facilities (hiNP), such as 
retail clinics, versus in markets with a lower density (lowNP).  I test this hypothesis as stated 
below (H8). 
H8. |
𝑑(𝑀|ℎ𝑖𝑁𝑃)
𝑑𝑁𝑃
 –  
𝑑(𝑀|ℎ𝑖𝑁𝑃)
𝑑𝑃𝐴
| > |
𝑑(𝑀|𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑁𝑃)
𝑑𝑁𝑃
 – 
𝑑(𝑀|𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑁𝑃)
𝑑𝑃𝐴
| 
Finally, I conduct an additional test of the reduced marginal cost hypothesis.  In the 
previous section, I asserted that the effects of relaxing NPC regulations may be different for 
different PCP practice types because their pre-reform marginal costs of care may have been 
sufficiently high or low that the reduction in marginal costs associated with relaxed NPC 
regulations would not affect the practice’s participation in Medicaid.  More specifically, the 
marginal costs of care for small one- and two-physician practices (Sm) may have been high 
enough that the potential reduction in marginal costs associated with greater use of NPCs post-
reform would be too small to effect change in their Medicaid participation (they may also have 
insufficient capital to hire additional NP or PA staff in response to changing NPC regulations).  
Similarly, the marginal costs of large, hospital-based and medical school-affiliated practices (Lg) 
may have been low enough that any potential reduction in marginal costs associated with 
greater use of NPCs post-reform would be immaterial.  Physician group practices with three or 
more physicians (Med), however, may be more responsive to changes in NPC regulations in 
terms of their use of PAs and NPs along both the intensive margin (greater use of employed NP 
and PA staff) and the extensive margin (hiring additional NPs or PAs). 
H9. 
𝑑(𝑀|𝑀𝑒𝑑)
𝑑𝑁𝑃
 > 
𝑑(𝑀|𝐿𝑔)
𝑑𝑁𝑃
 , 
𝑑(𝑀|𝑀𝑒𝑑)
𝑑𝑁𝑃
 > 
𝑑(𝑀|𝑆𝑚)
𝑑𝑁𝑃
 and 
𝑑(𝑀|𝑀𝑒𝑑)
𝑑𝑃𝐴
 > 
𝑑(𝑀|𝐿𝑔)
𝑑𝑃𝐴
 , 
𝑑(𝑀|𝑀𝑒𝑑)
𝑑𝑃𝐴
 > 
𝑑(𝑀|𝑆𝑚)
𝑑𝑃𝐴
 
 
Data and Empirical Framework 
To test these hypotheses, I employ empirical models that leverage the heterogeneity 
and variation within state regulatory environments over time as well as repeated surveys of 
physician practices to track how these environments affect PCP practices’ participation in 
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Medicaid.  My physician practice data are drawn from the Community Tracking Study Physician 
Surveys (CTSPS) from 1996-1997, 1998-1999, 2000-2001, and 2004-2005.  The CTSPS are 
nationally representative surveys of non-federal physicians’ practices directed by the Center for 
Studying Health System Change.  They contain information about the extent of physicians’ 
participation in Medicaid and a variety of other physician and practice characteristics.  Most of 
the survey items relevant to this study were retained in nearly identical formats across surveys; 
only minor recoding was needed to ensure regression variables were populated for all study 
observations.  The question “Is your practice accepting all, most, some, or no new patients who 
are insured through MEDICAID, including Medicaid managed care patients?,” is among the 
questions posed consistently across surveys.  To simplify my analyses and to mirror methods 
used in other studies of physician participation in Medicaid (Cunningham & O’Malley, 2009; 
Sommers, Paradise, & Miller, 2011; Wilk, 2013), I code this question by identifying physicians 
accepting some, most, or all new Medicaid patients as accepting new Medicaid patients and 
ignore the residual heterogeneity. 
For this study I also constructed a new data set of NPC regulation information gathered 
from a large collection of scholarly and proprietary resources.  For NP practice regulations, I 
capture information on the extent to which NPs may practice independently (set to 1 if only the 
state board of nursing has authority over any scope of practice restrictions and if there are “no 
statutory or regulatory requirements for physician collaboration, direction, or supervision” in 
NP practices, 0 otherwise) and the extent of their prescribing authority (set to 1 if NPs may 
prescribe “independent of any physician involvement,” 0 otherwise).  I record this 
information—derived from annual updates on legal and regulatory changes for NPs, state by 
state, by Pearson (1994-2004) and Phillips (2005-2008)—in separate variables but otherwise 
use the same approach as Kuo and colleagues (2013) to code NP practice regulations.  For PAs I 
capture information on scope of practice regulations, licensure requirements, physician 
supervision and proximity requirements, limitations of prescription authority, and maximum 
PA-to-physician ratios.  I identify these PA practice regulations using a collection of proprietary 
and publicly available reports produced by the American Academy of Physician Assistants 
(AAPA, 1994-2008).  Most of the PA regulation variables I include in my analyses have values set 
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to 1 for a given state-year if that state’s regulation was very unrestrictive and 0 otherwise.  
While this coding scheme fails to distinguish between states with moderately restrictive 
regulations and those with highly restrictive regulations, it simplifies my analysis and leverages 
findings that fully relaxed NPC regulations have the most significant effects on provider market 
outcomes (Kalist & Spurr, 2004; Kuo et al., 2013). 
I obtained average Medicaid-Medicare fee ratios for primary care services in 1993, 
1998, 2003, and 2008 from published estimates based on the Urban Institute Physician Survey 
(Norton 1995; Norton 1999; Zuckerman et al. 2004; Zuckerman, Williams, and Stockley 2009).6  
For years in which these fee data do not coincide with the physician surveys, I interpolated fee 
ratio values using exponential trending.  Use of alternative interpolation methods (e.g., linear 
trending, selection of the nearest available value) did not meaningfully affect my findings.  In 
addition, I drew several state- and county-level independent variables for each study year from 
the 2009-2010 update of the Area Health Resource File and Medicaid managed care enrollment 
fractions from Medicaid Analytic eXtract Chartbooks produced by the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services.  As with the Medicaid fee ratio data, these Medicaid managed care 
enrollment fractions data were interpolated for select years.  
My empirical framework employs difference-in-differences (DD) designs in regression 
models of Medicaid participation in PCP practices—defining PCPs to be physicians in family 
practice, general practice, internal medicine, or pediatrics.  For each PCP practice i in state s in 
the year t, I estimate logit models of two different measures of Medicaid participation Mist.  
These are an indicator of whether the PCP practice is currently accepting any new Medicaid 
patients (specified as described above) and a set of indicators of whether at least X percent of 
the practice’s revenue came from Medicaid, where X represents each integer value between 1 
and 100.  I present full model results for 2 percent, 5 percent, or 10 percent, as these 
correspond to the 10th, 25th, and 50th percentiles, respectively, among responses from PCP 
                                                     
 
 
6
 This study’s sample is limited to the 42 states (including the District of Columbia) for which average Medicaid-
Medicare fee ratios were available. 
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practices indicating they received non-zero revenues from Medicaid (Wilk, 2013).  The results of 
my models of accepting any new Medicaid patients are of interest because they can be 
compared to the findings of previous studies and because of policy interest in access to care for 
new Medicaid beneficiaries.  I include the revenue-based measures of Medicaid participation 
among my dependent variables so as to capture effects on the intensive margin of Medicaid 
participation (i.e., how significantly practices participate, conditional on treating at least some 
Medicaid patients) as well as the extensive margin (i.e., treating any new Medicaid patients, yes 
or no).  Conducting this analysis for the full range of percentages between 1 and 100 also 
supports the identification of any heterogeneous effects across the spectrum of Medicaid 
participation. 
In my tests of hypotheses H1 and H2, constructed using equation (1) below, my key 
independent variables are the vectors of NP and PA regulation variables NPst and PAst, 
respectively, which reflect the “POST × TREATMENT” term of interest in the classic DD design.  
Both NP and PA regulations are included in my main regressions; in supplemental analyses I 
include the NP and PA regulations in separate regressions, and I find that within-state changes 
in NP and PA regulations are not well correlated statistically.  To satisfy the remaining 
requirements of the DD design, these models also include sets of year fixed effects Yt for the 
“POST” term and state fixed effects Ss for the “TREATMENT” term.  The year fixed effects 
control for changes over time in national economic conditions and national health care market 
conditions (e.g., Medicare program characteristics, medical technology).  The state fixed 
effects, on the other hand, control for time-invariant differences across states in Medicaid 
eligibility criteria and benefit structures, provider integration, other laws and regulations (e.g., 
statutory limits on the ratio of fees paid to NPCs versus to physicians for the same services; Yee 
et al., 2013), and unmeasured socioeconomic factors. 
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑡 =  𝛬(𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑁𝑃𝑁𝑃𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽𝑃𝐴𝑃𝐴𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡 +  𝑆𝑠) +  𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡    (1) 
In these equations, 𝛬 represents the logistic function, the 𝛽𝑁𝑃 and 𝛽𝑃𝐴 terms represent 
my parameters of interest, and 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 represents the error term.  My control variables Cit are 
intended to include physician and practice characteristics that may change over time as well as 
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the most significant time-variant characteristics of state markets that may be coincident with 
changes in NPC practice regulations and affect Medicaid participation by PCP practices.  They 
account for differences across physicians in experience (year began practice), salary and 
practice ownership status, international medical graduate status, board certification status, and 
recent history of free care provision, differences across practices in practice type (solo or two-
physician practice, groups of three or more physicians [ref.], HMO, medical school-affiliated 
practice, hospital-based practice, or other) and capacity constraints (accepting most or all new 
Medicare and privately insured patients), and differences across counties in the densities of all 
physicians and general practice physicians, the demand for Medicaid primary  care services 
(total county population, number of Medicaid-eligible individuals per 1,000 population in the 
county, metro versus non-metro area, and county unemployment rate), the fraction of 
Medicaid beneficiaries enrolled in managed care in the state, and relative Medicaid 
reimbursement levels (average Medicaid-Medicare fee ratios for primary care services).  This 
full set of control variables is included in all principal and supplemental analyses except where 
specified or where select variables are dropped due to data limitations or multicollinearity. 
To test hypothesis H1, I review all individual PA practice regulation variables’ marginal 
effect estimates, and I also construct a χ2 test of the collective significance of these estimates.  
Likewise, for hypothesis H2, I construct a χ2 test of the difference between the marginal effects 
of NP practice regulations and PA practice regulations.  To further illustrate this difference, I 
predict for all PCP practices in my sample the effect of changing NPC regulations from those in a 
state with more restrictive NPC regulations to those in a state with less restrictive NPC 
regulations.  I identify these states by constructing an index of NPC regulation restrictiveness 
using all NP and PA regulations included in my regressions and the status of these regulations in 
each state as of 2008; I then selected randomly a state from among the ten least restrictive and 
a state from among the ten most restrictive for comparison. 
For my test of hypotheses H3 through H6, I introduce two new dependent variables.  For 
H3 and H4, my dependent variable is an indicator that the practice is accepting most or all new 
Medicare and privately insured patients nonMist (this variable is not included in the vector of 
controls C’it in these regressions), and for H5 and H6, my dependent variable is a measure of 
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total hours the surveyed PCP spent in patient care during the previous week Totist.  Information 
about the total number of hours the practice dedicates to patient care overall is not collected in 
the CTSPS.  These new regression equations (2) and (3), which parallel equation (1) in most 
respects, are presented below.  In addition, for hypotheses H4 and H6—as with hypothesis 
H2—I compare the magnitude of relaxed NP and PA regulations’ effects for states with 
regulations akin to those in a typical restrictive state and a typical unrestrictive state in 2008, as 
identified using the methodology described above.  
𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑡 =  𝛬(𝛽0 + 𝛽(𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑀)𝑁𝑃𝑁𝑃𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽(𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑀)𝑃𝐴𝑃𝐴𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽𝐶′𝐶′𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡 +  𝑆𝑠) + 𝜎𝑖𝑠𝑡 (2) 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡 =  𝛬(𝛽0 +  𝛽(𝑇𝑜𝑡)𝑁𝑃𝑁𝑃𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽(𝑇𝑜𝑡)𝑃𝐴𝑃𝐴𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡 +  𝑆𝑠) +  𝜔𝑖𝑠𝑡  (3) 
In my regressions for testing hypotheses H7, H8, and H9, I include terms interacting NPC 
regulations with other practice- or market-level variables of interest.  For my test of hypothesis 
H7, this variable of interest is the fraction of the state’s Medicaid beneficiaries enrolled in 
managed care.  This variable is not included among the model’s controls C’’it—see equation (4) 
below.  Specifically, for this hypothesis test I compare the marginal effect estimates of relaxing 
NPC regulations in states above and below the median of managed care penetration (34.5%), 
denoted hiMCst = 1. 
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑡 =  𝛬(𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑁𝑃𝑁𝑃𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽𝑃𝐴𝑃𝐴𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑀𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑀𝐶𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋×𝑁𝑃𝑋𝑖𝑡 × 𝑁𝑃𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑀𝐶×𝑃𝐴ℎ𝑖𝑀𝐶𝑠𝑡 ×
𝑃𝐴𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽𝐶′′𝐶′′𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡 +  𝑆𝑠) +  𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡             (4) 
For my test of hypothesis H8, my variable of interest is a measure of the local density of 
NP-operated care facilities relative to the population.  This measure is derived from a 2008 
survey of the distribution of retail clinics, a commonly NP-led primary care practice structure, 
conducted by Rudavsky, Pollack, and Mehrotra (2009) and 2008 population estimates from the 
U.S. Census.  Using their data, I identify select Combined Statistical Areas and Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas in Minnesota (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Missouri (Kansas City), Illinois (Chicago), 
Texas (Houston), Florida (Miami, Orlando, Tampa), Georgia (Atlanta), North Carolina 
(Charlotte), Ohio (Columbus, Cleveland), Pennsylvania (Pittsburgh), Tennessee (Nashville), 
Wisconsin (Milwaukee), and the District of Columbia to be “high-NP” markets.  These are 
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markets where competition or free-riding effects of relaxed NP regulations are most likely to be 
observed.  Figure 4, reprinted from the work of Rudavsky, Pollack, and Mehrotra (2009), gives 
some sense as to where NP retail clinics had their largest market footprints in 2008.  In 
particular, I compare estimated marginal effects in markets with high retail clinic density—
higher retail clinic count per resident than the national average among markets with at least 
one retail clinic, denoted hiNPit = 1—with reference estimates.  Because my identifying 
variation is strictly cross-sectional in this case, I do not include year fixed effects in this model – 
see equation (5) below. 
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑡 =  𝛬(𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑁𝑃𝑁𝑃𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽𝑃𝐴𝑃𝐴𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑁𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑁𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑁𝑃×𝑁𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑁𝑃𝑖𝑡 × 𝑁𝑃𝑠𝑡 +
𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑁𝑃×𝑃𝐴ℎ𝑖𝑁𝑃𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝐴𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑆𝑠) + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡           (5) 
Figure 4: Distribution of Retail Clinics in the Continental United States, 2008 
 
Source: Rudavksy, Pollack, and Mehrotra, 2009. 
Finally, to test hypothesis H9, my variables of interest are indicators of small practice 
size (solo or two-physician practice) and large practice size (medical school-affiliated or 
hospital-based practice), Smit and Lgit, respectively.  In this model (equation [6] below, in which 
NPCst replaces NPst + PAst to simplify notation), my set of controls C’’’it excludes corresponding 
indicators of practice type.  Using this model’s results, I compare marginal effect estimates for 
relaxed NPC regulations in small, medium-sized (reference group), and large practices. 
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𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑡 =  𝛬(𝛽0 +  𝛽𝑁𝑃𝐶𝑁𝑃𝐶𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽𝑆𝑚𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽𝐿𝑔𝐿𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑆𝑚×𝑁𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑡 × 𝑁𝑃𝐶𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝐿𝑔×𝑁𝑃𝐶𝐿𝑔𝑖𝑡 ×
𝑁𝑃𝐶𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽𝐶′′′𝐶′′′𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡 + 𝑆𝑠) +  𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡            (6) 
I cluster standard errors at the state level in all analyses and employ the Stata command 
margins for estimating marginal effects, following the approach described by Karaca-Mandic, 
Norton, and Dowd (2012) where my specification includes interaction effects.  I conduct my 
analyses using Stata/IC 13.1 (StataCorp, 2013).  This study was deemed IRB-exempt by the 
University of Michigan Health Sciences and Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board. 
 
Results 
I identify 24,299 PCP practice-year records in the CTSPS data in the 42 states for which 
primary care fee data are available.  Of these, 16,528 pertain to 6,222 unique practices (40 
states) for which more than one complete survey was collected across CTSPS survey waves and 
complete county- and state-level data are available.  Descriptive statistics from the 1996-1997 
surveys and 2004-2005 surveys for these practices and the respondent physicians are 
presented in Table 1 and Table 2.  Overall, 77.1% of my sample’s physician practices accepted at 
least some new Medicaid patients in the 1996-1997 survey versus 70.6% of physician practices 
in the 2004-2005 survey.  In 1996, 81.4% derived at least 2% of practice revenues from 
Medicaid, 74.0% derived at least 5% of practice revenues from Medicaid, and 54.6% derived at 
least 10% of practice revenues from Medicaid, versus 79.0%, 72.2%, and 56.6%, respectively, in 
2004.  In both surveys, the majority of physician respondents were non-salaried, full or part 
owners of their practices, board certified, and practicing in small or moderate-sized physician 
group practices.  Market-level characteristics of these physicians and their practices do not 
appear to change considerably between the 1996 and 2004 survey waves. 
Across the states where these samples of physicians practice, there is considerable 
heterogeneity in NP and, in particular, PA practice regulations over time.  The differences 
between the regulation statistics for the 1996 and 2004 surveys reflects further heterogeneity 
in NPC regulations over time within states as well as, to a lesser degree, in the mix of physicians 
surveyed.  As examples, state board licensure was required for PAs to practice in the states 
30 
 
where 47.8% of sample PCPs practiced in 1996 versus 72.9% in 2004, and the state allowed 
practice sites to determine PAs’ scope of practice limitations (rather than they themselves 
establishing such constraints) where 40.8% of sample PCPs practiced in 1996 versus 51.7% in 
2004.  
Information about the complete practice sample’s Medicaid revenue fractions is 
presented in Figure 5.  The data are presented as a reverse cumulative distribution plot so as to 
indicate clearly, for each threshold percent value, the fraction of sample practices receiving at 
least as much of their revenue from Medicaid; in this way the figure reflects my models’ 
dependent variables.  The stair-step structure of this figure, especially rigid above 9 percent of 
revenue from Medicaid, reflects rounding by respondents.  Because the distribution is highly 
skewed—less than 20 percent of practices report receiving more than 25 percent of their 
revenues from Medicaid—few of my models of practices receiving large fractions of their 
revenues from Medicaid yield precise estimates.  Indeed, models cannot be estimated for 
practices receiving more than 90 percent of their revenue from Medicaid, because such 
practices are too few in my sample.  This portion of the distribution is excluded from the figure. 
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Table 1: Final Sample Physician and Practice Descriptive Statistics, 1996 and 2004 CTSPS Survey Waves – Select 
Dependent and Independent Variables 
   
 
Variable Mean/% (SD) Mean/% (SD)
Dependent Variables
Accepting new Medicaid patients 77.1% (42.1%) 70.6% (45.6%)
≥ 2% Medicaid revenues 81.4% (38.9%) 79.0% (40.7%)
≥ 5% Medicaid revenues 74.0% (43.8%) 72.2% (44.8%)
≥ 10% Medicaid revenues 54.6% (49.8%) 56.6% (49.6%)
Physician Assistant Practice Regulations
Practice requires l icense 47.8% (50.0%) 72.9% (44.4%)
Site determines scope of practice 40.8% (49.2%) 51.7% (50.0%)
No restrictions on prescribing 15.4% (36.1%) 19.9% (39.9%)
MD co-signature not required 7.6% (26.6%) 13.7% (34.4%)
MD proximity req. not specified 27.1% (44.4%) 20.6% (40.4%)
No restrictions on PA/MD ratios 1.4% (11.9%) 6.9% (25.4%)
Nurse Practitioner Practice Regulations
MD supervision not required 35.5% (47.8%) 27.9% (44.8%)
Full prescription authority 11.7% (32.1%) 8.1% (27.2%)
N 3,609 2,147
Unique Physicians - 
1996-1997 Survey
Unique Physicians - 
2004-2005 Survey
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Table 2: Final Sample Physician and Practice Descriptive Statistics, 1996 and 2004 CTSPS Survey Waves – Control 
Variables 
 
Variable Mean/% (SD) Mean/% (SD)
Physician-level controls
Year began practice 1,961.2 (10.5) 1,965.8 (9.9)
Salaried 35.4% (47.8%) 29.6% (45.7%)
Full or part owner of practice 51.6% (50.0%) 55.3% (49.7%)
International medical graduate 21.0% (40.8%) 22.2% (41.5%)
Not board certified 19.3% (39.5%) 12.8% (33.4%)
Hours free care previous month (/10) 0.6 (1.3) 0.6 (1.3)
Practice-level controls
1-2 MD practice 35.6% (47.9%) 38.0% (48.6%)
3+ MD group practice (ref.) 25.4% (43.5%) 26.4% (44.1%)
HMO 9.5% (29.3%) 4.9% (21.6%)
Medical school-affil iated 5.0% (21.7%) 6.1% (23.9%)
Hospital based 14.0% (34.8%) 12.1% (32.6%)
Other practice type 10.5% (30.7%) 12.6% (33.2%)
Accepting most or all  Medicare and 
privately insured patients 64.2% (48.0%) 63.9% (48.1%)
Market-level controls
General practitioner density‡ 0.2 (0.1) 0.3 (0.1)
Physician density‡ 3.1 (1.9) 3.2 (2.0)
Population‡ 988.0 (1328.6) 1,088.9 (1765.1)
Medicaid eligibles density‡ 20.6 (7.9) 19.0 (8.3)
Non-metropolitan area 8.6% (28.1%) 13.1% (33.8%)
Unemployment rate 5.0% (1.9%) 5.5% (1.6%)
Fraction of Medicaid beneficiaries 
enrolled in managed care 36.7% (21.5%) 39.8% (24.7%)
Medicaid/Medicare primary care 
fee ratio 64.0% (21.4%) 63.4% (15.0%)
In market with high NP-led practice 
density in 2008 21.1% (40.8%) 21.2% (40.9%)
N 3,609 2,147
‡ Per 1,000 population
Unique Physicians - 
1996-1997 Survey
Unique Physicians - 
2004-2005 Survey
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Figure 5: Revenue from Medicaid Among Sample PCP Practices, 1996-2004, Reverse Cumulative Distribution Plot 
    
Table 3 provides additional summary information regarding the changes between CTSPS 
data years in the select NPC regulation variables included in my regression models.  Notably, 
there are substantial numbers of state-years in which most NP and PA practice regulation 
variables change versus previous years, changes from which I derive my identifying variation.  
Only the variable for NP full prescription authority switches between years for fewer than seven 
states (two states: Wisconsin and Wyoming).  The results for full prescription authority for NPs, 
therefore, may be less generalizable than those I generate for other NPC regulations. 
This table also highlights that the NPC regulatory changes providing my study’s 
identifying variation include both changes to lessen the restrictiveness of regulations and 
changes to tighten regulations.  These changes to tighten regulations comprise a distinct 
minority (26% overall, 37% excluding state licensure requirements for PAs) of the regulatory 
changes I observe during the study period.  Still, that my identifying variation comes from both 
forms of regulatory changes alleviates some concerns of endogeneity in my analyses due to the 
fact that efforts to relax regulations may be stronger in states where access to care has 
worsened.  This concern is also partly addressed through the inclusion of physician and 
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Medicaid-eligible population density measures and an indicator of non-metropolitan areas 
among my models’ control variables. 
Table 3: State-level Summary of Changes in NPC Regulations, 1996-2004 
 
Note: Table reflects policies in all fifty states and the District of Columbia, more states than are reflected in my 
analytic sample.  “Practice requires license” is included as a fully unrestrictive regulatory requirement, relative to 
reference categories “practice requires certification” and “practice requires registration,” because of the increased 
regulatory and subjective (for patients) legitimacy of the authority of licensed health care professionals as 
compared to unlicensed health care professionals.  The AAPA observes that in most states the requirements 
imposed on PAs to obtain licensure, relative to the requirements imposed for obtaining certification or 
registration, are only nominally different. 
Select analytic results for hypotheses H1 and H2 are presented in Table 4.7  In this table I 
include, for each dependent variable, marginal effect estimates for NPC regulations as well as 
predicted probabilities generated from these marginal effect estimates.  These predicted 
probability estimates reflect Medicaid participation levels if the state regulations for all 
physician practices were exchanged for those in a typical more restrictive state and those in a 
typical less restrictive state.  I then estimate the difference between these predicted 
probabilities and calculate a Wald statistic to determine the difference’s statistical significance. 
                                                     
 
 
7
 In Table 4 and subsequent figures, results are reported for NPC regulation changes only.  Results for these 
models’ full sets of covariates are available upon request. 
Law or Regulation
# States,
1996
# States,
1998
# States,
2000
# States,
2004
Switch to
Less Rest.
Switch to
More Rest.
Physician Assistants
Practice requires license 22 29 40 44 22 0
Site determines scope of practice 25 26 27 29 7 3
No restrictions on prescribing 8 9 14 17 10 1
MD co-signature not required 9 8 9 11 5 3
MD proximity req. not specified 6 6 6 6 3 3
No restrictions on PA/MD ratio 8 6 5 6 3 5
Nurse Practitioners
MD supervision not required 23 23 23 24 4 3
Full prescription authority 12 12 13 12 1 1
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Table 4: Medicaid Participation and the Marginal Effects of Changes in Non-Physician Clinician Regulations 
   
*** p < 0.01.  ** p < 0.05.  * p < 0.10.  † Select states' observations dropped due to collinearity in fixed effects.  
Note: In addition to NPC regulations, model covariates include physician-level (e.g., year began practice), practice-
level (e.g., practice type), and market-level (e.g., Medicaid relative reimbursement) controls, state fixed effects, 
and year fixed effects. 
Across all individual PA practice regulations and all models, marginal effect estimates 
are typically small, and only a few are statistically significant.  One of these suggests that 
relaxing restrictions on PAs’ prescribing authority leads to a 3.5 percentage point increase in the 
probability a PCP practice accepts new Medicaid patients, and another suggests that relaxing 
co-signature requirements for PAs’ physician supervisors reduces the probability a PCP practice 
receives at least 2% of its revenues from Medicaid by 3.3 percentage points.  Overall, relaxing 
PA regulations from those in a typical more restrictive state to those in a typical less restrictive 
state increases the probability of accepting new Medicaid patients by 4.4 percentage points; 
Dependent Variable
Marginal Effect / Pred. Prob. Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE
Physician Assistant Practice Regulations
Practice requires l icense 0.001 0.020 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.023 0.019 0.025
Site determines scope of practice -0.026 0.025 -0.026 0.021 -0.029 0.046 -0.024 0.031
No restrictions on prescribing 0.035 0.021* 0.001 0.022 -0.005 0.031 -0.007 0.034
MD co-signature not required -0.019 0.024 -0.033 0.019* -0.013 0.027 -0.020 0.026
MD proximity req. not specified 0.020 0.016 0.004 0.019 0.029 0.043 -0.036 0.041
No restrictions on PA/MD ratios 0.026 0.018 -0.004 0.013 0.000 0.023 0.004 0.035
Nurse Practitioner Practice Regulations
MD supervision not required -0.029 0.026 -0.065 0.024*** -0.051 0.034 0.011 0.062
Full prescription authority 0.013 0.011 -0.114 0.016*** -0.038 0.014*** 0.086 0.013***
Predicted Probabilities - PA Regulations
Typical, more restrictive state 0.766 0.018 0.835 0.015 0.755 0.034 0.571 0.022
Typical, less restrictive state 0.810 0.023 0.830 0.023 0.766 0.041 0.568 0.033
Difference (less - more) 0.044 * -0.005 0.012 -0.003
Predicted Probabilities - NP Regulations
Typical, more restrictive state 0.802 0.009 0.872 0.007 0.792 0.011 0.552 0.022
Typical, less restrictive state 0.786 0.023 0.675 0.034 0.700 0.030 0.649 0.041
Difference (less - more) -0.016 -0.197 *** -0.092 *** 0.096 **
Predicted Probabilities - All NPC Regulations
Typical, more restrictive state 0.775 0.023 0.865 0.016 0.776 0.038 0.558 0.033
Typical, less restrictive state 0.803 0.034 0.654 0.046 0.694 0.056 0.650 0.053
Difference (less - more) 0.028 -0.211 *** -0.082 0.093 *
N observations† 16,495 16,445 16,466 16,514
Model pseudo-r2 0.146 0.128 0.122 0.119
Accepting new 
Medicaid patients
≥ 2% Medicaid 
revenues
≥ 5% Medicaid 
revenues
≥ 10% Medicaid 
revenues
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this modest, positive effect is driven principally by the positive effect I estimate for relaxing 
restrictions on PA prescribing authority.  Overall effects on other measures of Medicaid 
participation are not statistically significant.  These results suggest that relaxing PA regulations 
may have a small, positive effect on PCP practices’ willingness to accept new Medicaid patients 
(consistent with hypothesis H1) but little effect on the composition of PCP practices’ patient 
panels overall. 
Marginal effects for both individual NP practice regulations are not statistically 
significant for the outcome of accepting new Medicaid patients; this may reflect the offsetting 
small effects of reduced marginal costs and free-riding behavior (or heterogeneous responses 
across physician practices), though the difference between the estimated effects for relaxed NP 
regulations and relaxed PA regulations is not statistically significantly different from zero at 
conventional levels (p = 0.43).  However these two regulations’ marginal effect estimates are 
strongly statistically significant and negative for the outcome of receiving at least 2% of practice 
revenues from Medicaid.  Switching from a state regulation requiring physician supervision for 
NPs to a regulation that does not require such supervision reduces the probability a PCP 
practice receives at least 2% of its practice revenues from Medicaid by 6.5 percentage points, 
for example.  The combined effect of these estimates—a reduction of 19.7 percentage points 
(versus a sample mean of 79.0% in 2004-2005) in the probability a PCP practice receives at least 
2% of its revenues from Medicaid—is also significantly lower than the net estimated effect of 
relaxed PA regulations (p = 0.01), strongly indicative of free-riding behavior among some PCP 
practices (i.e., contrary to the competition-driven hypothesis H2 as stated). 
For the outcomes of receiving at least 5% or 10% of practice revenues from Medicaid, 
marginal effect estimates are not statistically significant for physician supervision regulations 
but significant and negative and significant and positive, respectively, for full prescription 
authority regulations.  I estimate a smaller negative combined effect (9.2 percentage points) on 
the probability a practice receives at least 5% of its revenue from Medicaid and a positive 
combined effect (9.6 percentage points) on the probability a practice receives at least 10% of its 
revenue from Medicaid.  The differences in predicted probabilities between more restrictive 
regulatory environments and less restrictive regulatory environments for all NPC regulations 
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follow the same pattern across dependent variables.  Likewise, the differences between the 
effects of relaxing NP regulations and the effects of relaxing PA regulations change in sign and 
significance across dependent variables. 
Complete results for the effects of different regulatory environments for NPCs on 
practice revenues from Medicaid are presented in Figure 6.  Predicted fractions of practices 
exceeding each Medicaid revenue percentage threshold, generated using NPC regulations from 
a typical more restrictive state or from a typical less restrictive state, are presented separately 
with 95% confidence intervals.  For thresholds between 1% and 5% of practice revenue from 
Medicaid, the predicted fraction of practices reporting at least as much Medicaid revenue is 
significantly greater when NPC regulations are more restrictive.  At every threshold value above 
this range, the predicted fraction of practices reporting at least as much Medicaid revenue is 
significantly greater when NPC regulations are less restrictive, or there is no statistically 
significant difference.  The largest negative effect of relaxing NPC regulations on practice 
revenues from Medicaid is observed at the 2% threshold (see Table 4), and the largest positive 
effects—approximately 20 percentage point increases in the predicted probability that a 
practice receives at least as much revenue from Medicaid—are observed for thresholds 
between 25% and 29% of practice revenue from Medicaid. 
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Figure 6: Predicted Fractions of Practices Reporting Receipt of Medicaid Revenue above Different Levels, More 
Restrictive State NPC Regulations versus Less Restrictive State NPC Regulations 
 
The heterogeneity of these estimates across models may reflect heterogeneous effects 
across practice types.  Practices participating more marginally in Medicaid (e.g., 1 to 5% of 
practice revenues from Medicaid) may be more likely to withdraw from Medicaid participation 
and exhibit free-riding behavior than practices more committed to serving the Medicaid 
population.  By contrast, larger practices (e.g., FQHCs, medical school-affiliated practices, and 
HMOs) that serve the Medicaid population as part of their missions and that make more regular 
use of NPCs may experience greater reduced marginal cost effects and exhibit less free-riding 
behavior.  I explore this heterogeneity further in my test of hypothesis H9 below. 
Overall, the magnitudes of my effect estimates for individual regulations range from 
zero to 11.4 percentage points, though most of these individual effect estimates have 
magnitudes below four percentage points.  Should a state relax multiple, selectively-chosen 
NPC regulations jointly, it may realize a larger net increase in physician practices’ participation 
in Medicaid, depending on the state’s pre-reform regulatory environment.  These effect 
estimates are comparable to the estimated effects of large increases in Medicaid fees, such as 
those provided for through the ACA’s “fee bump”: Wilk (2013) found that these increases in 
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fees would be associated with an increase in the proportion of physician practices accepting 
new Medicaid patients of about 5.3 percentage points.  However, while the costs to states of 
relaxing NPC regulations can be minimal, the costs of maintaining or re-instituting such large 
fee increases may be prohibitive.  Thus my analyses suggest that many states’ NPC regulations 
offer a cost-effective opportunity to increase access to primary care services for Medicaid 
beneficiaries.  
In supplemental analyses in which I include only NP practice regulations or only PA 
practice regulations in my models, I obtain estimates of greater statistical significance and 
magnitude in both NP-focused and PA-focused regressions.  This represents evidence that the 
effects of relaxed NP and PA regulations are not independent and are achieved through similar 
mechanisms (e.g., reduced marginal costs of care). 
The results of my tests of hypotheses H3 through H6—regarding the relationships 
between NPC regulations and practices’ willingness to accept new non-Medicaid (Medicare or 
privately insured, principally) patients as well as total patient care—are summarized in Table 5.  
In the model of access for non-Medicaid patients, marginal effects for most PA regulations are 
estimated to be positive, and a χ2-test rejects the joint hypothesis that all of these estimates 
equal zero (p < 0.01), consistent with hypothesis H3 that reduced marginal costs of care may 
lead PCP practices to increase access for non-Medicaid patients.  However, since none of these 
individual regulation estimates is statistically significant, relaxed PA regulations may not 
strongly affect most PCP practices’ capacity to treat non-Medicaid patients.  (This is also 
consistent with my theoretical framework, which suggests only some physician practices would 
increase their hours allocated to non-Medicaid patients when PA regulations are relaxed.)  My 
estimates of relaxed PA regulations’ effects on the physician respondent’s total patient care 
hours are not statistically significant, both individually and in aggregate (p = 0.51), thus failing to 
support hypothesis H5.  This suggests that any increases in the use of PA staff in response to 
relaxed PA regulations may serve more to increase the practice’s overall capacity rather than to 
substitute for physician care. 
My estimates of the marginal effects of relaxed physician supervision regulations for 
NPs are not statistically significant, but my estimates of the marginal effects of relaxed NP 
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prescription authority regulations are well-aligned with the predictions of free-riding behavior 
by PCP practices.  In particular, when these prescription authority regulations are relaxed, the 
practice’s probability of accepting new non-Medicaid patients increases 15.6 percentage points, 
a large effect, while total patient care delivered falls approximately 1.1 hours.  These results are 
consistent with the hypothesis of free-riding behavior and contradict the competition 
hypothesis.  However, while the net effect of relaxing both regulations on non-Medicaid patient 
access is positive and statistically significant (p < 0.01), the net effect on total patient care hours 
is not statistically different from zero (p = 0.77) because of the large and positive (though 
imprecise) estimate of the effect of relaxed supervision regulations.  Additionally, the 
differences between the NP regulations’ effects and the PA regulations’ effects on both non-
Medicaid access and total patient care are not distinguishable from zero (p = 0.55 and p = 0.71, 
respectively).  These results appear to be a consequence of imprecise estimates of the effects 
of relaxed PA regulations in these regressions.  Because of these imprecise estimates, my tests 
of hypotheses H4 and H6 yield only suggestive evidence of free-riding behavior among PCP 
practices. 
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Table 5: Marginal Effects of Relaxed NPC Regulations on Care for Non-Medicaid Patients and Total Patient Care 
 
*** p < 0.01.  ** p < 0.05.  * p < 0.10.  † Select states' observations dropped due to collinearity in fixed effects.  
Note: In addition to NPC regulations, model covariates include physician-level (e.g., year began practice), practice-
level (e.g., practice type), and market-level (e.g., Medicaid relative reimbursement) controls, state fixed effects, 
and year fixed effects. 
The full results of my tests of hypothesis H7 and H9 are presented in the Chapter One 
Appendix.  Through my test of H7, I find evidence consistent with my hypothesis that 
competition and free-riding effects may be stronger in states with lower fractions of Medicaid 
beneficiaries enrolled in managed care plans.  Specifically, these results suggest that the effects 
of free-riding behavior outstrip competition effects and that this difference is particularly great 
in states with lower Medicaid managed care penetration.  My analyses of H9 offer evidence 
that the benefits of reduced marginal costs of care associated with relaxed PA practice 
regulations are greater in moderate-sized physician practices with three or more physicians 
than in larger hospital-based or medical school-affiliated practices (which may, themselves, 
already benefit from low marginal costs of care) or smaller practices (for whom the benefits 
may be too small to bring about meaningful changes in Medicaid participation). 
Marginal Effect / Pred. Prob. Est. SE Est. SE
Physician Assistant Practice Regulations
Practice requires l icense 0.000 0.021 -0.520 0.392
Site determines scope of practice 0.021 0.039 1.038 0.703
No restrictions on prescribing 0.056 0.038 -0.072 0.631
MD co-signature not required 0.034 0.035 -0.255 0.868
MD proximity req. not specified -0.032 0.045 1.327 0.913
No restrictions on PA/MD ratios 0.029 0.043 -0.146 0.459
Nurse Practitioner Practice Regulations
MD supervision not required 0.021 0.050 1.497 1.094
Full prescription authority 0.156 0.013*** -1.072 0.402**
Predicted Probabilities - All NPC Regulations
Typical, more restrictive state 0.613 0.038 43.182 0.655
Typical, less restrictive state 0.832 0.032 42.242 1.229
Difference (less - more) 0.218 *** -0.940
N observations† 16,513 16,528
Model pseudo-r2 0.037 0.101
Accepting most new 
Medicare, privately 
insured patients
Total patient care 
hours during 
previous week
Dependent Variable
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Finally, additional evidence of the effects of free-riding behavior emerges in my analysis 
of hypothesis H8, in which I examine how the effects of relaxed NPC regulations differed in 
areas where retail clinics, which are often NP-led, would make significant inroads by 2008.  As 
shown in Table 6, my effect estimates for relaxed NP practice regulations—particularly 
physician supervision regulations—are lower and statistically significant in these high-NP-led 
markets.  This is consistent with predictions of free-riding behavior by PCP practices where NP-
led practices become a particularly important fixture in the local primary care market. 
Table 6: Accepting New Medicaid Patients, Marginal Effects of NPC Regulations in Markets with Significant Retail 
Clinic Penetration in 2008 
 
*** p < 0.01.  ** p < 0.05.  * p < 0.10.  n = 16,495.  Note: In addition to NP regulations, model covariates include 
physician-level (e.g., year began practice), practice-level (e.g., practice type), and market-level (e.g., Medicaid 
relative reimbursement) controls, state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. 
 
Limitations 
My study has several limitations of note.  Two concern the structure of physicians’ and 
physician practices’ optimization functions.  First, physician practices may maximize more than 
just profits—several economic models hold that physicians also maximize quality and the 
benefit they provide to their patients and the community.  My data do not support a nuanced 
examination of continuity of care, any disparities in quality of care between PCPs and NPCs, or 
practices’ effectiveness as managers of NPC staff.  Should a practice incorporate these issues 
into their decision processes in ways that evolve over time, my estimates of reduced marginal 
cost effects may be attenuated. 
Similarly, PCP practices may respond to changes in NPC regulations by altering their 
quality production (e.g., time spent with patients per visit) as well as their patient mix.  PCP 
practice investments in non-reimbursed patient care (e.g., phone calls, patient education, care 
coordination), for example, may meaningfully affect patient outcomes, and they may change as 
Marginal Effect Est. SE Est. SE
Nurse Practitioner Practice Regulations
MD supervision not required -0.014 0.024 -0.205 0.040***
Full prescription authority -0.004 0.050 0.008 0.050
Reference markets
High NP-led practice 
density, 2008
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the practice adjusts to new mixes of staff and staff responsibilities.  However, they cannot be 
measured using CTSPS or other like survey data sets.  Garthwaite (2012) sought to draw 
inferences about the quality of care delivered to patients based on aggregate measures of time 
spent delivering medical care.  Thus, while I have not explicitly modeled this in the theoretical 
framework, one could interpret the results of my models of total patient care to indicate that 
relaxed NP regulations cause PCP practices to cut back on the amount of time they spend per 
patient rather than the number of patients they treat overall.  While time per patient may be 
an important measure for capturing patients’ care experiences and may be related to other 
measures of clinical quality, it would be more valuable to examine patient outcomes or the 
quality of care processes in this research context. 
It is a common criticism of the literature on physician participation in Medicaid that 
researchers use simplistic dependent variables (e.g., accepting any new Medicaid patients: yes 
or no), such as I use in this paper.  Among the limitations of these measures is that they do not 
reflect well the real policy concern of Medicaid beneficiaries’ access to care or questions of 
Medicaid care utilization (Aliu et al., 2014).  Importantly, my study does not capture whether, 
when PCP practices withdraw from the Medicaid market, Medicaid patients are able to access 
primary care in other ambulatory settings (e.g., NP-led practices).  Richards and Polsky (2014) 
contribute in this area through their simulated patient studies, described above, though their 
study has other limitations.  Nevertheless, the benefits of the dependent variables I use include 
comparability with previous estimates, consistency with my physician-oriented theoretical 
framework, and the capacity to examine both extensive and intensive margins of PCP practice 
responses to policy changes.  Still, given that Richards and Polsky likewise examine the effects 
of NP and PA practice regulations on access in Medicaid using different dependent variables, it 
may be said this paper and theirs are complementary.  
Because my results are derived from a difference-in-differences design at the state level, 
I am effectively controlling for fixed differences across states that would affect physician 
participation in Medicaid.  This design does not, by its structure, control for heterogeneity in 
market trends or asynchronous policy changes (other than NPC regulations) across states, 
which could bias my results.  However, it is unlikely that such biases are significant in my results 
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because I include among my empirical models’ controls measures of the most important factors 
that changed significantly, varied across states, and could have affected PCP practices’ 
participation in Medicaid during the study period.  Among these measures are the relative 
generosity of Medicaid fees for primary care services (Wilk, 2013), the fraction of Medicaid 
beneficiaries enrolled in managed care (Adams & Herring, 2008), the mix of settings in which 
primary care was delivered (Wilk, 2013), and key drivers of demand for primary care services in 
Medicaid such as the local density of Medicaid-eligible individuals and unemployment levels.  
Moreover, in a series of falsification tests, I find no statistically significant effects of changes in 
state NPC practice regulations two years after CTSPS data years on PCP practices’ reported 
participation in Medicaid.  This suggests that my principal findings are not spurious and that 
they are not a consequence of other secular, state-specific trends. 
One potential data-related limitation of my study is that, due to incomplete source data, 
I am not able to capture state- or county-level variation in the number of PAs or NPs in the 
observed PCPs’ markets and, in particular, the mix of these PAs or NPs’ specialties over time.  
This may be of concern because, since the mid-1990s, shifting incentives have led NPs and PAs 
to practice in primary care at a declining rate (Hooker & Everett, 2012).  It may be that in some 
markets, unmeasured factors (e.g., inhospitable physician attitudes toward NPs and PAs) drive 
NPCs into or out of primary care in ways that affect PCPs’ decisions to participate in Medicaid.  
Since the general trends have been toward lessening restrictions in NPC regulations and fewer 
NPCs practicing in primary care, it is likely that any associated bias would attenuate my 
estimates. 
Data limitations also deter me from testing the full set of predictions emerging from my 
theoretical models of reduced marginal costs and competition and thereby offering further 
evidence supporting or controverting them.  In particular, these models predict that relaxed 
NPC regulations lead to reduced care prices for privately insured patients; prices are not 
available through the CTSPS.  Likewise, I am unable to test the effects of relaxed NPC 
regulations on PCP practices’ employment of NPCs, as the CTSPS discontinued collection of this 
information following the 1998 survey wave. 
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My empirical strategy for identifying the competition or free-riding behavioral effects of 
relaxed NPC regulations relies on the assumption that PAs and NPs offer PCP practices similar 
opportunities to reduce their marginal costs of care relative to PCP staff.  While both may 
provide many of the services PCPs can provide, typically NPs’ scope of practice exceeds PAs’—
thus NPs may be able to stand in for PCPs more frequently than PAs, all else equal.  However, 
this difference is at least partially offset by the fact that NPs cost PCP practices significantly 
more in salary and benefits than PAs.  Whether NPs or PAs more effectively reduce a practice’s 
marginal costs may depend on the practice’s effective care models and management 
structures, which are typically unobservable.  Thus one of two biases may be introduced.  If NPs 
can be used more effectively to reduce PCP practices’ costs of care than PAs, then I may 
overestimate the extent of any competition effects and underestimate free-riding effects as 
driven by relaxed NP practice regulations.  Alternately, if PAs can be used more effectively than 
NPs to reduce PCP practices’ costs of care, then I may underestimate the extent of any 
competition effects and overestimate free-riding effects as driven by relaxed NP practice 
regulations.  As such, the magnitudes of these effect estimates should be assessed with 
caution. 
Yee and colleagues (2013) effectively identified another limitation of this analysis when 
they found that there may be considerably less variation in NPC practices across states than 
would be suggested by the heterogeneity in those states’ practice regulations.  Physician 
interviewees indicated that they supervised more closely NPs with less experience and less 
closely NPs with more experience and that practice culture could be a stronger determinant of 
NPs’ autonomy in practice than NPC regulations.  Moreover, regulations may vary in their 
ultimate effects on practice (Atwater et al., 2008) by region or practice type.  It is not feasible to 
capture the gaps between NPC regulatory constraints and within-practice functional constraints 
using available data sources.  These gaps should make my estimates of NPC regulations’ effects 
on PCP practices’ participation in Medicaid more conservative but also more reflective of the 
actual effects a state might expect upon relaxing its own regulations. 
Similarly, the effects of relaxed NPC regulations may be attenuated by Medicaid 
managed care organization policies where they do not credential NPs as primary care providers 
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(Schiff, 2012).  Among my results, I presented some evidence consistent with the notion that 
such policies may meaningfully mediate the relationship between NPC regulations and PCP 
practices’ participation in Medicaid.  It is unlikely my single, un-interacted control variable 
capturing the fraction of Medicaid beneficiaries enrolled in managed care is sufficient to control 
fully for these unmeasured policies, as this information is incomplete; more complete 
information on these policies within states over time is not accessible using publicly available 
data sources.  Importantly, such information is unavailable for private insurers and Medicare 
Advantage plans as well; moreover is it not known how consistent or inconsistent these policies 
were over time within states and markets during the study period.  Thus it is not clear how this 
dynamic should bias my results.  More recently, the fraction of surveyed managed care 
organizations that do credential NPs as primary care providers has increased to 74% as of 2012 
(Hansen-Turton et al., 2013).  This suggests that any effects of changes in NPC regulations are 
less likely to be impeded by managed care organization credentialing policies moving forward. 
 
Conclusions and Future Directions 
This study concerns the important policy dilemma of limited access to primary care in 
Medicaid and the strategies state policymakers are considering to improve access.  In the short-
term, states are considering whether to extend or re-institute the ACA’s temporary fee 
increases for primary care services in Medicaid in place during 2013-2014.  However, because 
of this policy’s high cost in many states (particularly where historically Medicaid fees have been 
lower), other policy alternatives are also receiving attention.  My findings illustrate that when 
policymakers implement one such alternative, relaxing NPC practice regulations, they may 
inadvertently cause significant decreases in Medicaid participation among some PCP practices, 
perhaps offsetting gains in participation resulting from increased fees and other measures.  
States relaxing practice regulations for PAs between 1996 and 2004 saw modest increases in 
Medicaid participation among PCP practices—up to 4.4 percentage points, with smaller 
increases in other measures of Medicaid participation.  However, states relaxing practice 
regulations for NPs saw heterogeneous responses among PCP practices: the proportion of PCP 
practices receiving at least 2% of their revenues from Medicaid was reduced 19.7 percentage 
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points, and the proportion of PCP practices receiving at least 10% of their revenues from 
Medicaid rose 9.6 percentage points. 
This paper also yields insights regarding the different mechanisms through which NPC 
regulations can affect PCP practices’ decisions regarding participation in Medicaid.  My findings 
suggest that relaxing these regulations may lead to small reductions in PCP practices’ marginal 
costs of care and thereby encourage Medicaid participation.  However, relaxed NP practice 
regulations that enable NPs to operate their own practices independently may also lead many 
PCP practices to withdraw from Medicaid if they believe the new NP-led market entrants will 
care for the Medicaid population in their place.  This “free-riding” behavior by PCP practices is 
consistent with the concept of Medicaid participation as akin to the provision of a public good.  
It also appears to be inconsistent with concerns often attributed to physician advocates that 
relaxed NPC regulations will mean greater competition for PCP practices, particularly for 
desirable privately insured and Medicare patients. 
This paper’s findings do not indicate that the choice to relax NPC regulations should be 
taken off the table by state policymakers seeking to increase access to care in Medicaid.  
Importantly, it does not indicate that Medicaid patients may be less likely to have primary care 
access in states with relaxed NPC regulations.  This is because my significant, negative 
estimated effects on Medicaid participation among some PCP practices may be offset from the 
Medicaid beneficiary’s perspective by increases in access to NP-led primary care practices or an 
increasing concentration of the Medicaid market in a smaller number of larger primary care 
practices more focused on serving the Medicaid population. 
Rather, it suggests that policymakers should not take it for granted that relaxed NPC 
regulations will have little effect on current Medicaid participants’ willingness to see Medicaid 
patients and lead to improvements in access overall.  More nuanced, thoughtful policy 
packages, possibly including the relaxing of such regulations, may be more productive in 
improving access than packages relaxing these regulations only.  For example, when a state 
considers relaxing NP practice regulations, it should also consider including additional measures 
to prevent or account for PCPs’ free-riding behavior.  To prevent this behavior, states may seek 
to increase competition between PCPs and NPs in markets for non-Medicaid patients.  They 
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may do this by increasing the apparent legitimacy of NPs as primary care providers in the eyes 
of patients and insurers, as by establishing in state boards of nursing authority comparable to 
that enjoyed by state medical boards and equalizing payment for services that may be provided 
equally well by PCPs or by NPs.  It may also be important to support public education 
campaigns or other measures, perhaps spearheaded by private entities (e.g., nursing agencies, 
insurers), to increase the public’s willingness to look upon NPs as substitutable for PCPs in many 
cases.  Because some of these measures are longer-term solutions, it may also be appropriate 
to account for free-riding behavior in the shorter term by empowering NPs to better serve the 
needs of the growing Medicaid population.  Among the policy measures to consider in this 
context are putting into place regulations that permit Medicaid to reimburse retail clinics 
directly for their services (Takach & Witgert, 2009) and mandating that NPs be included in 
Medicaid managed care organizations’ primary care provider credentialing processes alongside 
physicians. 
The complex provisions of the ACA will almost certainly affect PCP practice decisions 
about Medicaid participation as well as the importance of NPCs and NPC regulations to their 
calculus.  The law’s support for electronic health records, medical homes, accountable care 
organizations, FQHCs, and medical education may be particularly important.  As such, a full, 
general-equilibrium analysis of these changes’ effects on access to care in Medicaid is not 
feasible.  Perhaps the most significant change expected is marked growth in the number of 
patients insured through Medicaid who were previously uninsured or covered through private 
insurers.  This change—as well as expected changes in average Medicaid patient demographics 
and health status and any associated reductions in Medicaid “churn” due to less stringent 
Medicaid eligibility criteria—will increase demand for Medicaid primary care visits as well as 
their relative attractiveness as new patients to PCPs.  Primary care providers may respond by 
seeking to reduce marginal costs of practice to a level where they can meet the greater 
demand.  Should a state choose to relax its NPC regulations in the coming years, it will be 
difficult to disentangle the effects of the NPC regulations from these and other, far-reaching 
effects of the ACA (Aliu et al., 2014). 
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Researchers may extend this paper’s framework and findings in several ways.  This study 
is limited to primary care services because current policy developments have focused 
principally on access to primary care rather than specialty care (e.g., temporary increases in 
Medicaid fees for primary care services).  Yet Decker (2012; 2013), among others, has observed 
that access to specialty care is also a significant concern or Medicaid beneficiaries.  While 
relaxed NP practice regulations may have more significant, heterogeneous effects in primary 
care because NPs disproportionately match in primary care and may compete with primary care 
physicians but not with specialists, the effects of relaxing PA regulations on specialists’ 
participation in Medicaid should be evaluated in future work.  Likewise, access to care for 
Medicare patients and patients dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid is also increasingly a 
policy concern.  Brunt and Jensen (2014) speak to this issue and spillover effects between 
insurance markets in their recent paper.  My model could be extended (e.g., using more 
complex non-linear marginal revenue curves to reflect heterogeneity in insurance benefits 
among non-Medicaid patients) and used to generate hypotheses in this area; such an analysis is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
As non-physician clinicians come to play larger roles in the primary care market, 
policymakers are likely to pay closer attention to the regulations that govern their practices and 
also affect the behaviors of other clinicians.  My study offers evidence of significant effects of 
this kind, though more work must be done to fully understand how these regulations interact 
with one another.  This is necessary so that policies and incentives can be better informed and 
more effectively aligned to produce the desired outcome of sufficient access to care for 
Medicaid beneficiaries.  
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Chapter One Appendix 
In my test of hypothesis H7—that the effects of competition and free-riding may be 
stronger in states with lesser Medicaid managed care (MMC) penetration—I assessed the 
marginal effects of relaxing NPC regulations in environments where a low fraction of Medicaid 
beneficiaries were enrolled in managed care and where a high fraction of Medicaid 
beneficiaries were enrolled in managed care.  Results for the dependent variable of accepting 
new Medicaid patients are presented in Table 7—findings for the other dependent variables are 
broadly similar.  In states with low Medicaid managed care penetration, the effects of relaxing 
PA practice regulations are mixed across regulations, though nearly all are statistically 
significant.  By comparison, in states with higher Medicaid managed care penetration rates, 
most effects are statistically significant, but their signs are almost always flipped.  In addition, I 
find that the effect of relaxing physician supervision regulations for NPs is not statistically 
significant in states with a lower fraction of Medicaid beneficiaries enrolled in managed care, 
but the effect is a 9.2 percentage point increase in the probability of accepting new Medicaid 
patients in states with higher Medicaid managed care penetration.  Most pertinently, I find 
using a Wald test that the overall difference in relaxed NP and PA regulations’ effects is greater 
in states with lower Medicaid managed care penetration (p < 0.01).  This is consistent with my 
hypothesis that the effects of competition and free-riding—particularly the negative effects on 
Medicaid participation of free-riding behavior—may be stronger in these states. 
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Table 7: Accepting New Medicaid Patients, Marginal Effects of NPC Regulations Interacted with Indicator of 
Medicaid Managed Care (MMC) Enrollment Fraction above Median 
 
*** p < 0.01.  ** p < 0.05.  * p < 0.10.  n = 16,495.  Note: In addition to NPC regulations, model covariates include 
physician-level (e.g., year began practice), practice-level (e.g., practice type), and market-level (e.g., Medicaid 
relative reimbursement) controls, state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. 
The results of my tests of hypothesis H9—that small one- and two-physician practices 
and very large practices may be least likely to experience meaningful reductions in the marginal 
costs of care when NPC practice regulations are relaxed—for the decision to accept new 
Medicaid patients are presented in Table 8.  Effect estimates for relaxed PA regulations are 
mixed across individual regulations.  Direct Wald tests of the differences between the 
aggregate effects of relaxed PA regulations in large practices versus in moderate-sized practices 
(p = 0.06) and in small practices versus in moderate-sized practices (p = 0.12) suggest that the 
reduced marginal costs from relaxed PA regulations may be most likely to increase Medicaid 
participation among the moderate-sized PCP practices.  Marginal effect estimates for relaxed 
NP practice regulations are generally small and not statistically significant, and comparative 
Wald tests identify no statistically significant differences between effects for small, moderate-
sized, or large practices.  Only a positive estimated effect of relaxed NP prescription authority 
regulations for practices with three or more physicians was statistically significantly different 
from zero, and these effects may be significantly offset for such practices by the effects of 
relaxed physician supervision regulations, which are imprecisely estimated.  Overall, these 
results offer some evidence consistent with my hypotheses; my test of differential marginal 
effects of relaxed NP practice regulations across practice types may be under-powered. 
Marginal Effect Est. SE Est. SE
Physician Assistant Practice Regulations
Practice requires l icense -0.035 0.014** 0.016 0.020
Site determines scope of practice -0.035 0.022 0.086 0.036**
No restrictions on prescribing 0.062 0.015*** -0.059 0.023***
MD co-signature not required -0.043 0.011*** 0.211 0.026***
MD proximity req. not specified 0.024 0.014* 0.113 0.019***
No restrictions on PA/MD ratios 0.042 0.009*** -0.013 0.024
Nurse Practitioner Practice Regulations
MD supervision not required -0.026 0.021 0.092 0.026***
Full prescription authority
Low MMC High MMC
(not estimable)
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Table 8: Accepting New Medicaid Patients, Marginal Effects of Relaxed NPC Regulations Interacted with Practice 
Type Indicators 
 
*** p < 0.01.  ** p < 0.05.  * p < 0.10.  n = 16,495.  Note: In addition to NPC regulations, model covariates include 
physician-level (e.g., year began practice), practice-level (e.g., practice type), and market-level (e.g., Medicaid 
relative reimbursement) controls, state fixed effects, and year fixed effects.
Marginal Effect Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE
Physician Assistant Practice Regulations
Practice requires l icense -0.017 0.033 -0.002 0.028 0.028 0.015*
Site determines scope of practice -0.063 0.035* -0.008 0.027 -0.033 0.023
No restrictions on prescribing 0.043 0.024* 0.052 0.028* -0.049 0.027*
MD co-signature not required -0.046 0.029 -0.003 0.058 0.008 0.024
MD proximity req. not specified -0.033 0.029 0.039 0.025 0.070 0.027***
No restrictions on PA/MD ratios 0.041 0.021* 0.003 0.034 0.006 0.031
Nurse Practitioner Practice Regulations
MD supervision not required -0.017 0.034 -0.045 0.029 0.004 0.025
Full prescription authority -0.015 0.041 0.031 0.017* -0.002 0.026
1-2 MD practices 3+ MD practices
Medical school-aff. or 
hosp.-based practice
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Chapter Two 
 
The Role of Medical Consultants in the Active Management of Complex 
Surgical Inpatients’ Care 
 
The costs of medical consultations in the inpatient hospital setting are high, and they 
are rising rapidly.  Within Medicare, MedPAC (2013) reports that 37.5 percent of allowed 
charges for physician evaluation and management services in 2011 were for visits in the 
inpatient setting, and the costs of critical care visits grew 7.5 percent annually between 2006 
and 2010.  Journalists have also observed high consultation service costs borne directly by 
patients, whom out-of-network consulting physicians may “balance bill” for what insurance 
does not cover (Rosenthal, 2014). 
What makes these high and rising costs disconcerting is the decidedly mixed evidence 
about the effects and benefits of consults: it is not clear what specific services consultants 
provide most commonly, whether they affect planned courses of treatment in cases of 
diagnostic uncertainty is in doubt (Gluck, Muñoz, & Wise, 1988; Katz et al., 1998; Mollema, 
Berger, & Girbes, 2000; Katz, Cimino, & Vitkun, 2005; PausJenssen, Ward, & Card, 2008; Burden 
et al., 2013), and associations between consult use and important patient care outcomes such 
as mortality appear to be significant for certain patient and organization types but not others 
(Gluck, Muñoz, & Wise, 1988; Katz, Cimino, & Vitkun, 2005; Wijeysundera et al., 2010).  The 
dearth of evidence about benefits may have contributed too to the substantial variation in 
consult use across hospitals that researchers have observed in recent years (Wijeysundera et 
al., 2012; Stevens et al., 2013; Thilen et al., 2013a; Thilen et al., 2013b; Chen et al., 2014). 
The difficulty in identifying the value of consults may be attributable in part to an 
insufficient understanding of what consultants actually do.  The most readily apparent purpose 
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consultants serve is to provide specialty-specific input, answering the attending physician’s 
specialty-specific questions or monitoring a specialty-specific concern the attending physician 
feels ill-equipped to manage.  A less-apparent purpose is to provide “active management”: non-
specialty-specific work alongside the attending physician to manage a particularly complex 
patient’s case overall.  The duties of a consultant taking on an active management role include 
coordinating the care of other providers, identifying and mitigating conflicting care orders and 
prescriptions, and assisting the attending physician in determining and evaluating the patient’s 
care pathway.  
It has been noted that vulnerable, complex patients may benefit most from such active 
management support (EWA & N3C, 2013; McCullough, Parente, & Town, 2013).  While typically 
it is understood that these duties are carried out exclusively by primary care physicians, 
internists, and hospitalists, specialists provide active management as well, more commonly for 
the complex patients attending physicians are less well-equipped to manage independently.  
Recognition of this second role of consultants will be especially important as health care 
systems seek to streamline and expand access to inpatient specialty care through the use of e-
consults and telemedicine services (Bailes et al., 1997; Dick, Filler, & Pavan, 1999; Sable et al., 
2002; Marcin et al., 2004; McAdams, Cannavo, & Orlander, 2014; Wasfy et al., 2014; Ellenby & 
Marcin, 2015).  The active management role of consultants will be compromised when their 
specialty-specific input is gathered through these more distant, narrowly-focused interactions 
(Mehrotra & Hussey, 2015). 
How consultants respond to other consultants’ behavior—in particular, to what extent 
they have demonstrated a willingness to help manage the patient’s case—reflects recognition 
about the needs the patient may have for additional active management support.  An 
understanding of consultants’ activities based solely on their role as providers of specialty-
specific input would not account for a consultant’s decisions about how many consults to 
render being affected by such evidence of active management by other consultants.  From this 
perspective, this study provides evidence of the active management role of medical consultants 
through an analysis of consultant interactions.  My analyses also elucidate consultants’ 
decision-making processes by differentiating among three theoretical frameworks with distinct 
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predictions for patterns of consult provision.  In doing so, this study is the first to present 
empirical evidence on the interpersonal and organizational factors that affect consultants’ care 
for elderly, highly vulnerable or complex patients. 
I find that medical consultants’ decisions about how many visits to pay a patient are 
significantly affected by decisions of this same kind by other consultants before them.  When 
previous consultants have given evidence they are taking on an active management role with a 
patient, the next consultant is significantly more likely to “sign off” sooner and move onto other 
cases rather than to stay on the case, following an “all hands on deck” mentality.  Moreover, 
when all of the consults previously rendered have been provided more often by only one or a 
few consultants, I find the next consultant is more likely to step in and provide additional 
consults, more consistent with a framework of Diminishing Marginal Productivity than a 
framework akin to the Bystander Effect, as described by Stavert and Lott (2013).  Both sets of 
findings are consistent with an understanding of consultants’ second role as active managers of 
inpatient care.  These findings are informative for hospital administrators and medical staffs 
looking to design incentives and effectively motivate their specialist consultants to improve the 
efficiency of their care and their patients’ outcomes.  
 
Theoretical Frameworks 
In this section I describe briefly three theoretical frameworks and their different 
predictions for the behavior and care patterns of consultants in response to the decisions of 
other consultants before them.  I call these frameworks All Hands on Deck, Diminishing 
Marginal Productivity, and the Bystander Effect.  I summarize the hypotheses emerging from 
these frameworks in the following section. 
 
All Hands on Deck 
More complex patients’ needs for additional specialist input and additional active 
management tend to be greater than less complex patients’ needs.  If patients’ levels of 
complexity were apparent at admission, all needed specialists could be readied to meet those 
needs as early as possible.  More typically, the full complexity of a patient’s case only becomes 
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clear during the course of the hospital stay, and specialists may be able to infer the complexity 
of the case only using imprecise signals.  One such signal is the number of different specialists 
who have consulted on the case previously; intuitively, this number is positively correlated with 
the patient’s complexity. 
After a specialist reviews the patient’s medical chart and observes this signal during her 
initial consult, she may infer from the number of prior consultants the patient’s complexity and 
determine whether to “sign off” or to provide additional consults.  The All Hands on Deck 
theory suggests that she would choose to provide these additional consults if she infers greater 
patient complexity because the consults would serve as additional opportunities to monitor the 
case and provide active management support as soon as they are needed.  Moreover, the 
specialist can ensure that any implications of the chosen care pathway for the patient anatomy 
about which she has expertise are fully considered.  More cynically, a specialist observing this 
signal of complexity may also spot an opportunity to provide and bill for additional consulting 
visits, even if the patient’s level of complexity does not merit them. 
If the predictions of the All Hands on Deck framework are realized, then the care 
patterns of consultants reflect suboptimal information-sharing and inefficient overprovision of 
consults when they may not be needed.  It would be appropriate in this case for hospitals and 
medical staffs to realign consultants’ incentives in order to reduce this inefficiency. 
 
Diminishing Marginal Productivity 
In production theory, the Law of Diminishing Marginal Productivity holds that as the 
number of inputs of equal measure is increased, the product derived per unit of input will 
eventually decrease.  In this study’s context, the Law suggests that, for a given patient case, as 
the number of consults or consulting physicians increases, the marginal value to the patient of 
additional consults or consulting physicians should fall.  If consultants recognize this diminishing 
value in their own consults, they may be more inclined to “sign off” and discontinue seeing the 
patient in favor of providing more valuable care to other patients as the number of consultants 
already involved in the case increases.  For this study (in particular for distinguishing the 
predictions of the Diminishing Marginal Productivity and Bystander Effect frameworks, as I 
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describe below), it is important to note the marginal value of additional consults should 
diminish more rapidly than the marginal value of additional consulting physicians.  New 
consultants will have greater opportunities to present new insights or perspectives valuable to 
the patient, while the same consultants providing additional consults will be less likely to 
contribute such breakthrough ideas. 
If the predictions of this Diminishing Marginal Productivity framework hold, there is no 
inherent failure of the consulting care model.  Hospitals and medical staffs should seek to 
maximize the efficiency of consultants’ sign-off decisions by ensuring their information is as 
complete as possible when they join the case.  
The most germane evidence of the Law of Diminishing Marginal Productivity in the 
context of inpatient physician services to complex patients was provided by Jensen and 
Morrisey (1986).  Jensen and Morrisey’s focus was the number of attending physicians on a 
hospital’s medical staff and their productivity as measured using hospital admissions.  While the 
evidence of diminishing marginal productivity in this context is compelling, it is not clear that 
the authors’ findings translate to the numbers of consultants engaged in individual patient 
cases.  Their theory suggested that their finding of diminishing marginal productivity arose from 
teaching hospitals’ high physician labor-to-capital ratios, and these hospital-level ratios may not 
be pertinent at the individual patient level. 
A key assumption of the theory of Diminishing Marginal Productivity is that the input 
units added are all of equal measure.  In the context of medical consultations, this assumption 
may hold for the active management role of consultants, but it may not hold for the role of 
providing specialty-specific input.  Different specialties, it may be said, provide consults of 
unequal measure.  As such, controlling for consultants’ specialties may be very important in 
isolating the effects of Diminishing Marginal Productivity in this study. 
 
The Bystander Effect 
The theory of the Bystander Effect, first formally defined by Darley and Latané (1968) in 
the experimental psychology literature, is stated as follows: “the more bystanders to an 
emergency, the less likely, or the more slowly, any one bystander will intervene to provide aid.”  
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In general terms, the Bystander Effect suggests that as the number of individuals with an 
opportunity to intervene on a threatened party’s behalf increases, each individual feels less 
personally responsible for intervening, and so the probability that any individual intervenes 
actually falls.  Stavert and Lott (2013) cited this theory and the associated “diffusion of 
responsibility”8 as a possible reason for failures of active management among larger groups of 
consulting physicians involved in a complex surgical patient’s case.  They reasoned that if the 
number of consulting physicians involved in patient cases increased—perhaps because of 
medical subspecialization and the increasing complexity of patient data—the average 
probability that any consultant would take responsibility for actively managing the patient’s 
case would fall correspondingly.  Similarly, Srivastava (2013) explained that consultants’ failures 
of active management in such cases may be a consequence of all involved physicians 
subconsciously deferring to the implicit, collective confidence of their peers in the patient’s 
established care pathway despite any concerns they held personally.  The consequences of the 
Bystander Effect, if its predictions hold in consultant care, include more frequent poor patient 
outcomes, such as those Stavert and Lott (2013) and Srivastava (2013) described.  In this case it 
would be appropriate for hospitals and medical staffs to realign consultant incentives to 
encourage active management.  It may also be necessary to assign individual consultants as 
designated active managers. 
The literature on the Bystander Effect offers little explicit evidence regarding physician 
behavior specifically.  Several of the defining characteristics of physicians and physician care 
(e.g., no real threat to the bystander herself, no pre-established relationship between the 
bystander and the threatened party [Fischer et al., 2011]) are associated with stronger 
Bystander Effects, but this evidence is only suggestive.  The complex incentives physicians face 
when deciding how actively to be involved in a patient case (different fees for new and 
established patients, institutional expectations of productivity, professional and institutional 
                                                     
 
 
8
 A similar concept termed “passenger syndrome” is described elsewhere (AHRQ, 2008). 
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norms about “patient ownership” and accountability, etc.) and their opportunities to be more 
deliberate in this decision clearly distinguish physicians from the typical Bystander Effect 
experiment subject.  It remains to establish the relevance of the Bystander Effect to medical 
consultants’ behavior. 
In the context of medical consult provision, the core predictions of the Diminishing 
Marginal Productivity and Bystander Effect theories are the same: as the numbers of consults 
already rendered to a patient or of consultants already involved in a patient’s case increase, the 
probability the next consultant will continue to render additional consults and provide active 
management support decrease.  (The All Hands on Deck framework generates the opposite 
prediction.)  What distinguishes these two theories is the Bystander Effect’s prediction 
regarding the concentration of provided consults across involved consultants, conditional on 
the number of each.   
The principal prediction of the Bystander Effect pertains to consultants’ behavior when 
it is unclear whether another consultant is engaging in active management.  In addition, when 
there is clearer evidence one or more other consultants have already done so, the Bystander 
Effect implies that consultants will be less willing to provide active management.  Thus, as the 
distributions of consults across a fixed number of consultants becomes more concentrated, 
reflecting greater investment by a few consultants in the patient’s case, the next consultant’s 
incentive to intervene and provide active management care weakens.  Indeed, following 
Srivastava’s (2013) hypothesis of deference, the Bystander Effect holds that subsequent 
consultants will look upon this evidence of a previous consultant’s active management as an 
indication that they should sign off quickly rather than provide secondary active management, 
even if it is needed. 
By contrast, what the Diminishing Marginal Productivity framework predicts about the 
effects of an increasing concentration of consults on subsequent consultants’ behavior is 
ambiguous.  Assuming consultants are well aware of their secondary role as active managers of 
inpatients’ care, then the Diminishing Marginal Productivity framework would hold that new 
consultants joining cases with concentrated consult distributions would provide fewer consults, 
as they could expect only to serve the patient through specialty-specific input, not active 
60 
 
management support.  On the other hand, Diminishing Marginal Productivity theory also holds 
that the marginal productivity of consults may diminish more rapidly within individual 
consultants than across multiple consultants, whose differences of perspectives may prove 
valuable to the patient.  In other words, as the distribution of consults across consultants 
becomes more concentrated, the more significantly involved consultants’ last consults may be 
less productive than a new consultant’s consults would be.  Therefore, new consultants joining 
cases with especially concentrated consult distributions may provide more consults than 
consultants joining cases with less concentrated consult distributions. 
 
Hypotheses 
In this section I summarize the predictions of the All Hands on Deck, Diminishing 
Marginal Productivity, and Bystander Effect theories and describe how they align and conflict.  
This information is also presented in Table 9. 
After a physician completes her initial consult, including a review of the patient’s 
medical chart and all notes made by previous consultants, the consultant decides whether to 
“sign off” or to provide additional consults and active management care.9  Suppose two patient 
cases are identical except that case A has one additional previous consultant or consult than 
case B.  While the All Hands on Deck theory suggests that the consultant is more likely to 
provide additional consults and active management care for case A, both the Diminishing 
Marginal Productivity and Bystander Effect theories predict the opposite. 
Now suppose two patient cases are identical, including with respect to the numbers of 
consults rendered and consultants involved, except that case C’s distribution of consults is 
                                                     
 
 
9
 While the decision to sign off ultimately belongs to the consulting physician, in some hospitals it may be common 
for consulting physicians to communicate one-on-one with the patient’s attending physician, and they may discuss 
together whether or not the consulting physician should sign off.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that nearly all 
conversations between the attending physician and consultants are likely to center on the consulting physician’s 
specialty-specific input and would include discussion of the patient’s overall management or other specialists’ 
consults only rarely.  As such, the attending physician is unlikely to play a meaningful role in the consulting 
physician’s decision to provide active management. 
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more concentrated than case D’s.  The All Hands on Deck theory offers no predictions for the 
response of the new consultant to this difference.  If the Diminishing Marginal Productivity 
theory holds, it is not clear whether the consultant will be more or less inclined to provide 
additional consults and active management care.  However, if the Bystander Effect theory 
holds, the consultant should provide fewer consults and should be less likely to provide active 
management care. 
Table 9: Theoretical Predictions for New Consultant's Behavior, by Theoretical Framework 
 
Medical Chart Reflects… All Hands on Deck Diminishing Marginal Productivity The Bystander Effect 
Additional consultants/ 
consults 
More consults; greater 
probability of providing A/M care 
Fewer consults; reduced 
probability of providing A/M care 
Fewer consults; reduced 
probability of providing A/M care 
More concentrated 
distribution of consults 
No prediction Ambiguous predictions 
Fewer consults; reduced 
probability of providing A/M care 
* A/M = active management 
It is possible that the effects of Diminishing Marginal Productivity and the Bystander 
Effect are coincident in consultants’ decision-making.  As such, small negative effect estimates 
of differences in consult distribution concentrations should be interpreted as evidence of 
Diminishing Marginal Productivity as the dominant mechanism (the Bystander Effect might or 
might not play a meaningful role), and large negative effect estimates should be interpreted as 
evidence of the Bystander Effect as the dominant mechanism (Diminishing Marginal 
Productivity might or might not play a meaningful role).  But finding either framework as 
dominant does not obviate the other framework entirely.  Ultimately, findings of any consistent 
relationship between other consultants’ decisions and the next consultant’s decisions would 
constitute strong support for the identification of consultants’ role as active managers of care 
above and beyond the role of providing specialty-specific input. 
I describe my data and empirical framework for testing these hypotheses in the 
following section. 
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Data and Empirical Framework 
Because elderly surgical patients tend to be highly vulnerable and in need of greater 
active management than other populations, I analyze the decision-making of consultants in the 
context of perioperative consults for Medicare beneficiaries.  In particular, I consider the care 
provided to Medicare patients undergoing coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) or colectomy 
procedures—two relatively common, high-risk surgical procedures for patients that commonly 
exhibit multiple comorbid conditions and present with complications—as identified using 100% 
MedPAR (hospital inpatient services) files for 2007 through 2010 and all Medicare Part B claims 
(Carrier files) for the same patients with dates of services between the date of admission and 
the date of discharge.  To further homogenize these patient samples, I restricted these samples 
to CABG patients not also undergoing valve replacement or percutaneous coronary 
intervention procedures and colectomy patients who also exhibited diagnoses of colon cancer 
on their inpatient hospital claims.  In addition, I use the corresponding Beneficiary Summary 
files and the 2008 American Hospital Association survey to identify additional beneficiary and 
hospital characteristics, respectively. 
Patients are excluded from my analytic samples if they were younger than age 65 or 
older than age 100, lacked Part B coverage, received zero consults during their hospital stay, 
had been hospitalized for the same procedure earlier in the same year, had their procedures 
performed at federal, Veterans Administration, or non-acute care hospitals or hospitals that 
could not be matched to AHA data or were outside the fifty states and the District of Columbia, 
or were otherwise missing data.  Because Part B data were not available for all time periods and 
because of concerns about potential changes in consult coding practices between years 
(especially between 2009 and 2010, when certain consultation Current Procedural Terminology 
[CPT] codes were no longer accepted on Medicare claims), inpatient hospital stays spanning 
more than one calendar year (e.g., including December 31, 2007 and January 1, 2008) are 
excluded from these data.  Without these year-spanning cases (approximately 0.6%), the 
remaining sample has a slightly shorter average length of stay than the full sample as a result of 
this exclusion, though this should not meaningfully affect study validity. 
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I identify the relevant pool of consulting physicians for my analyses using unique 
physician ID numbers (Carrier Line Performing Profiling Identification Number) as represented 
on Medicare Carrier File claim lines with first dates of service between the patient’s date of 
admission and date of discharge.10  I exclude from the pool of physicians to be analyzed the 
surgeons and anesthesiologists involved in the patients’ principal procedures.  In addition, to 
control for any role the surgeon or anesthesiologist may play in the patient’s management 
post-surgery, I include among my models’ regressors patient-level dummy variables indicating 
whether or not either billed for a consult at least once post-surgery.  While I am not able to 
distinguish attending physicians from other consulting physicians using available Medicare 
claims data sets, I include among my sensitivity analyses regressions that identify effects 
separately among generalist consultants versus among interventionist and non-interventionist 
specialist consultants. 
I model consultants’ decision-making at the patient-physician dyad level, the level at 
which my theoretical frameworks are operative.  This level of analysis permits identification 
based on differences in patient cases at the time of their consultants’ initial consults.  My 
identification strategy leverages the fact that individual consultants typically render their initial 
consults when requested with little negotiation or withholding and regardless of the number of 
previous consults or involved consultants. 
The decision of interest in this study is the consultant’s decision to provide additional 
consults and active management or to sign off following the initial consult.  Because active 
management is not recorded explicitly in Medicare claims data, I construct two claims-derived 
proxy measures pertaining to the intensive margin of consult provision.  These measures are (1) 
                                                     
 
 
10
 While this approach may not uniquely identify a single care provider if residents, physician assistants, nurse 
practitioners, or other clinical staff render consults and employ “incident-to” billing for the physician identified 
with the ID, such billing practices may be less common in the inpatient setting than in outpatient hospital or office 
clinics.  Moreover, because of the terms of incident-to billing, the provision of these services by allied health 
professionals would indicate extended engagement by the physician, the likes of which I seek to capture with my 
analysis.  As such, interpretations of my results should not be significantly affected by this choice to identify 
physicians uniquely using Medicare billing ID numbers.   
64 
 
whether or not the individual consultant provides consulting care across two or more days and 
(2) the consultant’s total number of days consulting.  These two measures capture necessary 
conditions for active management by a consultant; without detailed electronic medical record 
data, it is not possible to determine the extent to which they are sufficient.  These measures are 
also different in that the first captures the consultant’s determination at the time of the initial 
consult, while the second incorporates additional information gathered by the consultant at 
later points in time. 
In the first of my two principal analyses, I estimate the patient-physician dyad-level 
model of Equation (1), regressing consultant i’s decision to provide active management (AMpiht) 
for patient p in hospital h in the year t on two measures of other consultants’ care before the 
date of i’s first consult: Npi, the number of physicians rendering consults for patient p, and 
AMPREVpi, an indicator of whether another consulting physician has provided active 
management care (here, consults over two or more days). 
𝐴𝑀𝑝𝑖ℎ𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽1
′𝐴𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑝 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑋ℎ + 𝑅ℎ + 𝑦𝑡 + 𝜔𝑝𝑖ℎ𝑡   (1) 
In this equation, β1 and β’1 represent my parameters of interest: β1 can be taken to 
reflect equally evidence of the Diminishing Marginal Product and Bystander Effect theoretical 
frameworks, while β’1, which partly reflects the concentration of consults across consultants, 
offers more evidence of the Bystander Effect’s hypothesis than that of Diminishing Marginal 
Product theory. 
I include numerous patient-level, physician-level, and patient-physician dyad-level 
controls (Xp, Xi, and Xpi, respectively) to account for differences in patient severity and 
comorbidity, differences in average patterns of consults rendered by physicians like i, and 
observed care patterns on behalf of patient p.  The patient-level controls include the total 
number of consultants involved in the case by discharge, first- and second-order age terms, sex, 
race category indicators, 29 indicators of comorbid conditions as identified using the Elixhauser 
comorbidity index (Elixhauser et al., 1998), a dummy variable indicating whether the surgical 
procedure was elective, and length of stay.  I also include dummy variables for the days of the 
week of the patient’s admission and of the patient’s surgery—in case the timing and patterns of 
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consults should be affected by weekends—and for the presence of a consultation by the 
patient’s surgeon or anesthesiologist, which likely reflects a complication that would lead other 
clinicians to defer to surgeon or anesthesiologist in managing the patient.  The physician-level 
controls include 19 indicators of physician i’s specialty and two dummy variables reflecting 
whether physician i’s initial consult fell within three or five days of the patient’s death or 
discharge (given that the attending physician’s expectations for the patient’s death or discharge 
might be communicated to the consultant at this time).  And the patient-physician dyad-level 
controls include dummies for each of 19 specialties indicating whether a consultant of that 
specialty had rendered a consult by the date of i’s first consult. 
My hospital-level controls include teaching status, for-profit status, size (bed counts), 
nurse-to-patient ratio, and Medicaid fraction.  The α term is a constant, and Rh and yt represent 
region (of the hospital) and year fixed effects.  I include these fixed effects to control for broad 
cultural differences across physician populations and differences in billing practices or medical 
technology diffusion.  In all regressions, I cluster standard errors at the hospital level to account 
for any heteroskedasticity across hospitals. 
In my second principal analysis, I estimate the patient-physician dyad-level model shown 
in Equation (2), regressing consultant i’s active management decision on a measure HHIpi 
identifying how concentrated the distribution of consulting days has been across other 
consultants before the date of i’s first consult.  This measure is constructed in the same way as 
the well-known Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI): the sum of the squares of all previous 
consultants’ shares of consulting days, with shares expressed as fractions multiplied by 100.  All 
controls and fixed effects in Equation (1) are included in this equation as well, with the addition 
of DAYSpi, the total number of consulting days before the date of i’s first consult. 
𝐴𝑀𝑝𝑖ℎ𝑡 = 𝛾 + 𝛽1𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽1
′𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑝 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑋ℎ + 𝑅ℎ + 𝑦𝑡 + 𝜔𝑝𝑖ℎ𝑡    (2) 
To ensure that HHIpi is well-defined, this analysis is limited to the experiences of 
consultants whose first consult took place at least one day after the patient’s first consult 
overall. 
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This study protocol was approved by the University of Michigan Health Sciences and 
Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board under expedited review. 
 
  
Results 
After applying all inclusion and exclusion criteria, my main analytic samples consist of 
253,209 consultants for 61,785 CABG patients and 115,853 consultants for 33,460 colectomy 
patients.  In Table 10 I present select descriptive statistics characterizing these samples.  
(Corresponding patient-level descriptive statistics are presented in the Chapter Two Appendix.)  
As defined, both samples’ patients are elderly, relatively sick, and complex.  There are some 
meaningful differences in these groups’ demographic characteristics: CABG patients are more 
likely to be male, a few years younger, diabetic, hypertensive, and treated in an academic 
hospital.  Their consulting physicians are also somewhat more likely to be medical specialists, 
interventionist or non-interventionist, and to render their initial consults within three or five 
days of the patient’s discharge.  While both groups consist of vulnerable, complex patients for 
whom active management care may be valuable, they appear to be sufficiently distinct that 
findings found consistently for both samples may be considered generalizable to other 
vulnerable populations, particularly among Medicare beneficiaries. 
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Table 10: Descriptive Statistics for CABG and Colectomy Patient-Physician Dyad-Level Samples, 2007-2010 
 
The results of my first patient-physician dyad-level analyses, representing the 
dependent variable of active management as the probability the physician renders consults 
over at least two days and the physician’s total number of days consulting, are presented in 
Table 11 and Table 12, respectively.  These tables’ results are highly consistent with one 
another, across samples, and with the theoretical frameworks of Diminishing Marginal Product 
and the Bystander Effect.  As such, they are also consistent with the understanding of 
consultants as providers of both specialty-specific input and active management care. 
As shown in these tables, for each additional physician consulting for a complex CABG or 
colectomy patient before the index physician renders her first consult, the index physician’s 
probability of providing two or more days consulting falls between 0.8 and 1.1 percentage 
Variable Mean or % SD Mean or % SD
Active Management
2+ days consulting 64.3% 66.0%
Days consulting 3.17 3.32 3.57 3.87
Explanatory Variables
Prior consulting physicians 2.97 3.72 2.90 3.49
Prior MD had 2+ days 64.3% 66.0%
Select Control Variables
Male 63.5% 44.3%
Age 73.71 6.10 79.57 7.71
Black 7.5% 9.6%
Other race (non-white) 5.1% 3.6%
Length of stay 13.82 9.45 15.35 9.26
Post-op consult by surgeon 3.3% 4.9%
Post-op consult by anes. 11.6% 17.6%
Uncomplicated diabetes 42.3% 16.5%
Congestive heart failure 3.3% 20.9%
Hypertension 72.4% 48.6%
Depression 2.6% 2.6%
Elective procedure 40.5% 37.6%
Academic hospital 26.9% 15.2%
For-profit hospital 14.2% 12.2%
Nurse-occupancy ratio 6.80 2.27 6.47 2.20
Medicaid share 15.83 8.48 15.79 9.13
Within 3 days of discharge 19.8% 17.3%
Within 5 days of discharge 27.8% 25.6%
Generalist physician 19.1% 36.5%
Non-interventionist specialist 16.8% 8.9%
Interventionist specialist 50.3% 43.7%
n 253,209 115,853
CABG Colectomy
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points (1.2 to 1.7 percent of sample means), and her total days consulting fall approximately 
0.25 days (7.1 to 7.4 percent).  I also find that if one of the preceding consultants rendered 
consults across two or more days (i.e., provided active management), the index physician’s 
probability of providing two or more days consulting falls between 13.2 and 14.2 percentage 
points (20.6 to 21.5 percent), and her total days consulting fall 0.49 to 0.95 days (15.5 to 26.6 
percent).  With these large, negative effect estimates, we can reject the hypotheses of the All 
Hands on Deck theoretical framework.  Moreover, if these results are biased positively by 
unmeasured health status—other researchers have found this to be an important issue in 
studying consult use (Auerbach et al., 2007; Thilen et al., 2013a)—despite the efforts I have 
made to homogenize the sample and to control for observable health status differences, the 
true effects may be larger still. 
Table 11: Patient-physician Dyad-level Models of Active Management, 2+ Days Consulting, Select Parameter 
Estimates, 2007-2010 
 
Notes: **: Statistically significant at p < 0.01.  *: Statistically significant at p < 0.05.  Other control variables (results 
not presented) include age
2
, 29 Elixhauser comorbid condition indicators, indicators for the day of the week on 
which the index surgery took place (Monday refs.), 19 indicators of the index consultant’s specialty, indicators of 
whether a consultant had previously rendered a consult for each of 19 specialties, other profit status (neither 
discernibly investor-owned nor non-for-profit), indicators for hospital bed counts 200-349, 350-499, and 500+ (< 
200 ref.), and region and year fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered at the hospital level. 
Variable Estimate SE Estimate SE
Prior consulting physicians -0.0080 0.0008** -0.0113 0.0010**
Prior MD had 2+ days consulting -0.1324 0.0059** -0.1419 0.0053**
Total consulting physicians -0.0049 0.0006** -0.0037 0.0006**
Length of stay 0.0048 0.0004** 0.0045 0.0003**
Elective procedure 0.0529 0.0035** 0.0178 0.0036**
Init. consult < 3 days from disc. -0.2111 0.0043** -0.2016 0.0058**
Init. consult < 5 days from disc. -0.0092 0.0044* -0.0343 0.0052**
Prior post-op consult by surgeon -0.0001 0.0058 0.0042 0.0070
Prior post-op consult by anes. 0.0023 0.0042 -0.0036 0.0042
Male -0.0002 0.0021 0.0006 0.0028
Age 0.0044 0.0037 0.0019 0.0034
Black 0.0068 0.0054 0.0073 0.0054
Other race (non-white) 0.0170 0.0061** 0.0252 0.0079**
Academic hospital -0.0352 0.0099** -0.0349 0.0085**
Investor-owned hospital 0.0366 0.0101** 0.0357 0.0061**
Nurse-occupancy ratio -0.0045 0.0013** -0.0065 0.0011**
Medicaid share -0.0008 0.0004 -0.0007 0.0002**
n
CABG Colectomy
253,209 115,853
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Table 12: Patient-physician Dyad-level Models of Active Management, Total Days Consulting, Select Parameter 
Estimates, 2007-2010 
 
Notes: **: Statistically significant at p < 0.01.  *: Statistically significant at p < 0.05.  Other control variables (results 
not presented) include age
2
, 29 Elixhauser comorbid condition indicators, indicators for the day of the week on 
which the index surgery took place (Monday refs.), 19 indicators of the index consultant’s specialty, indicators of 
whether a consultant had previously rendered a consult for each of 19 specialties, other profit status (neither 
discernibly investor-owned nor non-for-profit), indicators for hospital bed counts 200-349, 350-499, and 500+ (< 
200 ref.), and region and year fixed effects.  Twelve observations are dropped from the CABG model’s full sample 
of 253,209 observations due to conflicting billing dates and discharge dates.  Standard errors are clustered at the 
hospital level. 
The models described in Equation 2 differentiate the effects of Diminishing Marginal 
Productivity and the Bystander Effect; their results are presented in Table 13 and Table 14.  The 
key parameter estimates from these models pertain to the consult share HHI measure.  This 
measure is scaled so that a one-unit change in the variable corresponds to an increase in the 
concentration of consult-day shares across consultants by 2,500 (equivalent to the difference in 
concentrations between a set of consult-days distributed equally among four consultants and a 
set of consult-days shared equally between two consultants), a large change in consult-day 
concentrations.  I find that when the index consultant observes consults have been more 
concentrated by the time of her first consult, her probability of providing two or more days 
Variable Estimate SE Estimate SE
Prior consulting physicians -0.2351 0.0109** -0.2546 0.0123**
Prior MD had 2+ days consulting -0.4901 0.0236** -0.9485 0.0336**
Total consulting physicians 0.0453 0.0073** 0.0301 0.0073**
Length of stay 0.1243 0.0056** 0.1418 0.0060**
Elective procedure 0.1228 0.0221** -0.2708 0.0295**
Init. consult < 3 days from disc. -0.4468 0.0166** -0.4127 0.0221**
Init. consult < 5 days from disc. -0.2515 0.0222** -0.4192 0.0296**
Prior post-op consult by surgeon -0.1003 0.0517 0.1683 0.0662*
Prior post-op consult by anes. 0.1450 0.0427** -0.1508 0.0409**
Male -0.0263 0.0162 0.0462 0.0232*
Age -0.0180 0.0277 0.0599 0.0267
Black 0.0913 0.0457* 0.1993 0.0535**
Other race (non-white) 0.3080 0.0601** 0.4247 0.1005**
Academic hospital -0.2789 0.0789** -0.3942 0.0828**
Investor-owned hospital 0.3787 0.0792** 0.3954 0.0643**
Nurse-occupancy ratio -0.0636 0.0136** -0.0807 0.0114**
Medicaid share -0.0083 0.0034* -0.0055 0.0025*
n
CABG Colectomy
253,197 115,853
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consulting increases by 1.9 to 2.0 percentage points (2.9 to 3.1 percent), and her total days 
consulting rise 0.19 to 0.21 days (5.8 to 6.1 percent). 
Table 13: Models of Active Management, 2+ Days Consulting, Select Parameter Estimates Including Consult-
share HHI, 2007-2010 
  
Notes: **: Statistically significant at p < 0.01.  *: Statistically significant at p < 0.05.  Other control variables (results 
not presented) include age
2
, 29 Elixhauser comorbid condition indicators, indicators for the day of the week on 
which the index surgery took place (Monday refs.), 19 indicators of the index consultant’s specialty, indicators of 
whether a consultant had previously rendered a consult for each of 19 specialties, other profit status (neither 
discernibly investor-owned nor non-for-profit), indicators for hospital bed counts 200-349, 350-499, and 500+ (< 
200 ref.), and region and year fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered at the hospital level. 
 
Variable Estimate SE Estimate SE
Consult-share HHI (/2,500) 0.0185 0.0018** 0.0202 0.0021**
Total previous consults -0.0018 0.0001** -0.0020 0.0002**
Total consulting physicians -0.0006 0.0006 0.0002 0.0006
Length of stay 0.0040 0.0004** 0.0037 0.0003**
Elective procedure 0.0197 0.0035** -0.0002 0.0042
Init. consult < 3 days from disc. -0.2158 0.0044** -0.2095 0.0061**
Init. consult < 5 days from disc. -0.0213 0.0043** -0.0412 0.0056**
Prior post-op consult by surgeon 0.0125 0.0064 0.0042 0.0081
Prior post-op consult by anes. 0.0020 0.0044 0.0018 0.0049
Male -0.0042 0.0024 -0.0039 0.0035
Age 0.0021 0.0043 0.0003 0.0040
Black -0.0008 0.0062 0.0128 0.0063*
Other race (non-white) 0.0115 0.0067 0.0277 0.0097**
Academic hospital -0.0338 0.0098** -0.0420 0.0089**
Investor-owned hospital 0.0301 0.0104** 0.0351 0.0068**
Nurse-occupancy ratio -0.0038 0.0016* -0.0054 0.0010**
Medicaid share -0.0004 0.0004 -0.0005 0.0003
n
CABG Colectomy
176,313 80,507
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Table 14: Models of Active Management, Total Days Consulting, Select Parameter Estimates Including Consult-
share HHI, 2007-2010 
 
Notes: **: Statistically significant at p < 0.01.  *: Statistically significant at p < 0.05.  Other control variables (results 
not presented) include age
2
, 29 Elixhauser comorbid condition indicators, indicators for the day of the week on 
which the index surgery took place (Monday refs.), 19 indicators of the index consultant’s specialty, indicators of 
whether a consultant had previously rendered a consult for each of 19 specialties, other profit status (neither 
discernibly investor-owned nor non-for-profit), indicators for hospital bed counts 200-349, 350-499, and 500+ (< 
200 ref.), and region and year fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered at the hospital level. 
The 95 percent confidence intervals for these estimates are sufficiently tight that 
negative estimates are ruled out.  This result is not consistent with the Bystander Effect 
hypothesis of a negative effect.  Thus my results appear to be most consistent with the 
predictions of the Diminishing Marginal Productivity framework.  However, if there is 
substantial residual positive bias in my results due to unmeasured health status, the true effect 
of increasing concentration in consult distributions may be small and negative, potentially 
consistent with the Bystander Effect.  Ultimately, while I find no strong evidence to support the 
Bystander Effect, I cannot rule it out definitively. 
 
Variable Estimate SE Estimate SE
Consult-share HHI (/2,500) 0.1923 0.0132** 0.2083 0.0147**
Total previous consults -0.0426 0.0018** -0.0453 0.0023**
Total consulting physicians 0.0280 0.0069** 0.0272 0.0065**
Length of stay 0.1109 0.0057** 0.1068 0.0057**
Elective procedure 0.0666 0.0215** -0.1569 0.0284**
Init. consult < 3 days from disc. -0.4821 0.0159** -0.5140 0.0204**
Init. consult < 5 days from disc. -0.3333 0.0234** -0.4912 0.0306**
Prior post-op consult by surgeon -0.0257 0.0603 0.0837 0.0662
Prior post-op consult by anes. 0.1455 0.0456** -0.0437 0.0412
Male -0.0097 0.0189 0.0433 0.0248
Age -0.0349 0.0314 0.0648 0.0284*
Black 0.0049 0.0450 0.1883 0.0544**
Other race (non-white) 0.1770 0.0566** 0.2972 0.0826**
Academic hospital -0.2602 0.0717** -0.3434 0.0739**
Investor-owned hospital 0.2946 0.0674** 0.2987 0.0572**
Nurse-occupancy ratio -0.0488 0.0106** -0.0506 0.0099**
Medicaid share -0.0062 0.0030* -0.0033 0.0023
n 176,313 80,507
CABG Colectomy
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Sensitivity and Robustness 
In this section I describe important ways in which my analyses may be modified simply 
to address corollary hypotheses or to test the sensitivity of my findings to changes of 
assumptions or specifications.  I make these modifications and present findings in Table 15 and 
Table 16.  The consistency of these estimates across specifications and subsamples can be 
taken as strong evidence in support of the role of consultants as active managers. 
Table 15: Patient-physician Dyad-level Models, Supplemental and Sensitivity Analyses, 2007-2010 
 
Notes: **: Statistically significant at p < 0.01.  *: Statistically significant at p < 0.05.  Control variables (results not 
presented) include age, age
2
, black, other race (white ref.), 29 Elixhauser comorbid condition indicators, elective 
admission status, length of stay, indicators of initial consult within 3 or 5 days of patient discharge, indicators for 
the day of the week on which the initial consult took place (Monday ref.), 19 specialty indicators, indicators of prior 
post-operative consult by surgeon or anesthesiologist, teaching status, for-profit status, other profit status (neither 
discernibly for-profit nor non-for-profit), nurse-occupancy ratio, Medicaid patient share, indicators for hospital bed 
counts 200-349, 350-499, and 500+ (< 200 ref.), and region and year fixed effects.  Standard errors clustered at the 
hospital level. 
Variable Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE
Baseline Pt-MD Dyad-level Models
Prior consulting physicians -0.0080 0.0008** -0.0113 0.0010** -0.2351 0.0109** -0.2546 0.0123**
Prior MD had 2+ days consulting -0.1324 0.0059** -0.1419 0.0053** -0.4901 0.0236** -0.9485 0.0336**
i. Intensive Care Consult Within  3 Days
Prior consulting physicians -0.0069 0.0012** -0.0088 0.0022** -0.2301 0.0136** -0.2206 0.0219**
Prior MD had 2+ days consulting -0.0037 0.0087 0.0283 0.0134* 0.0241 0.0513 -0.2991 0.0994**
ii. 6 Comorbid Conditions
Prior consulting physicians -0.0236 0.0100* -0.0176 0.0068* -0.1770 0.0460** -0.2559 0.0454**
Prior MD had 2+ days consulting -0.1388 0.0310** -0.1023 0.0226** -0.3066 0.1698 -0.7543 0.1514**
iii. For-profit Hospitals Only
Prior consulting physicians -0.0061 0.0021** -0.0133 0.0033** -0.3071 0.0281** -0.3466 0.0498**
Prior MD had 2+ days consulting -0.1236 0.0143** -0.1322 0.0122** -0.5438 0.0693** -1.2012 0.1047**
iv. Academic Hospitals Only
Prior consulting physicians -0.0073 0.0014** -0.0115 0.0022** -0.2127 0.0197** -0.2268 0.0255**
Prior MD had 2+ days consulting -0.1508 0.0130** -0.1948 0.0133** -0.5036 0.0436** -0.7650 0.0861**
v. Lagged Probability of General Medicine Co-management
Low Co-mgmt
Prior consulting physicians -0.0012 0.0010 -0.0021 0.0014 -0.2068 0.0123** -0.2506 0.0150**
Prior MD had 2+ days consulting -0.1528 0.0074** -0.1818 0.0090** -0.3034 0.0324** -0.6021 0.0602**
High Co-mgmt vs. Low Co-mgmt
Prior consulting physicians -0.0270 0.0030** -0.0220 0.0026 -0.0676 0.0231** 0.0023 0.0214
Prior MD had 2+ days consulting 0.1202 0.0178** 0.1102 0.0174** -1.0387 0.1426** -0.8729 0.1374**
vi. One Randomly Selected Consultant per Patient
Prior consulting physicians -0.0016 0.0023 -0.0003 0.0005 -0.1833 0.0168** -0.2457 0.0252**
Prior MD had 2+ days consulting -0.3338 0.0094** -0.0129 0.0023** -1.0068 0.0333** -1.4181 0.0468**
CABG Colectomy CABG Colectomy
Modeling Total Days ConsultingModeling Consult Provision Over 2+ Days
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Table 16: Patient-physician Dyad-level Models Including Consult-share HHI Measure, Supplemental and 
Sensitivity Analyses, 2007-2010 
 
Notes: **: Statistically significant at p < 0.01.  *: Statistically significant at p < 0.05.  Control variables (results not 
presented) include age, age
2
, black, other race (white ref.), 29 Elixhauser comorbid condition indicators, elective 
admission status, length of stay, indicators of initial consult within 3 or 5 days of patient discharge, indicators for 
the day of the week on which the initial consult took place (Monday ref.), 19 specialty indicators, indicators of prior 
post-operative consult by surgeon or anesthesiologist, teaching status, for-profit status, other profit status (neither 
discernibly for-profit nor non-for-profit), nurse-occupancy ratio, Medicaid patient share, indicators for hospital bed 
counts 200-349, 350-499, and 500+ (< 200 ref.), and region and year fixed effects.  Standard errors clustered at the 
hospital level. 
In my main analyses, patient samples are restricted to those who have exactly three 
comorbid conditions identified on their hospital stay records.  The value of active management 
should be greater for more complex patients.  The predictions of the All Hands on Deck 
framework may be more likely to hold for more complex patients if their consultants recognize 
the need for greater active management and “pitch in” more to meet it.  In addition, the 
predictions of the Diminishing Marginal Productivity and Bystander Effect frameworks may be 
less likely to hold for these patients if the marginal benefits of their consults are more difficult 
to estimate and if it is less clear that a single, previous consultant’s active management care 
should be sufficient to meet the patient’s needs, respectively. 
To assess these possibilities, I re-estimate my models for patients with both three 
comorbid conditions and at least one consult in an intensive care unit within the first three days 
of the hospital stay (with a length of stay of at least six days) and, separately, for patients with 
exactly six identified comorbid conditions.  In general, results for the sample of patients with an 
Variable Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE
Baseline Pt-MD Dyad-level Models 0.0185 0.0018** 0.0202 0.0021** 0.1923 0.0132** 0.2083 0.0147**
i. Intensive Care Consult Within  3
    Days
0.0194 0.0039** 0.0090 0.0063 0.2270 0.0362** 0.1857 0.0487**
ii. 6 Comorbid Conditions 0.0069 0.0148 0.0253 0.0121* 0.2234 0.0797** 0.2607 0.0769**
iii. For-profit Hospitals Only 0.0251 0.0042** 0.0183 0.0058** 0.2777 0.0330** 0.1854 0.0439**
iv. Academic Hospitals Only 0.0027 0.0035 0.0138 0.0052** 0.1429 0.0233** 0.2173 0.0381**
v. Lagged Probability of General
    Medicine Co-management
Low Co-mgmt 0.0109 0.0023** 0.0136 0.0031** 0.1254 0.0138** 0.1711 0.0208**
High Co-mgmt vs. Low Co-mgmt 0.0462 0.0060** 0.0163 0.0060** 0.2418 0.0420** 0.0407 0.0415
vi. One Randomly Selected
    Consultant per Patient
0.0225 0.0033** 0.0258 0.0050** 0.1644 0.0165** 0.1793 0.0273**
Modeling Total Days Consulting
CABG Colectomy CABG Colectomy
Modeling Consult Provision Over 2+ Days
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intensive care consult are similar to those I estimate for the base sample, though my estimates 
are smaller and less statistically significant in some cases pertaining to whether a previous 
consultant rendered consults across two or more days.  This is likely the result of estimating the 
models on smaller samples (N = 51,499 CABG patient-physician dyads and N = 14,114 
colectomy dyads for the intensive care consult models presented in Table 15).  Estimates for 
the sample with six comorbid conditions are likewise comparable to estimates for the base 
sample. 
There may be unmeasured hospital-level traits that bias my results as a function of their 
associations with the provision of additional consults, as through financial or other incentives 
for consulting physicians, or through differences in patients’ health status.  While I include 
select hospital-level controls in my regressions, doing so will not aid in detecting heterogeneous 
effects across hospital types.  The All Hands on Deck framework may find greater support in an 
analysis of a sample of patient-physician dyads at an investor-owned hospital, for example, if 
consultants take a greater number of previously involved consultants as an indication of an 
opportunity to bill for more consultations themselves. 
To determine how the hospital’s investor-owned status and academic status affects 
these hypotheses, I re-estimate my models using samples restricted to patients who attended 
teaching hospitals or investor-owned hospitals.  I find that my estimates for both of these 
samples are similar to those for the base sample.  There is one noteworthy difference in my 
estimates of the effects of prior consultants’ decisions to more actively manage a patient’s case 
on the index consultant’s active management decisions.  These estimates remain negative for 
the investor-owned subsample, but they are significantly larger in magnitude than they are for 
the overall sample.  These analyses yield no additional evidence to support the All Hands on 
Deck or Diminishing Marginal Productivity frameworks. 
The Bystander Effect may also be distinguishable from Diminishing Marginal Productivity 
based on the effects of a hospital’s norms regarding active management care.  In hospitals with 
a more established record of “co-management,” a strong form of active management in which 
a physician provide consults on at least 70% of patient days (Sharma et al., 2010), evidence that 
another physician has taken on active management responsibilities may be a strong indicator 
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that the patient’s active management need will be met.  Thus, if the Bystander Effect holds in 
general, it should hold more strongly in these hospitals, as the index consultant may be 
particularly unlikely to provide active management care upon observing this strong indicator of 
active management (or co-management) already underway.  The predictions of Diminishing 
Marginal Productivity should not be affected meaningfully by the hospital’s co-management 
norms or policies. 
I test this hypothesis by including in my main regressions a hospital-level variable 
measuring the average probability of like patients experiencing co-management in the previous 
calendar year and terms interacting this co-management probability variable with my measures 
of active management.  In Table 15 and Table 16, I present the main parameter estimates for 
my active management measures as the estimates for “low co-management” hospitals, and I 
present the interaction effect estimates as the estimates for comparing “high co-management 
versus low co-management” hospitals.  The co-management variables are scaled so that a one 
unit difference corresponds to the difference between hospitals where zero patients were co-
managed and hospitals were all patients were co-managed the previous year.  As shown in 
Table 15, the effects of prior consultants’ active management on the index consultant’s 
provision of consults over two or more days are typically much closer to zero in high co-
management hospitals versus low co-management hospitals, while the effects of prior 
consultants’ active management on the index consultant’s total days consulting are negative 
and greater in magnitude in high co-management hospitals versus low co-management 
hospitals.  In Table 16, I show that the effects of a more concentrated distribution of consults 
before the index consultant’s first consult are positive and significantly larger in high co-
management hospitals versus low co-management hospitals.  Overall, the evidence yielded by 
these estimates is mixed, but, as in my main analyses, my results appear to support the 
Diminishing Marginal Productivity framework more than the Bystander Effect framework. 
A potential concern about my patient-physician dyad-level analysis is that the results are 
disproportionately weighted to reflect the experiences of more complex patients in my samples 
or hospitals where consult provision is more frequent by the inclusion of one record for each 
patient-physician dyad: that is, patients and hospitals with more consulting physicians are 
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reflected in additional data records.  Thus my results may be positively biased.  To address this 
concern, I also re-estimate my models using a data set containing only a single randomly 
selected dyad record for each hospital stay.  The estimates I derive in this analysis vary 
somewhat about those I derive in my main analysis, both more positive and more negative.  No 
estimates change signs, however, and so this analysis does not yield support for the All Hands 
on Deck framework.  The estimated effects of the consult-share HHI measure remain relatively 
stable, and so this analysis also does not support further differentiating the Diminishing 
Marginal Productivity and Bystander Effect frameworks. 
 
Conclusions and Future Directions 
Observing the high and rising costs and unknown benefits of consults, many health care 
system stakeholders have dedicated efforts to develop new strategies and tools for reducing 
costs and improving quality in consulting care.  The use of these tools and strategies, including 
e-consults, inpatient telemedicine services, co-management programs, and bundled payments 
for hospital and inpatient physician services, has become increasingly widespread in recent 
years as well (Kuo et al., 2009; Society of Hospital Medicine, 2011; George et al., 2012; 
Futurescan, 2014; Orlander, 2014).  These policies and care delivery strategies can be designed 
and implemented more effectively with a more complete understanding of what consultants do 
and why. 
In this study, I analyze how inpatient medical consultants’ decisions about how many 
consults to provide a given patient are affected by the decisions of other medical consultants 
when caring for complex surgical inpatients.  Given the magnitudes and regularity of these 
statistical relationships, I conclude that consultants are providing care that extends beyond 
providing specialty-specific insights and answers, which researchers typically understand to be 
the scope of their services.  They appear to also provide active management support to help 
oversee and manage the patient’s case.  When I review the patterns of consultants’ decision-
making conditional on other consultants’ behavior, I find these patterns to be inconsistent with 
an All Hands on Deck framework, whereby consultants observe their peers becoming more 
extensively involved in a patient’s case and step in to ensure these other consultants’ care is 
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well-coordinated and that their own specialty’s perspective is represented.  And I find little 
evidence to support that these patterns follow the predictions of the Bystander Effect theory 
proposed by Stavert and Lott (2013).  Rather the evidence is most consistent with a Diminishing 
Marginal Productivity framework: consultants provide approximately 20 percent fewer days 
consulting when others are already providing active management, but they provide 
approximately 6 percent more days consulting when the distribution of others’ consults are 
more concentrated.   
These findings, which are robust to several alternative specifications, indicate that 
administrators seeking to increase use of e-consults and telemedicine services should be 
mindful of the potential for these tools to interfere with the active management responsibilities 
of consultants.  For example, they might consider instituting patient-centered initiatives such as 
coordinated co-management programs or like policies to ensure that there are resources 
available to attending physicians in need of additional support when overseeing the care of 
vulnerable, complex patients.  Moreover, that consultants’ patterns of care are consistent with 
a Diminishing Marginal Productivity framework suggests that many consultants are aware of 
this role of active management and calibrate the intensity of their consult provision to meet the 
patient’s needs, given the mix of consultants already involved in the case.  Whether consultants 
overestimate how rapidly the returns of their consults diminish and how well the active 
involvement of one or more consultants on a patient’s case proxies for the effectiveness with 
which the patient’s case is being managed, as Srivastava intimated (2013), remains an 
important open question.  If these decisions are not made to optimize patient benefit, it may be 
possible to increase the appropriateness of consultants’ decisions about their roles as active 
managers of care by ensuring the case information available to them at the time of their initial 
involvement is as complete as possible. 
This analysis has a few important limitations.  First, because this study relies on 
Medicare claims data, it identifies consultants’ active management of patient cases using 
imperfect proxy measures.  Consultants may be more actively involved—providing “curbside” 
consults and not billing for them (Weinberg et al., 1981; Burden et al., 2013)—or less active 
involved—billing for consults when their actual investment in the case is minimal—than is 
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reflected in administrative records.  The provision of more or fewer consults, as measured in 
this study, is a tangible reflection of active management, but measurement error in capturing 
active management using claims data may confound my estimates.  Data gathered in 
qualitative interviews, surveys of consultants, or physicians’ notes in electronic medical record 
systems may be valuable in identifying to which physicians consultants attributed the primary 
responsibilities for managing patient cases. 
My measures of active management may also reflect other unrelated dimensions of the 
patients, consultants, or hospitals involved.  I have used clinical indicators to substantially 
homogenize my patient samples, and I have included numerous patient-, physician-, and 
hospital-level controls in my analysis to address these concerns.  While these controls are more 
extensive than are included in most studies of care coordination and physician decision-making, 
my results may be partially confounded by omitted variable bias due to unmeasured health 
status and severity differences or other factors.  If unmeasured health status differences are 
the most significant of these omitted factors, the associated bias in my main analyses (models 
as described in Equation 1) would be positive, and so I would be less likely to observe results 
consistent with consultants’ roles as active managers and with the Diminishing Marginal 
Product or Bystander Effect frameworks.  It is not clear how unmeasured health status would 
be correlated with the concentration of consults across consultants.  In future work, large, 
detailed electronic health record system data sets may support capturing more detailed 
information about the patient’s health status at each point during the hospital stay, mitigating 
this concern.  Such data may also be valuable in developing unbiased estimates of the effects 
consultants’ services have on patient outcomes of broad interest, such as mortality, length of 
stay, and readmissions as well as more intermediate outcomes over which active care 
managers may have some greater influence (e.g., delayed charting, dangerous drug 
interactions, nurse ratings of communication or confusion at the unit level, and inadequate 
information transfer between physicians in the hospital or to the patient at discharge). 
Finally, although I was able to construct my analyses for two distinct samples of patients 
undergoing different surgical procedures—CABG and colectomy—it is not clear that my findings 
are generalizable to all patients undergoing other major surgeries, other, similarly complex non-
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surgical inpatients (e.g., patients with pneumonia, uncontrolled diabetes, or severe mental 
illness), or non-Medicare patients.  Additional studies of medical consultants’ decision-making 
in the care of other populations of interest may further substantiate the generalizability of my 
study’s findings. 
This study highlights the active management role of consultants and clarifies how 
consultants interact with their peers in deciding whether to provide active management 
support.  The recognition that medical consultants provide this active management support as 
well as specialty-specific input is an important step toward designing effective policies and 
incentives to improve the quality and efficiency of their care. 
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Chapter Two Appendix 
In Table 17, I present patient-level descriptive statistics for my analytic samples. 
Table 17: CABG and Colectomy Patient-Level Samples, 2007-2010, Descriptive Statistics 
 
  
Variable Mean or % SD Mean or % SD
Active Management
2+ days consulting (any MD) 80.1% 69.6%
Avg. days consulting (per MD) 2.88 1.63 3.21 1.92
Explanatory Variables
Consulting physicians 4.10 3.71 3.46 3.64
Consulting specialties 2.48 1.85 2.23 2.01
Select Control Variables
Male 64.8% 42.5%
Age 73.45 5.89 78.51 7.58
Black 6.1% 9.1%
Other race (non-white) 4.9% 3.9%
Length of stay 10.33 5.90 10.92 6.55
Post-op consult by surgeon 2.9% 3.4%
Post-op consult by anes. 6.4% 14.3%
Uncomplicated diabetes 42.3% 23.4%
Congestive heart failure 2.7% 13.4%
Hypertension 80.3% 62.9%
Elective procedure 52.4% 58.9%
Academic hospital 25.5% 16.8%
For-profit hospital 15.4% 11.6%
Nurse-occupancy ratio 6.96 2.58 6.71 2.35
Medicaid share 15.99 8.66 16.39 9.65
n
ColectomyCABG
33,46061,785
  
81 
 
Chapter Three 
 
Variation in the Quality of Diabetes Care for Veterans 
 
The literature on geographic variation in health care has focused principally on the 
outcomes of use and expenditures, on care rendered to Medicare or privately insured patients, 
on low-value or “discretionary” services, and on the effects of financial incentives.  While this 
work has been valuable for deepening our understanding of heterogeneity in decision-making 
among health care providers, it has also left many stones unturned.  In particular, the literature 
on geographic variation in quality is substantially underdeveloped, and very little is known 
about the role of non-financial—that is, organizational or structural—factors in mediating such 
variation.  Perhaps the most significant reason for this imbalance is the absence of data 
elements useful for quantifying quality in Medicare’s and private insurers’ administrative claims 
data.  Specifically, these data systems lack patient health outcomes, patient health status 
indicators, and other clinical characteristics (e.g., lab values) important for clinicians’ decisions 
about medical care.  The measures of quality constructed using administrative claims data often 
fall short of precisely assessing guideline adherence in medical care, the gold standard of 
measured quality, and so the quality of care measured may poorly reflect the true quality of 
care patients receive.  Moreover, it has been argued that these measures are insufficiently 
patient-centered and evidence-based (Kerr et al., 2001).  As a consequence, studies that have 
sought to identify geographic variation in quality using such measures likewise produce 
imprecise estimates of true care quality and variation therein. 
The same limitations hamper research on quality variation in the veteran population 
despite the availability of the data elements required to more precisely assess guidelines 
adherence in the Veterans Health Administration’s (VA) Clinical Data Warehouse (CDW).  It 
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would be natural to expect more sophisticated research on diabetes care quality in particular in 
this setting, as nearly one fourth of veterans have been diagnosed with diabetes (VHA, 2013), 
and the VA’s medical care use and costs associated with the condition are also very significant 
(Ashton et al., 2003; Maciejewski & Maynard, 2004).  Yet historically, studies have typically 
measured diabetes care quality in the VA using the same administrative data-driven, limited 
process measures that appear in the Health Plan and Employer Data Information Set (HEDIS) 
and are used regularly outside the VA.  Since 2000, such studies have regularly shown that the 
VA’s quality of this care is quite high on average and often higher than is observed outside the 
VA (Jha et al., 2003; Asch et al., 2004; Kerr et al., 2004; Singh & Kalavar, 2004; Ward et al., 2004; 
Perlin & Pogach, 2006; Powers et al., 2009); however, the limitations of the measures used call 
these findings into question. 
Studies of variation in diabetes care quality in this setting are further hampered by the 
fact that the process measures used have been included in the External Peer Review Program 
(EPRP), the VA’s longstanding performance measurement program.  As a consequence, the 
measured distribution of quality across VA facilities will be compressed due to Hawthorne and 
ceiling effects. 
In this paper, I leverage the VA’s clinically rich CDW data using a new, ordinal measure 
of blood pressure (BP) management among patients with diabetes to describe the variation in 
diabetes care quality across the VA.  This ordinal measure is an innovative extension of the 
“tightly-linked clinical action measure” of BP control developed by Kerr and colleagues (2012), a 
measure which itself was not used in any capacity in the VA (performance measurement, public 
reporting, research, etc.) until 2011, the final few months of my four-year study period.  In 
addition, I explore—using cross-sectional and clinician-level panel data analyses unique in the 
literature—to what extent organizational and structural characteristics of VA facilities can 
explain the patterns of diabetes care quality I observe.  My analyses are informed by two 
theoretical frameworks adopted from the geographic variation literature: these are the 
framework of Resource Availability and Coordination and the framework of Physician Learning 
and Peer Effects. 
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I find moderate variation in this ordinal BP control quality measure across VA facilities, 
less than has been observed outside the VA and using other quality measures.  In my analyses 
of the effects of available resources and coordination structures on diabetes care quality, I find 
no evidence of consistent relationships among these organizational features.  However, I find 
strong evidence of large peer effects among physicians, particularly when using my novel 
identification strategy of following physicians who move between VA facilities during my study 
period.  These findings help to fill important gaps in the geographic variation literature and 
offer valuable insights to VA administrators evaluating alternative strategies for improving 
diabetes care quality both within individual facilities and across the VA health care system. 
 
Existing Literature on Geographic Variation in VA Quality 
The existing literature on geographic variation in the quality of VA health care for 
veterans with diabetes is methodologically heterogeneous but uniformly limited in its 
applications of enriched clinical data, as described above.  Most studies employ a cross-
sectional design (Krein et al., 2001; Ward et al., 2004; Jackson et al., 2005; Kirsh et al., 2012), 
correlating cross-sectional survey data with contemporary performance on quality measures.  
One study employed a limited longitudinal design with quality improvement as its outcome of 
interest (Thompson et al., 2005), but no studies present evidence from multiple alternative 
frameworks side-by-side—as I do in this study—or replicate another paper’s findings using 
alternative methods.  Consequently, all preceding study findings have been characterized as 
associations: authors do not claim causal inference in their conclusions.  This is an important 
limitation for a literature seeking to identify opportunities for quality improvement in diabetes 
care.  In addition, all previous studies have relied on the limited, standard EPRP or HEDIS 
measures or the standard threshold values for common diagnostic or lab test results (e.g., 
130/80 mm Hg for BP control) on which those measures are based.  Examples of studies that 
supplement their use of such measures—as with partially clinically enriched process measures 
(Ward et al., 2004) or resource use measures (Krein et al., 2001)—are few. 
Two key findings from this literature substantiate my approach in this study.  First, my 
choice to analyze variation in diabetes care quality principally at the facility level is supported 
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by the findings of Krein and colleagues (2001), who assessed diabetes care quality variation at 
the physician, provider group, and facility levels.  Based on the results of their multilevel model, 
the authors concluded that quality measurement and improvement interventions should be 
directed at the facility-level, given that this is where they observed the greatest variation in 
their cross-section.  Thompson and colleagues (2005) likewise found that some facility-level 
factors could be very important in determining average organizational quality measure 
performance through an examination of changes in facility performance over time.  Other 
studies have followed this approach, concentrating their analyses at the facility level (Ward et 
al., 2004; Jackson et al. 2005; Kirsh et al., 2012).  A few studies have found evidence suggesting 
that, in addition to facility-level variation, there exists important, if lesser, variation in diabetes 
care quality within facilities at the individual clinician level or at the region level (Egede et al., 
2011; Trivedi et al., 2011).  Detailed analysis of this secondary variation is beyond this study’s 
scope. 
The second key finding of this literature concerns the content of the facility 
characteristics identified as differentially associated with facilities demonstrating high-quality 
and low-quality diabetes care.  Kirsh and colleagues (2012), comparing “high-performing” and 
“low-performing” facilities in their analysis of structured qualitative interview data, found that 
high-performing facilities’ interviewees were more likely to cite sufficient and well-allocated 
clinical care resources (e.g., support staff) and resources to support patient engagement in care 
as well as well-coordinated collaborative and team-based care models.  Jackson and colleagues 
(2005), likewise identified resources—specifically information systems and decision support 
tools—and well-coordinated team-based care principles and patient engagement as associated 
with improved hemoglobin A1c control at the facility level.  Similarly, Ward and colleagues 
(2004) identified coordinated efforts to emphasize guideline adherence in practice, 
performance metrics monitoring, and a culture of engaged quality improvement as associated 
with high performance among VA facilities.  Collectively, the findings of Kirsh and colleagues 
(2012), Ward and colleagues (2004), and Jackson and colleagues (2005), among others, are 
consistent with my own hypotheses of resource availability and coordination.  I generate these 
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hypotheses through the corresponding theoretical framework I describe in the following 
section. 
 
Theoretical Frameworks 
In this paper, I develop intuition, generate hypotheses, and select independent variables 
of interest using two theoretical frameworks drawn from the geographic variation literature.  
First I discuss the interplay of resource availability and coordination in determining facility 
outcomes, and second I discuss how a model of physician learning and peer effects can also be 
used to identify the effects of differences across provider facilities. 
 
Resource Availability and Coordination 
In a study concerned with physician supply and specialization and effects on the quality 
of care delivered to Medicare beneficiaries, Baicker and Chandra (2004b) laid out succinctly the 
intuition of the resource availability and coordination theoretical framework used commonly in 
the geographic variation literature.  The authors set up their analysis by observing that in areas 
with greater physician specialization, patients see more doctors.  It was unclear, however, 
whether the increased access to these care resources necessarily reflected “better care.”  
Baicker and Chandra suggested this might not be the case if increasing physician volumes begat 
increasing coordination costs and “the potential for increased coordination failures;” such 
failures may result from specialist physicians inadequately internalizing “the coordination cost 
they impose on other physicians.” 
More generally, this framework may be stated in terms of the negative spillover effects 
of resource volume.  Increases in a health care provider organization’s capacity to provide 
services and care for patients enable the organization to avoid the hazards of “undertreatment” 
(e.g., failing to prescribe a blood pressure medication for a hypertensive patient), while a more 
resource-constrained facility may be unable to avoid such hazards.  This understanding is 
consistent with findings in many different health care settings, including the VA (Wells & Sturm, 
1995; Ayanian et al., 2002; Soban & Yano, 2005; Yano et al., 2007; Chang et al., 2011).  
However, an unintended consequence of increasing capacity is the increasing difficulty of 
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ensuring all care resources are well-coordinated and allocated efficiently.  In this environment, 
the resulting poor coordination or coordination failures may lead to “overtreatment” (e.g., 
risking hypotension in a previously hypertensive patient through excessive medication).  
Indeed, as coordination difficulties mount, the net marginal benefits of additional care 
resources may decline and even become negative as a facility’s propensity to avoid 
undertreatment rises, but its propensity to overtreat rises more.  Numerous studies have also 
identified this relationship in different health care settings (Fisher et al., 2003; Baicker & 
Chandra, 2004a; Soban & Yano, 2005; Yano et al., 2007; Skinner, Staiger, & Fisher, 2010; 
Chang), though it has been suggested these findings may be in part explained by differences in 
health status in some cases (Skinner, Staiger, & Fisher, 2006; CBO, 2008). 
H1. Higher Resource Availability  →  Less Undertreatment 
H2. Higher Resource Availability  →  More Overtreatment 
It is useful to refine our understanding of “coordination” and what is meant by this 
term.  In Baicker and Chandra’s (2004b) framework, “coordination” signifies efforts (e.g., 
communication, information sharing) to prevent conflicts in delivered care modalities, 
redundancies in care, and unnecessary service use.  In other words, the purpose of these 
coordination efforts is to constrain the use or misuse of some care resources.  Such 
coordination efforts, which may effectively reduce the quantity of care resources used, may be 
termed “coordination as management.” 
However, in the quality improvement literature, the term “coordination” has been 
applied to a diverse array of organizational structures and practices extending beyond 
coordination as management structures (Baggs et al., 1992; Wheelan, Burchill, & Tilin, 2003; 
Katon et al., 2010).  In another context, a facility manager, perceiving that certain facility 
resources are underutilized, might encourage its providers to build relationships and more 
efficiently leverage one another’s capabilities to ensure patients get needed care.  In other 
words, the purpose of these efforts to coordinate care patterns and delivery structures is to use 
more of its existing resources.  Coordination efforts of this form, which may effectively increase 
the quantity of care resources used, may be termed “coordination as facilitation.” 
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Importantly for this study, facilities may employ many coordination efforts that at 
different times may seek both to encourage and to discourage use of certain resources by 
physicians.  When it cannot be identified whether these coordination efforts are principally of 
the coordination as management or coordination as facilitation varieties, it may be convenient 
to term the efforts “coordination as both.”  Given the historical focus at VA facilities on EPRP 
measures, which have incentivized greater use of resources—inadvertently rewarding 
overtreatment to prevent undertreatment—it is likely these coordination as both structures 
have been used most often to facilitate greater use of resources, much like “coordination as 
facilitation” structures. 
Ultimately, how the quantity of available care resources at a facility affects the facility’s 
quality of care—measured in terms of the underuse and overuse of services—may be mediated 
by the facility’s efforts to coordinate those resources, that is, to manage or facilitate their use.  
This dual interpretation of coordination practices is not well-appreciated in the geographic 
variation literature or in the quality of care literature. 
H3. Higher Resource Availability with Coordination as Management  →  More 
Undertreatment than Higher Resource Availability without Coordination as 
Management 
H4. Higher Resource Availability with Coordination as Management  →  Less 
Overtreatment than Higher Resource Availability without Coordination as 
Management 
H5. Higher Resource Availability with Coordination as Facilitation  →  Less 
Undertreatment than Higher Resource Availability without Coordination as 
Facilitation 
H6. Higher Resource Availability with Coordination as Facilitation  →  More 
Overtreatment than Higher Resource Availability without Coordination as 
Facilitation 
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Physician Learning and Peer Effects 
This paper aims to support a fuller understanding of the interplay of available resources 
with coordination mechanisms and how it affects the quality of patient care.  Such information 
will be of greater use to VA and other organizational administrators if my findings can be 
validated using two alternative study designs and also if it can be shown that changes in clinical 
environments and care norms can drive improvement in care delivery.   
To this end, I introduce a second geographic variation literature-derived framework on 
physician learning and peer effects.  Initially laid out by Phelps and Mooney (1993) and 
reformulated by Epstein and Nicholson (2009), this framework describes how a physician’s 
practice patterns may evolve over time as she adopts the practice patterns of her peers.  In the 
context of a given treatment approach and its perceived efficacy (both papers are concerned 
with Caesarian sections), Phelps and Mooney’s simple model holds that a physician’s initial 
(prior) beliefs are acquired during training and then are updated by observing peers’ practices.  
The physician’s average practices, then, are a blend of her initial beliefs and later learnings, 
asymptotically approaching her peers’ average practices over time as the weight given to initial 
beliefs decrease and the weight given to later learnings increase.  Moreover, if a physician’s 
peers change their practices, her practice will evolve likewise.  Epstein and Nicholson (2009) 
produced evidence that physicians’ patterns of practice do evolve and become more like their 
peers’, if only very slowly.  Phelps and Mooney (1993) suggest this pattern of internalizing local 
practice norms is attributable to physicians’ inclinations to conform rather than flout their 
peers’ examples.  They also suggest that conformity may confer benefits of reduced risk of 
malpractice litigation, since, when an adverse health event befalls a patient, the involved 
physician could well claim no other local physician would have practiced differently.11 
                                                     
 
 
11
 This explanation suggests that local practice patterns beyond the walls of the VA facilities where clinicians 
practice may play a meaningful role in driving their care patterns.  This subject may be worthy of further study, 
though it is beyond the scope of this work.  Geographic variation studies have presented evidence that overall 
patterns of practice in the care of one population in a region do not predict patterns of care for a second 
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H7. More Undertreatment (Overtreatment) Among Peer Physicians  →  More 
Undertreatment (Overtreatment) by Individual Physician 
If this prediction holds, it also serves to help explain the persistence of variation in 
quality of care despite national efforts to constrain such variation.  Whatever incentives or 
constraints are in place (at the physician staff, facility, and patient population levels), the 
Physician Learning and Peer Effects framework predicts that physicians are compelled to 
practice as their peers do or in accordance with established practice norms. 
Differential resource availability or coordination mechanisms across facilities may also 
influence whether and how quickly physicians’ practice patterns evolve to become like their 
peers’.  In particular, binding resource constraints (i.e., where there are fewer available 
resources or where coordination as management is strong relative to coordination as 
facilitation) could restrict physician practices to a particular pattern and limit physician 
discretion.  For example, if a site has few allied health professionals on staff, all physicians 
might be disinclined to encourage their patients with diabetes to visit the facility regularly to 
have their medications re-calibrated, whereas at a site with more allied health professionals on 
staff, physicians might have more discretion in determining how much follow-up care to 
recommend.  If this is the case, then physicians’ practice patterns may be more likely to 
approach local patterns when resources are newly constrained (or when physicians move to a 
resource-constrained facility) than when resources are less constrained (or when physicians 
move where resource constraints are less binding). 
H8. Stronger Resource Constraints (e.g., Lower Resource Availability)  →  Stronger 
Peer Effects (H7) 
In the following section, I describe my empirical framework for testing the hypotheses 
associated with these frameworks. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
 
population, though the evidence is not fully consistent (Chernew et al., 2010; Franzini, Mikhail, & Skinner, 2010; 
Rettenmaier & Saving, 2010; Franzini et al., 2011). 
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Methods 
In the literature on variation in care quality, my methods are innovative principally in 
two ways.  First, I measure quality using a unique ordinal measure of BP control among patients 
with diabetes that supports identifying almost certain evidence of both undertreatment and 
overtreatment.  And, second, I employ both cross-sectional and longitudinal designs side-by-
side to lend additional credence to my findings.  To my knowledge, the longitudinal design I 
employ is also unique in the literature. 
 
Measure of BP Control 
The ordinal measure of BP control I use in this study is based on the work of Kerr and 
colleagues (2012) who developed a new clinical action measure of diabetes care quality 
targeting BP control.  This measure identifies index diabetes care visits with documented BP 
measurement and, based on the patient’s BP reading, credits the provider with appropriate 
clinical action if the patient’s prescription medication mix and dosages post-visit are aligned 
with evidence-based guidelines.  Because these guidelines identify multiple alternative care 
pathways as clinically appropriate, depending on various patient characteristics and histories, 
Kerr and colleagues’ measure makes similar allowances.  Thus their clinical action measure 
“better capture the complexity of clinical decision making” for clinicians monitoring patients 
with diabetes than a standard diabetes care quality measure, which typically focuses on a single 
threshold level (e.g., BP below 130/80 mm Hg) and is agnostic about the means by which the 
threshold level is achieved or whether there is a strong evidence basis for taking clinical actions 
that do not achieve this strict level.  Kerr and colleagues’ measure is also superior to the 
standard quality measure in that it supports categorizing care episodes into potential 
undertreatment, appropriate care, or potential overtreatment, while the standard measure 
does not support identifying the latter. 
For this paper, I further enhance Kerr and colleagues’ measure by more precisely 
categorizing individual care episodes into the following mutually exclusive categories: almost 
certain undertreatment, potential undertreatment, appropriate care, potential overtreatment, 
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and almost certain overtreatment.  These additional categories of almost certain 
undertreatment and almost certain overtreatment are derived from published clinical trials and 
evidence-based guidelines (Messerli et al., 2006; Anderson et al., 2011) and the accepted 
definition of Stage 2 hypertension (American Heart Association, 2014).  A summary description 
of the criteria used to categorize care episodes is presented in Figure 7.  Kerr and colleagues’ 
measure of appropriate care corresponds to Category 3 versus Categories 2 and 1 in the new 
ordinal measure, and Kerr and colleagues’ measure of potential overtreatment corresponds to 
Category 4 versus Categories 3, 2, and 1. 
Figure 7: Dependent Variable: Ordinal, Categorical Measure of Diabetes Care Quality 
  
SBP = Systolic blood pressure, DBP = Diastolic blood pressure, * patient has normal blood pressure at follow-up 
appointment, increased dosage, changed drug class, or new class of antihypertensive drug added to regimen 
For most analyses in this paper, I present results both for the overall ordinal measure 
and for separate analyses of dummy variables identifying each of appropriate care (measure = 
3), almost certain undertreatment (measure = 1), and almost certain overtreatment (measure = 
5). 
Almost certain 
overtreatment
Almost certain 
undertreatment
Appropriate 
care
Potential
overtreatment
Potential
undertreatment
DBP < 60
SBP ≤ 130 and DBP ≤ 65, AND
3+ antihypertensive medications  OR  active intensification of Rx
SBP ≥ 160, OR
DBP ≥ 100
SBP < 140 and DBP < 90, OR
SBP < 150 and DBP < 65, OR
SBP < 150 and 3+ antihypertensive
medications
Category Criteria
(5)
(4)
(3)
(2)
(1)
Not (5) +
Not (4) 
or (5)
+
Not (1), (3), (4) or (5)
Other appropriate 
clinical action* 
within 90 days
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Kerr and colleagues’ (2012) measure was not used in any capacity for quality or 
performance measurement activities within the VA until 2011 (the final few months of my 
study period), and even today it is not widely known and is not used for public reporting 
purposes.  As such, my analyses of variation using an extension of their measure are 
considerably less likely to be contaminated by Hawthorne and ceiling effects than analyses of 
variation using standard HEDIS or EPRP measures.   
  
Empirical Framework 
My methods for describing variation in the quality of care delivered to veterans with 
diabetes are non-parametric and straightforward.  First, I calculate the ordinal measure of BP 
control for all eligible patient episodes, and I describe the distributions of the facility-year-level 
average values of this overall measure and facility-year-level fractions of patients receiving 
appropriate care, almost certain undertreatment, and almost certain overtreatment.  I also plot 
the distributions of almost certain undertreatment and almost certain overtreatment jointly to 
establish the appropriateness of analyzing factors contributing to variation in the quality of care 
at the facility level.  Lastly, I present summary statistics of BP control quality at the region level 
for comparison across regions. 
After constructing scales of resource availability and coordination as both structures, I 
present preliminary, non-parametric evidence of the relationships between these scales and BP 
control quality measures and their consistency with the geographic variation literature’s 
Resource Availability and Coordination framework. 
In my first pooled, cross-sectional analyses at the episode level, I estimate multiple 
parametric models to identify the relationship between episode-level quality and facility-level 
measures of available resources, testing Hypotheses H1 and H2.  Among these models are 
ordinary least squares (OLS) and ordered logit models of the overall BP control measure 
BPContvft—for the veteran v treated in facility f in the year t—as a function of the broad 
resource availability scale RAf, a set of veteran-, facility-, and county-level controls Xvft, and year 
fixed effects Yt.  I estimate both models to take advantage of the strengths of each: OLS model 
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is comparatively easy to interpret, while the ordered logit model recognizes and accounts for 
the structure of the dependent variable as a discrete, ordinal measure. 
The controls Xvft are included in these models to account for differences in the difficulty 
of managing patients’ BP levels; they include indicators of the patient’s sex and age, the facility 
physicians’ responsibilities in addition to outpatient care (making rounds, serving as attending 
physicians), facility clinicians’ stress levels, the training of residents in primary care at the 
facility, and the local area’s health professional shortage area status and continuous measures 
of the county’s total diabetes case burden, veteran population density, veteran facility density, 
total primary care physician density, and diabetes care need (diabetes-related death rate during 
2004-2006, Medicaid eligible population density, and per capita income).  I include year fixed 
effects to control for national trends in EPRP measure use and changes in associated incentives 
as well as national trends in the emphasis of the Primary Care Management Module and other 
delivery models reforms across VA facilities. 
So that each model may be simply presented as a single equation, I present the OLS 
model’s estimating equation as Equation 1, and I present the ordered logit model’s likelihood 
function maximized in estimation as Equation 2. 
𝐵𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑣𝑓𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐴𝑓 + 𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑣𝑓𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜀𝐵𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡,𝑣𝑓𝑡     (1) 
𝐿 = ∏ [𝛬(𝛿0 − 𝑿)
if eq1𝑖  ×  [𝛬(𝛿1 − 𝑿) −  𝛬(𝛿0 − 𝑿)]
if eq2𝑖  ×  [𝛬(𝛿2 − 𝑿) −  𝛬(𝛿1 −
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑿)]if eq3𝑖  ×  [𝛬(𝛿3 − 𝑿) −  𝛬(𝛿2 − 𝑿)]
if eq4𝑖  ×  [1 − 𝛬(𝛿3 − 𝑿)]
if eq5𝑖], where  𝑿 =  𝛽1𝑅𝐴𝑓 +
𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑣𝑓𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡           (2) 
In Equation 1, β0 represents the constant term and εBPcont,vft is the error.  And in 
Equation 2, L is the likelihood, N is the number of episode-level observations indexed by i, Λ 
represents the logistic cumulative distribution function, δ0 through δ3 are the model’s four 
threshold values, and eq1i through eq5i are binary indicators of the observation i’s overall BP 
control measure equaling 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5, respectively.  Because my theorized mechanisms 
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operate at the facility-level, I cluster my standard errors at the facility level.  In sensitivity 
analyses, I cluster standard errors at the Veteran’s Integrated Service Network (VISN) and 
region levels.12  A map of the VISNs is presented for reference in the Chapter Three Appendix. 
I supplement the intuition derived from these models and directly test Hypotheses H1 
and H2 by estimating separate logit models of three of the overall BP control measures’ 
outcomes: almost certain undertreatment, appropriate care, and almost certain overtreatment.  
These models are summarized in Equation 3. 
(𝐵𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡 = 𝑥)𝑣𝑓𝑡 = 𝛬(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐴𝑓 + 𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑣𝑓𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡) + 𝜔𝐵𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡,𝑥,𝑣𝑓𝑡, for 𝑥 = 1, 3, or 5 (3) 
In this equation, ωBPcont,x,vft is the error, and all other terms are as presented in Equations 
1 and 2. 
In further refining the intuition derived from these models (Equations 1, 2, and 3), I re-
estimate the models, replacing RAf with the component subscales and factors of resource 
availability I developed following approaches 2 and 3. 
To identify in the cross-section how coordination structures mediate the effects of 
resource availability on quality, testing Hypotheses H3-H6, I estimate revised versions of the 
above equations that introduce interactions between resource availability and measures of 
different coordination structures Cf.  These models are summarized in Equations 4, 5, and 6. 
𝐵𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑣𝑓𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐴𝑓 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑓 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐴𝑓 × 𝐶𝑓 + 𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑣𝑓𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜀′𝐵𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡,𝑣𝑓𝑡  (4) 
𝐿 = ∏ [𝛬(𝛿0 − 𝑿′)
if eq1𝑖  ×  [𝛬(𝛿1 − 𝑿′) −  𝛬(𝛿0 − 𝑿′)]
if eq2𝑖  ×  [𝛬(𝛿2 − 𝑿′) −  𝛬(𝛿1 −
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑿′)]if eq3𝑖  ×  [𝛬(𝛿3 − 𝑿′) −  𝛬(𝛿2 − 𝑿′)]
if eq4𝑖  ×  [1 − 𝛬(𝛿3 − 𝑿′)]
if eq5𝑖], 
where  𝑿′ =  𝛽1𝑅𝐴𝑓 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑓 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐴𝑓 × 𝐶𝑓 + 𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑣𝑓𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡     (5) 
(𝐵𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡 = 𝑥)𝑣𝑓𝑡 = 𝛬(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐴𝑓 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑓 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐴𝑓 × 𝐶𝑓 + 𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑣𝑓𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡) + 𝜔′𝐵𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡,𝑥,𝑣𝑓𝑡, 
for 𝑥 = 1, 3, or 5          (6) 
                                                     
 
 
12
 I define regions in accordance with the definition provided by the Department of Veteran Affairs Field Research 
Advisory Committee: Northeast (VISNs 1, 2, and 3), Mid-Atlantic (VISNs 4, 5, 6, 9, and 10), South (VISNs 7, 8, 16, 
and 17), Midwest (VISNs 11, 12, 15, 19, and 23), and West (VISNs 18, 20, 21, and 22). 
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I also re-estimate these models without year fixed effects and test the differences in the 
key covariate coefficients between models with and without the fixed effects.  Where the 
differences are insignificant (this is the case for all models estimated), I estimate and present 
the interaction effects using techniques described in Karaca-Mandic, Norton, and Dowd (2012). 
To address potential bias due to reverse causality in the cross-sectional estimates and to 
support the investigation of Hypotheses H7 and H8, derived from the Physician Learning and 
Peer Effects framework, I conduct longitudinal analyses at the physician-year level.  Specifically, 
I examine the care patterns of physicians who relocate their practices from one VA facility to 
another from one year to the next.  I use relatively restrictive criteria to identify moving 
physicians: those for whom at least 60% of diabetes care episodes took place at a single VA 
facility in a given year13 and at least 60% of diabetes care episodes took place at a different VA 
facility in the following year, with a minimum of 10 episodes in each of these years.  I allow 
physician-years to be included in this sample if the pre-move and post-move years were non-
consecutive and the intervening year had insufficient data to assess whether the physician had 
moved.  The VA’s Data Access Request Tracker staff linked physician records using staff Social 
Security numbers to support the identification of physician movers using these criteria. 
Using these physician movers’ data, I construct linear fixed effects models that are 
analogous to the models represented in Equations 1, 3, 4, and 6.  The ordered logit models in 
Equations 2 and 5 are not replicable at the physician-year level because the ordinal BP control 
measure BPContvft is summarized as a physician-year-level mean BPContmeanpt for the 
physician p in the year t; BPContvft is a discrete measure, but BPContmeanpt is not.  Likewise, the 
dependent variables capturing whether the patient received almost certain undertreatment, 
appropriate care, or almost certain overtreatment are summarized as physician-year means: 
FracBPCont=1,pt, FracBPCont=3,pt, and FracBPCont=5,pt, respectively.  I estimate fixed effects in these 
                                                     
 
 
13
 At least 60% of diabetes care episodes took place at a single VA facility for over 99% of physician-years in my 
sample, and at least 90% of diabetes care episodes took place at a single VA facility for over 95% of physician-
years.  These data suggest that only rarely do physicians practice at two or more different VA facilities in a given 
year, let alone move from one facility to another. 
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models by replacing all model variables with the same variables demeaned, subtracting within-
physician means from the variable values in each physician-year observation. 
The panel data models I estimate that are analogous to the models in Equations 1, 3, 4, 
and 6 are summarized in Equations 7, 8, 9, and 10, respectively.  For each variable Y in the 
cross-sectional models, ?̈? represents the corresponding demeaned variable. 
𝐵𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛̈ 𝑝𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅?̈?𝑓 + 𝛽𝑋?̈?𝑝𝑓𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜀?̈?𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛,𝑝𝑡    (7) 
𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑐̈ 𝐵𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡=𝑥,𝑝𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅?̈?𝑓 + 𝛽𝑋?̈?𝑝𝑓𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡 + ?̈?𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑐𝐵𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡,𝑥,𝑝𝑡, for 𝑥 = 1, 3, or 5 (8)  
𝐵𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛̈ 𝑝𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅?̈?𝑓 + 𝛽2?̈?𝑓 + 𝛽3𝑅?̈?𝑓 × ?̈?𝑓 + 𝛽𝑋?̈?𝑝𝑓𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜀′̈𝐵𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛,𝑝𝑡 (9) 
𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑐̈ 𝐵𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡=𝑥,𝑝𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅?̈?𝑓 + 𝛽2?̈?𝑓 + 𝛽3𝑅?̈?𝑓 × ?̈?𝑓 + 𝛽𝑋?̈?𝑝𝑓𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜔′̈ 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑐𝐵𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡,𝑥,𝑝𝑡, 
for 𝑥 = 1, 3, or 5          (10) 
These panel data models overcome the potential bias due to reverse causality in the 
corresponding cross-sectional models by identifying effects solely using differences in 
physicians’ practices and their exposures to facility environments and patient mixes over time.  
This identification strategy depends on the assumption of exogenous changes in physician 
practice location.  I discuss potential threats to this assumption in a later section. 
While each of the models in Equations 1-10 implicitly tests a facility-level dimension of 
Hypotheses H7 and H8 concerning physician learning and peer effects by identifying the effects 
of facility-level factors on physician-level care patterns, I test these hypotheses more fully and 
explicitly in the models represented in Equations 11-14.  These models relate physician-year-
level quality measure performance to average facility-year-level quality measure performance 
using both cross-sectional and longitudinal frameworks.  In the cross-sectional models 
(Equations 11 and 12), I regress the physician’s BP control measure mean values in a given year 
BPContmeanpt and FracBPCont=x,pt on the BP control measure mean values for the physician’s 
modal facility (at least 60% of diabetes episodes at the facility) during the same year FACpft and 
FACx,pft.  For each physician-year record, the facility’s BP control measure mean values are 
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constructed without the experience of the physician herself so as to avoid inducing correlations 
between physician-year-level and facility-year-level means arithmetically. 
𝐵𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑝𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑝𝑓𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑣𝑓𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜎𝐵𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡,𝑣𝑓𝑡    (11) 
𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑐𝐵𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡=𝑥,𝑝𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑥,𝑝𝑓𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑝𝑓𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜂𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑐𝐵𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡,𝑥,𝑝𝑡, for 𝑥 = 1, 3, or 5 (12)  
The goal of the panel data models is to identify effects based on the differences in 
average facility-year-level quality measure performance between physician movers’ pre-move 
and post-move facilities.  And so these differences FACΔpft and FACΔx,pft—between the average 
performance of the physician’s home facility in the current year and the average performance 
of the physician’s home facility in the final year pre-move—serve as the key independent 
variables in the panel data models I estimate (Equations 13 and 14).  Because these differences 
are computed relative to the pre-move year, any preceding physician-years for a moving 
physician are dropped from this analysis.  Again, all facility-year averages are computed without 
the experience of the individual physician mover, and all variables are demeaned in the panel 
data models to estimate fixed effects regressions. 
𝐵𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛̈ 𝑝𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐴𝐶𝛥̈ 𝑝𝑓𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋?̈?𝑝𝑓𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡 + ?̈?𝐵𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛,𝑝𝑡     (13)  
𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑐̈ 𝐵𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡=𝑥,𝑝𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐴𝐶𝛥̈ 𝑥,𝑝𝑓𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋?̈?𝑝𝑓𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡 + ?̈?𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑐𝐵𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡,𝑥,𝑝𝑡, for 𝑥 = 1, 3, or 5   (14)  
In the Equations 11-14, σBPCont,vft, 𝜂FracBPCont,x,pt, ?̈?BPcont,vft, and ?̈?FracBPCont,x,pt, represent the 
new residuals. 
Such tests of physician learning and peer effects must be interpreted carefully due to 
the well-understood difficulties of identification and endogeneity in peer effects analyses 
(Mansky, 1993).  In particular, without more clearly representing specific mechanisms by which 
these peer effects take place, one cannot infer directly from my analyses that the effects are a 
consequence purely of differences among the physicians themselves (e.g., preferred patterns of 
practice), among the facilities where they practice (e.g., organizational structures or incentive 
programs), or among the patient populations they serve (e.g., average difficulty with which 
patients’ BP is managed).  In the context of this study, it is unlikely that peer effects emerge 
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because of differences in knowledge of the evidence about the proper way to manage blood 
pressure in patients with diabetes—the guidelines underlying the construction of this study’s 
BP control measure date back to the late 1990s and early 2000s (Kerr et al., 2012), and the VA’s 
national EPRP performance measurement system aids in homogenizing awareness of evidence-
based care practices.  In addition, my peer effects estimates for the probability of patients 
receiving appropriate care (measure = 3) are unlikely to emerge from differences in how easily 
patients can be managed; this is because of the controls I include in my models to address this 
concern and because the BP control measure scores of 2, 3, or 4 are assigned to patient cases 
purely in response to the appropriateness of clinical actions and account for potentially 
important differences in patient traits.  As a result, it is most appropriate to interpret these 
results in terms of differences between facilities. 
Finally, for the explicit test of Hypothesis H8, I add to the Equations 11-14 measures of 
the current-year facility’s resource availability and interactions between these measures and 
FACΔpt to determine whether physicians’ peer effects are mediated by available facility 
resources. 
I conduct all analyses using Stata/MP 13.1 analytic software. 
 
Data & Study Sample 
For these analyses I constructed a rich dataset by linking data from a variety of VA 
datasets and select non-VA data. 
My principal analytic sample of diabetes care episodes and BP control information is 
generated using VA Clinical Data Warehouse (CDW) data.  I identify all veterans ages 18 and 
older who, during FY2008-FY2011, met the eligibility criteria Kerr and colleagues (2012) used in 
defining their measures of BP control for diabetes patients—they present these detailed criteria 
in full.  To summarize, these veterans must have records of care delivery encounters with select 
diabetes- and hypertension-related diagnosis codes and recorded BP levels during the index 
fiscal year as well as the year before.  Veterans were excluded if were diagnosed with 
gestational diabetes, steroid-induced diabetes, or hyperglycemia, if there was evidence they 
had select terminal conditions, if they died during the index year, or if there were notations in 
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their medical records of specific restrictions on the care they received.  Before restricting the 
sample to records that could be merged with facility-level datasets, these data were comprised 
of approximately 3.5 million veteran-years with valid BP control measure values (one measure 
value per eligible veteran-year).  The application of the exclusion criteria, the merging of these 
data with facility-level datasets, and the exclusion of records for sites with fewer than 10 cases 
in a year or with missing data values yielded a sample of 966,632 veteran-years.  I used this 
sample of veteran-years to construct my conservatively-defined longitudinal sample of 1,016 
physician-years. 
Data on the facilities where veterans received care are derived from four sources.  Two 
of these data sources are VA Clinical Practice Organization Surveys (CPOS) developed by 
researchers in the VA HSR&D Center of Excellence for the Study of Healthcare Provider 
Behavior and distributed to VA facilities during 2006 and 2007, immediately before my study 
period.  The first of these CPOS modules was distributed to facilities’ Chiefs of Staff (“COS 
module”; Yano et al., 2007a), and the second was distributed to facilities’ Primary Care 
Directors (“PC module”; Yano et al., 2008).  The PC module’s survey sample included 250 VA 
facilities, including 153 VA medical centers and 97 large community-based outpatient clinics 
(CBOCs); the response rate was 90 percent.  This survey “focused on primary care program 
features and practice arrangements.”  The COS module’s survey sample included 129 sites with 
a VA hospital and an identifiable Chief of Staff.  This survey achieved an 86 percent response 
rate and “focused on hospital characteristics and ambulatory care practice arrangements.” 
A third data source is the 2008-2009 VA Primary Care Survey (PCS), which, like the CPOS 
PC module, was developed by the VA HSR&D Center of Excellence for the Study of Healthcare 
Provider Behavior and distributed to Primary Care Directors at a larger sample (N = 248) of VA 
medical centers and CBOCs.  This survey sought to identify primary care practices in the VA that 
were successful and practices in need of improvement.  This survey’s response rate was 92 
percent.  Information from both CPOS sources and the PCS is available for 84 VA facilities. 
The fourth data source I relied on for obtaining information about the facilities where 
veterans with diabetes received care was, again, the VA CDW.  I used these data to construct 
aggregated facility-year-level information about patients, staff, and average patterns of care. 
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Gathering information from each of these sources is desirable because they contain 
different types of information.  The CPOS and PCS data contain more subjective, specific, largely 
time-invariant information about the sufficiency of select resources, whereas the CDW data 
consist of more objective, less specific, time-varying information about existing resources and 
their use.  Combining such diverse data types in my analysis adds to its construct and external 
validity.  Where information from different sources is duplicative (e.g., the same question is 
asked in different surveys in different years), I retain for each care episode the data from the 
source that most recently preceded it. 
Additional data sources used in these analyses included Vital Status records—this is a VA 
data set that more precisely identifies veterans’ dates of death than the CDW alone—records of 
VA facilities’ resident training programs in outpatient care, and the Area Health Resource File to 
capture county characteristics where VA facilities are located; such characteristics include the 
local veteran population density, whether the area is designated a health professional shortage 
area, and measures of local diabetes care burden. 
This study protocol was approved by the VA Research & Development Committee and 
Institutional Review Board. 
 
Key Explanatory Variables: Resource Availability and Coordination 
My key independent variables are measures of resource availability and coordination of 
resources at the facility level.  To simplify analysis and interpretation of my data on resource 
availability and “coordination as both” structures, I construct and analyze the data in scales.  
This is an attractive approach because my analytic data set contains more diabetes care-
relevant variables about these constructs than can be reasonably analyzed individually. 
I develop the scales using three different approaches.  My first approach is to construct 
broad scales of these concepts.  These scales support straightforward analysis and 
interpretation of effects in the terms of this study’s theoretical frameworks.  However, they 
may not yield insights about which specific resources and coordination structures are most 
important in driving the observed relationships. 
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My second and third approaches involve the construction of narrower subscales, each 
approach meant to validate the other.  I construct clinical and non-clinical subscales using 
subsets of data items that appear ex ante to be more homogeneous and focused on previously 
validated underlying component factors (Parchman, Noël, & Lee, 2005; Soban & Yano, 2005; 
Yano et al., 2007b; AHRQ, 2011; Jackson et al., 2011; Kilbourne et al., 2011; Rosland et al., 
2013).  And, third, I conduct a principal-factor analysis with varimax rotation of variables that 
allows the data to identify underlying component factors freely.  For this final approach, I 
generate regression-based factor scores for all component factors retained with eigenvalues 
greater than one in concordance with the Kaiser criterion—I also generate Scree plots and use 
them in tandem with the Kaiser criterion to choose the factors to be retained.  My second and 
third approaches are more complex methodologically but may be more helpful in identifying 
important mechanisms at work. 
For each scale, I pre-standardize each included data item to have mean zero and 
standard deviation one in accordance with the standard practices of exploratory factor analysis, 
and I report Cronbach’s α statistics to test the scales’ internal consistency.  Complete lists of the 
data items I use in constructing scales of resource availability and coordination as both 
structures are provided in the Chapter Three Appendix. 
The CPOS and PCS data do not contain sufficient specific detail in their questions about 
most diabetes care-related coordination structures to identify them uniquely as reflective of 
coordination as management or coordination as facilitation.  In this study I examine the 
mediating effects of these constructs using the few coordination structures for which such a 
designation can be made.  For coordination as management, I analyze differences across 
facilities with respect to the existence of requirements that physicians obtain pre-authorization 
for specified medications.  And for coordination as facilitation, I analyze differences across 
facilities with respect to two variables: any identified difficulties coordinating with 
endocrinology specialists (never or rarely versus more often) and the existence of service 
agreements between primary care and endocrinology or diabetes clinics for coordination 
purposes (fully or partially implemented versus none).  Future explorations of the frameworks 
described in this study may benefit from more in-depth examinations of additional coordination 
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structures more clearly identifiable as coordination as management or coordination as 
facilitation in their functions. 
 
Control Variables 
In analyses that include measures of coordination as management or coordination as 
facilitation, I also include my scale of coordination as both structures.  The purpose of including 
this scale is to control for any disproportionate investment in coordination structures or a 
broad culture of collaborative coordination overall at any one facility, of which coordination as 
management or coordination as facilitation structures may be only a small part.  Absent this 
control, my parameters of interest might be confounded by the simultaneous use of different 
types of coordination structures at a given facility. 
The patient-level controls I include in all regressions—aggregated to the facility-year 
level in the longitudinal, physician-year-level analyses—are limited to sex and a set of age 
splines (provider-year-level average proportions of patients in age ranges 18-40, 41-65, 66-80, 
and ≥ 81 in longitudinal analyses).  These controls are intended to proxy for patient 
comorbidities and complexity, which can affect how easily physicians manage their care in 
accordance with evidence-based guidelines.  Because select complex patients are excluded 
from the Kerr and colleagues’ (2012) BP control measure, it is unlikely the absence of other 
patient-level control variables (e.g., comorbid condition indicators) meaningfully affects my 
findings. 
At the facility level, I include controls first for constraints on physicians’ time.  Such 
constraints may affect physicians’ capacity to learn and follow clinical practice guideline 
developments and the amount of time they have to spend with each patient.  I include 
variables reflecting whether at least some facility physicians have inpatient care 
responsibilities—making rounds with ward teams, working as attending physicians for 
inpatients—on top of their outpatient medical care responsibilities, whether local clinicians feel 
overwhelmed with stress and how busy their clinics are, and whether or not the facility formally 
trains residents or other trainees in outpatient care.  The indicator for the presence of local 
training programs also serves as a proxy for the facility’s academic affiliation.  This control 
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variable may be important if physicians who practice in facilities affiliated with academic 
medical centers are more likely to engage with their peers in knowledge-sharing interactions or 
otherwise influence one another’s practices than physicians who practice in other settings.  So 
and colleagues (2012) have also identified independent effects of academic affiliation on the 
quality of care delivered to veterans. 
I also control for the density of the local veteran population and total diabetes care 
episodes at the facility in each year to capture both strain on local facility resources due to 
demand and also any unmeasured resources VISNs may allocate to certain facilities rather to 
others. 
In addition, there may be other factors associated with the urban or rural location of a 
VA facility—as examples, difficulties working with large homeless or seriously mentally ill 
populations, or cultural issues working with Native American, African American, or Hispanic 
patients (Kirsh et al., 2012)—that affect the quality of care (Weeks, Yano, & Rubenstein, 2002).  
Such facilities may also be under-resourced for diabetes care if the local veteran population is 
disproportionately diabetic.  For these reasons, I include as controls measures of local non-VA 
care resources (a health professional shortage area indicator and primary care physicians per 
1,000 residents), a measure of diabetes prevalence (diabetes-related deaths during 2004-2006 
per 1,000 deaths), and measures associated with other access concerns (per-capita income and 
estimated Medicaid eligible individuals per 1,000 residents). 
 
Results 
Descriptive statistics for my analytic samples are presented in Table 18.  In these 
samples, the BP control measure average is slightly greater than 3, and the average proportions 
of episodes with measure value 5 (12.9%-14.2%) significantly exceeds the average proportions 
of episodes with measure value 1 (3.9%-5.0%).  This suggests that, on average, veterans with 
diabetes and hypertension were given appropriate care for their hypertension during FY2008-
FY2011.  However, if they received care out of line with evidence-based guidelines, they were 
more likely to be almost certainly overtreated than almost certainly undertreated.  The 
resource availability and coordination as both scales have means near zero as a result of their 
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component data items’ standardization (mean zero) prior to inclusion in the scales.  The means 
of these samples’ control variables tend to reflect the population of veterans with diabetes 
overall.  In particular, sample veterans tend to be older and male.  In my cross-sectional sample, 
two thirds of veteran-years took place at facilities where residents were trained on-site, nearly 
86% of physicians expressed feeling overwhelmed at their practices in these same facilities, and 
just less than half of veteran-years took place in counties designated as health professional 
shortage areas.  The longitudinal sample’s physician-years took place in facilities that were 
somewhat smaller and in areas more likely to be designated health professional shortage areas 
with denser veteran populations. 
Additional descriptive statistics for the individual variables used to construct my scales 
of resource availability and coordination are presented in the Chapter Three Appendix. 
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Table 18: Sample Descriptive Statistics, Episode-level and Provider-year-level 
  
* Measured per 1,000 population 
 
Variation in BP Control across VA Facilities 
Figure 8 depicts the distributions of FY2011 (the most recent year in my sample) average 
ordinal measure values and rates of appropriate care, almost certain undertreatment, and 
almost certain overtreatment across facilities in my sample (N = 244,067).  While this figure 
marks meaningful variation across facilities in the average measure value (panel i) and the 
fraction of patients receiving appropriate care (panel ii), this variation is somewhat narrow 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Dependent Variables
BP Control Measure Value (1 to 5) 3.18 (0.11) 3.12 (0.48)
Almost Certain Undertreatment (Measure = 1) 3.9% 5.0%
Appropriate Care (Measure = 3) 69.0% 68.2%
Almost Certain Overtreatment (Measure = 5) 14.2% 12.9%
Key Explanatory Variables
Resource Availability Scale -0.03 (0.23) 0.01 (0.23)
Pre-Authorization for Select Rx 0.87 (0.33) 0.84 (0.37)
No Difficulties Coord. With Endocrinology 0.37 (0.48) 0.36 (0.48)
Service Agreement with Endocrinology 0.38 (0.49) 0.36 (0.48)
Coordination as Both Scale 0.04 (0.35) -0.02 (0.33)
Patient-level Control Variables
Female 3.6% 4.6%
Age 67.0 (10.8) 66.8 (4.2)
Facility-level Control Variables
PCPs Also Make Rounds 20.9% 21.2%
PCPs Also Attending Physicians 69.2% 73.8%
Clinicians Express Feeling Overwhelmed 85.9% 88.7%
Residents Trained On-site (Academic) 67.1% 71.6%
Total Episodes (1,000s) 4.0 (1.9) 3.0 (1.8)
County-level Control Variables
Veteran Population, 2010* 60.2 (66.1) 95.9 (110.7)
Veteran Hospitals Beds, 2008* 13.0 (18.5) 11.1 (16.8)
Health Professional Shortage Area 48.3% 55.9%
PCPs in Patient Care, 2010* 0.9 (0.3) 0.8 (0.3)
Diabetes Deaths, 2004-2006* 0.3 (0.1) 0.3 (0.1)
Per Capita Income, 2008 ($1,000s) $39.9 ($11.8) $40.8 ($10.1)
Medicaid-Eligibles, 2007* 208.5 (73.4) 223.6 (89.7)
Years
FY 2008 24.8% 23.9%
FY 2009 24.8% 26.0%
FY 2010 25.1% 27.7%
FY 2011 25.2% 22.4%
n
Cross-sectional 
Sample (episode level)
966,632
Longitudinal Sample 
(provider-year level)
1,016
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relative to distributions of quality shown outside the VA and for other quality measures.  Both 
distributions are quite smooth in general.  The average measure value distribution identifies a 
single high-outlier facility (average value above 3.4) and a handful of low-outlier facilities.  By 
comparison, the appropriate care distribution identifies a single low-outlier facility (rate less 
than 0.6) and two high-outlier facilities (rate greater than 0.8), but these high-outlier facilities 
are not well-removed from other facilities with marginally lower rates. 
Of greater interest are Figure 8’s distributions of almost certain undertreatment (panel 
iii) and overtreatment (panel iv).  The distribution of almost certain overtreatment is 
considerably wider—its range is approximately three times the range of the almost certain 
undertreatment distribution—in part because of its higher mean and lesser floor effects.  While 
the distribution of almost certain undertreatment is concentrated about its mean, the 
distribution of almost certain overtreatment is less concentrated.  In addition, both 
distributions identify a small number of high outliers and no distinct low outliers.  
Corresponding charts for previous years revealed similar patterns. 
107 
 
Figure 8: Average Values and Rates of Appropriate Care, Almost Certain Undertreatment, and Almost Certain 
Overtreatment by Facility, BP Control Ordinal Measure, FY2011 
 
Figure 9 depicts a facility-level scatterplot of FY2011 rates of almost certain 
undertreatment and almost certain overtreatment to assess any unadjusted correlation 
between the two.  In this figure, the sizes of the plotted circles are weighted by the number of 
episodes at the facility: larger circles identify facilities with larger samples of diabetes care 
episodes.  There is considerable noise in this relationship, but there is a statistically significant, 
negative correlation between the two rates (r(244,065) = -0.21, p < .001).  This negative 
correlation is stronger among larger facilities with more than 4,000 episodes during FY2011 
(r(102,780) = -0.47, p < .001) than among smaller facilities (r(141,283) = -0.14, p < .001).  Again, 
corresponding plots for previous years revealed similar patterns. 
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Figure 9: Almost Certain Undertreatment Rate versus Almost Certain Overtreatment Rate by Facility, BP Control 
Ordinal Measure, FY2011 
 
The negative association between almost certainly undertreated and almost certainly 
overtreated patient fractions supports the choice of analyzing quality of care using this study’s 
BP control measure at the facility level.  However, the substantial noise about the trend in this 
figure suggests that numerous factors, perhaps at multiple levels, contribute to this variation. 
Finally, in Table 19, I compare facility-level descriptive statistics by region for BP control 
measure values and key independent variables.  While there is meaningful variation across 
regions in select independent variables, particularly between the West region and other 
regions, there is little variation in any of the BP control measures at this level. 
.05
.1
.15
.2
.25
%
 a
lm
o
s
t 
c
e
rt
a
in
ly
 o
v
e
rt
re
a
te
d
0 .02 .04 .06 .08
% almost certainly undertreated
109 
 
Table 19: Facility-year-level Descriptive Statistics by Region, FY2008-FY2011 
 
Note: Mean values are reported with standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
Resource Availability and Coordination as Both Scale Construction and Descriptive Analysis 
In Table 20 I provide summary statistics regarding the construction of my scale of 
resource availability following my first and second approaches.  In accordance with my first 
approach, I constructed broad scales for each of resource availability and coordination as both.  
I used 16 variables to construct the resource availability scale.  Based on its Cronbach’s α 
statistic of 0.55, this scale is only marginally internally consistent.  The resource availability 
subscales of clinical staff and non-clinical staff resources—with α = 0.36 and α = 0.67, 
respectively—indicate that what limited internal consistency the resource availability scale has 
comes from variables concerning non-clinical staff resources.  These findings are not surprising 
given the array of resource types included in this analysis.  The coordination as both scale, 
constructed using 11 variables, is not internally consistent (α = 0.38), and so I conduct 
Variable
Northeast
Region
Mid-Atlantic
Region
South
Region
Midwest
Region
West
Region
Dependent Variables
BP Control Measure Value (1 to 5) 3.17 3.16 3.18 3.16 3.13
(0.11) (0.08) (0.11) (0.13) (0.11)
Almost Certain Undertreatment (Measure = 1) 3.9% 4.0% 4.0% 4.1% 4.1%
(1.0%) (1.4%) (1.2%) (1.5%) (1.4%)
Appropriate Care (Measure = 3) 68.9% 70.1% 68.8% 68.8% 70.7%
(4.6%) (4.3%) (5.3%) (4.5%) (5.8%)
Almost Certain Overtreatment (Measure = 5) 13.0% 13.4% 14.3% 13.8% 12.4%
(4.6%) (3.3%) (4.5%) (4.7%) (4.7%)
Key Explanatory Variables
Resource Availability Scale -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 0.19
(0.16) (0.21) (0.19) (0.28) (0.72)
Pre-Authorization for Select Rx 0.92 1.00 0.94 0.83 0.69
(0.28) (0.00) (0.24) (0.38) (0.47)
No Difficulties Coord. With Endocrinology 0.17 0.35 0.31 0.52 0.31
(0.38) (0.48) (0.47) (0.50) (0.47)
Service Agreement with Endocrinology 0.50 0.35 0.25 0.35 0.38
(0.51) (0.48) (0.44) (0.48) (0.49)
Coordination as Both Scale -0.08 0.05 0.23 -0.11 -0.05
(0.40) (0.34) (0.29) (0.37) (0.32)
N (facility-years) 48 80 64 92 52
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sensitivity analyses in which I replace the coordination as both scale with the complete set of its 
component variables in my regressions. 
Table 20: Constructing Scales of Resource Availability and Coordination as Both; Scale Summary Statistics at the 
Facility Level, FY2008-FY2011 
 
† All scales have mean 0 because all component variables are standardized with mean zero and standard deviation 
one before inclusion 
Table 21 presents information on my principal-factor analyses of resource availability 
and coordination as both.  With respect to resource availability, three factors were identified 
with eigenvalues greater than one.  Ordered by rotated factor loadings, the top three variables 
for the first factor identify it with the non-clinical resources component subscale I formulated 
for my second approach.  The second and third factors’ top three variables are less clearly 
thematically aligned.  Thus analyses of the first factor may be interpreted to reflect non-clinical 
resource effects, while analyses of the second and third factors—the second factor in 
particular, given two of its top variables have inverse impacts—may not be interpretable.  For 
this reason, I focus my analysis on the first factor and on the scales developed through my first 
and second approaches. 
Scale N Cronbach's α SD Min Max
Approach 1: Single, Broad Scale
Resource Availability 16 0.55 0.36 -0.56 2.78
Coordination as Both 11 0.38 0.32 -0.79 0.69
Approach 2: Component Subscales
Resource Availability
Clinical Staff Resources 9 0.36 0.39 -1.04 0.86
Non-clinical Resources 7 0.67 0.58 -0.65 6.75
Scale Statistics†Component Variables
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Table 21: Principal-Factor Analyses of Resource Availability and Coordination as Both 
 
† Highest-relevance variables for factor, rank-ordered by rotated factor loadings, * inverse impact on factor
For each of the dependent variables of the average BP control measure value, 
appropriate care (measure = 3), almost certain undertreatment (measure = 1), and almost 
certain overtreatment (measure = 5), I present two scatterplots in Figure 10, Figure 11, Figure 
12, and Figure 13, respectively.  The panels (i) and (ii) in each figure are FY2011 facility-year-
level scatterplots depicting the relationship between the dependent variable on the y-axis and 
my scales of resource availability and coordination as both, respectively, on the x-axis.  Each 
scatterplot is also presented with its associated line of best fit.  (Corresponding plots for 
previous years showed similar patterns.)  Excluded from these figures is one outlier facility-year 
with a resource availability scale value of 2.41, the second highest value being 0.58. 
If coordination as both structures operate like coordination as facilitation structures 
because of the VA’s historical focus on EPRP measure performance, then resource availability 
and coordination as both scales should be similarly associated with BP control measures.  Based 
on these unadjusted scatterplots, this appears to be the case.  Figure 11, Figure 12, and Figure 
13 show parallel associations across panels: greater resource availability and coordination as 
both scales are associated with lower fractions of patients receiving appropriate care, higher 
fractions almost certainly undertreated, and higher fractions almost certainly overtreated.  
Given that most facilities’ average BP control measure values are greater than 3, the 
appropriate care and overtreatment patterns are consistent and in line with expectations.  The 
positive associations with undertreatment are contrary to my hypothesis.  Finally, the 
relationships between the average BP control measure value and each of resource availability 
Variable Group Eigenvalue Variable 1† Variable 2† Variable 3†
Resource Availability
Factor 1 2.99 FTE officers, administrators, 
supervisors
Exam rooms per PCP FTE clerks and receptionists
Factor 2 1.40 Total primary care 
physicians at site*
Appropriately equipped 
exam rooms sufficient
Endocrinology/diabetology 
specialists onsite*
Factor 3 1.04 Endocrinology/diabetology 
specialists onsite
Medical informatics support 
sufficient
Total primary care 
physicians at site
Coordination as Both
Factor 1 1.11 Visible support for 
guideline implementation
Teamwork in implementing 
guidelines
Cooperative culture
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and coordination as both scales are indeterminate.  All of these associations are statistically 
insignificant; in part this may be attributable to small sample sizes (n = 83), but there is 
substantial noise in these relationships as well.
Figure 10: Average BP Control Measure Value versus 
Resource Availability and Coordination as Both Scales, 
FY2011 
 
Lines of best fit: (i) β = -0.011 (p = 0.83) and (ii) β = 
0.012 (p = 0.70) 
Figure 11: % Appropriate Care (BP Control) versus 
Resource Availability and Coordination as Both Scales, 
FY2011 
 
Lines of best fit: (i) β = -0.016 (p = 0.48) and (ii) β = -
0.013 (p = 0.35) 
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Figure 12: % Almost Certainly Undertreated (BP 
Control) versus Resource Availability and Coordination 
as Both Scales, FY2011 
 
Lines of best fit: (i) β = 0.008 (p = 0.21) and (ii) β = 0.001 
(p = 0.77) 
Figure 13: % Almost Certainly Overtreated (BP 
Control) versus Resource Availability and Coordination 
as Both Scales, FY2011 
 
Lines of best fit: (i) β = 0.007 (p = 0.73) and (ii) β = 0.012 
(p = 0.35) 
 
Cross-sectional Analysis Results 
In Table 22, I present the results of three OLS models of the overall BP control measure, 
as presented in Equation 1.  These models differ in their specification of resource availability: as 
a broad scale, as a pair of component subscales (clinical staff resources and non-clinical 
resources), and using the three regression-based factor scales developed through principal 
factor analysis.  Each of these variables was standardized with mean 0 and variance 1 prior to 
modeling.  Only the coefficient estimate for the clinical resources subscale is statistically 
significant; this estimate suggests that a one standard deviation increase in clinical resources is 
associated with a measure reduction of 0.053 units, equivalent to 5.3 percent of the sample 
switching from appropriate care (3) to potential undertreatment (2).  In total, five of the six 
estimates are negatively signed.  These negative associations are contrary to the Resource 
Availability and Coordination framework’s hypothesis. 
Among the other variables in these models, all of the patient-level covariates are 
strongly statistically significant—this is not surprising given that the model is estimated at the 
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episode level and the samples are large.  There are also positive associations between the BP 
control measure and primary care physicians also serving as attending physicians at the facility 
as well as facility size based on the total number of measured diabetes episodes.  There were 
no meaningful changes in these models’ results when standard errors were clustered at the 
VISN (network) or region level. 
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Table 22: OLS Models of Overall BP Control Measure (1-5), Alternative Approaches for Specifying Resource 
Availability, Equation 1 
 
* p < 0.10.  ** p < 0.05.  † Measured per 1,000 population. 
Table 23 presents the resource availability-specific estimates of two ordered logit 
models of the overall BP control measure and six logit models of almost certain 
undertreatment, appropriate care, and almost certain overtreatment.  These models are as 
presented in Equations 2 and 3.  The first set of estimates corresponds to models with resource 
Variable Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE
Key Explanatory Variables
Resource Availability Scale -0.026 (0.039)
Clinical Resources Subscale -0.053 (0.024)**
Non-clinical Resources Subscale -0.009 (0.026)
RA Factor 1 -0.079 (0.088)
RA Factor 2 -0.018 (0.018)
RA Factor 3 0.013 (0.013)
Patient-level Control Variables
Female 0.045 (0.011)** 0.047 (0.010)** 0.047 (0.011)**
Age 18-40 -0.022 (0.001)** -0.022 (0.001)** -0.021 (0.001)**
Age 41-65 0.035 (0.002)** 0.035 (0.002)** 0.034 (0.002)**
Age 66-80 0.008 (0.001)** 0.008 (0.001)** 0.008 (0.001)**
Age 81+ -0.015 (0.001)** -0.015 (0.001)** -0.015 (0.001)**
Facility-level Control Variables
PCPs Also Make Rounds 0.032 (0.034) 0.032 (0.033) 0.031 (0.033)
PCPs Also Attending Physicians 0.042 (0.023)* 0.043 (0.023)* 0.046 (0.024)*
Clinicians Express Feeling Overwhelmed -0.055 (0.035) -0.052 (0.034) -0.050 (0.035)
Residents Trained On-site (Academic) 0.028 (0.021) 0.025 (0.020) 0.026 (0.022)
Total Episodes (1,000s) 0.018 (0.006)** 0.021 (0.006)** 0.021 (0.008)**
County-level Control Variables
Veteran Population, 2010† 0.0002 (0.0001) 0.0003 (0.0001)* 0.0002 (0.0002)
Veteran Hospitals Beds, 2008† 0.0000 (0.0006) 0.0001 (0.0006) -0.0001 (0.0006)
Health Professional Shortage Area -0.016 (0.024) -0.021 (0.024) -0.020 (0.024)
PCPs in Patient Care, 2010† -0.040 (0.039) -0.022 (0.040) -0.029 (0.043)
Diabetes Deaths, 2004-2006† 0.090 (0.134) 0.094 (0.132) 0.104 (0.123)
Per Capita Income, 2008 ($1,000s) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Medicaid-Eligibles, 2007† -0.0003 (0.0002)* 0.000 (0.000) -(0.0003) (0.0002)
Years
FY 2008 (ref.) (ref.) (ref.)
FY 2009 0.009 (0.007) 0.010 (0.007) 0.010 (0.007)
FY 2010 0.013 (0.009) 0.016 (0.009)* 0.015 (0.009)
FY 2011 -0.007 (0.010) -0.004 (0.010) -0.005 (0.010)
Constant 3.611 (0.097)** 3.569 (0.096)** 3.557 (0.100)**
n
Approach 1
(Broad Scale)
Approach 2
(Comp. Subscales)
966,632
Approach 3
(Factor Scales)
966,632 966,632
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availability specified as a broad scale, and the second and third sets correspond to models with 
resource availability specified as its two component subscales.  I also estimated these models 
with resource availability specified using factor scales, with similar results.  I present marginal 
effect estimates rather than coefficient estimates, and so the outcome-specific marginal effect 
estimates for the ordered logit models can be compared to the marginal effect estimates for 
the logits. 
As in Table 22, the effect estimates of the broad scale of resource availability are not 
statistically significant, though these estimates are generally consistent in sign with the 
statistically significant effect estimates obtained for the clinical resources subscale.  The 
ordered logit results suggest that, where levels of available clinical staff resources are one 
standard deviation higher, rates of almost certain overtreatment are 1.5 percentage points 
lower, rates of appropriate care are 0.6 percentage points higher, and rates of almost certain 
undertreatment are 0.5 percentage points higher.  These are economically significant effects, 
particularly for almost certain overtreatment, and effects consistent with the results in Table 
22. 
Table 23: Marginal Effect Estimates of Almost Certain Undertreatment, Appropriate Care, and Almost Certain 
Overtreatment in BP Control, Ordered Logit and Logit Models, Equations 2 and 3 
 
* p < 0.10.  ** p < 0.05.  Additional control variables included in models (results not shown) include Female, Age 
18-40, Age 41-65, Age 66-80, Age 81+, Facility's PCPs Also Make Rounds, Facility's PCPs Also Attending Physicians, 
Facility's Clinicians Express Feeling Overwhelmed, Residents Trained On-site (Academic Facility), Total Episodes 
(1,000s) at Facility, County's Veteran Population in 2010, County's Veteran Hospital Beds in 2008, Health 
Modeled Outcome Variable Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE
Marginal Effects of Resource Avail. Scale
BP Control Measure = 1 (Undertreatment) 0.002 (0.003) 0.004 (0.005)
BP Control Measure = 3 (Appropriate Care) 0.004 (0.005) -0.004 (0.019)
BP Control Measure = 5 (Overtreatment) -0.008 (0.011) -0.002 (0.014)
Marginal Effs. of Clinical Resources Subscale
BP Control Measure = 1 (Undertreatment) 0.005 (0.002)** 0.004 (0.156)
BP Control Measure = 3 (Appropriate Care) 0.006 (0.003)** 0.011 (0.014)
BP Control Measure = 5 (Overtreatment) -0.015 (0.007)** -0.018 (0.010)*
Marginal Effs. of Non-clinical Resources Subscale
BP Control Measure = 1 (Undertreatment) 0.001 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002)
BP Control Measure = 3 (Appropriate Care) 0.001 (0.003) -0.008 (0.014)
BP Control Measure = 5 (Overtreatment) -0.003 (0.007) 0.002 (0.011)
n
Logit Model of BP 
Control Measure = 5 
(Overtreatment)
966,632
Ordered Logit Model 
of Overall BP Control 
Measure (1-5)
Logit Model of BP 
Control Measure = 1 
(Undertreatment)
Logit Model of BP 
Control Measure = 3 
(Appropriate Care)
966,632 966,632 966,632
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Professional Shortage Area, County's PCPs in Patient Care in 2010, County's Diabetes Deaths in 2004-2006, 
County's Per Capita Income in 2008 ($1,000s), County's Medicaid Eligible Population in 2007, and year fixed 
effects. 
 In Table 24 I present select coefficient estimates from the models represented in 
Equation 4, which include measures of resource availability, coordination, and their 
interactions.  None of these factors was found to be statistically significant, except for a positive 
estimate for the interaction between resource availability and the absence of difficulties 
primary care providers experience when coordinating with endocrinology departments.  Thus 
veterans treated at facilities with more available resources may be more likely to be 
overtreated and less likely to be undertreated where primary care and endocrinology services 
are well coordinated, relative to where such services are not well coordinated.  This represents 
limited, suggestive evidence consistent with the Resource Availability and Coordination 
framework hypothesis that coordination as facilitation structures may effectively increase the 
quantity of resources used in controlling the blood pressure of veterans with diabetes.  Results 
were similar for alternative specifications of resource availability. 
Table 24: Interactions of Resource Availability and Coordination, OLS Models of Overall BP Control Measure (1-
5), Equation 4 
 
* p < 0.10.  ** p < 0.05.  Additional control variables included in models (results not shown) include Female, Age 
18-40, Age 41-65, Age 66-80, Age 81+, Facility's PCPs Also Make Rounds, Facility's PCPs Also Attending Physicians, 
Facility's Clinicians Express Feeling Overwhelmed, Residents Trained On-site (Academic Facility), Total Episodes 
Variable Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE
Key Explanatory Variables
Resource Availability Scale (RA) -0.046 (0.045) -0.045 (0.047) -0.049 (0.046)
Pre-Authorization for Select Rx (CM) 0.009 (0.013) 0.012 (0.012) 0.011 (0.013)
No Difficulties Coord. With Endocrinology (CF1) -0.007 (0.012) -0.006 (0.011) -0.007 (0.011)
Service Agreement with Endocrinology (CF2) 0.011 (0.012) 0.015 (0.012) 0.012 (0.012)
Coordination as Both Scale (CB) 0.031 (0.031) 0.014 (0.030) 0.030 (0.033)
Interaction Terms
RA × CM 0.017 (0.045)
RA × CF1 0.098 (0.038)**
RA × CF2 -0.037 (0.042)
RA × CB -0.003 (0.111)
n
RA Interacted with 
Coordination as 
Management
RA Interacted with 
Coordination as 
Facilitation
RA Interacted with 
Coordination as 
Both
966,632 966,632 966,632
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(1,000s) at Facility, County's Veteran Population in 2010, County's Veteran Hospital Beds in 2008, Health 
Professional Shortage Area, County's PCPs in Patient Care in 2010, County's Diabetes Deaths in 2004-2006, 
County's Per Capita Income in 2008 ($1,000s), County's Medicaid Eligible Population in 2007, and year fixed 
effects. 
In Table 25 I present interaction effect estimates for the logit models described in 
Equation 6; the very small and statistically insignificant estimates for the model of almost 
certain undertreatment are not presented.  All effect estimates were generated using the 
coefficient estimates from the re-estimated versions of these models without year fixed effects 
(parameter estimates were found to be insignificantly different between the models with and 
without year fixed effects).  The only statistically significant interaction effects are estimated for 
the clinical resources subscale of resource availability and my two measures of coordination as 
facilitation.  These interaction effect estimates indicate that in facilities where primary care 
departments effectively coordinate and share service agreements with endocrinology 
departments (i.e., where effective coordination as facilitation structures are in place), higher 
levels of available clinical resources are associated with increases in the probability of patients 
receiving appropriate care and decreases in the probability of patients receiving almost certain 
overtreatment, relative to facilities with less effective coordination as facilitation structures.  
These findings contradict the hypothesis of the Resource Availability and Coordination 
framework.  Findings were similar for regressions estimated using alternative specifications of 
resource availability and for the ordered logit model represented in Equation 5. 
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Table 25: Interactions of Resource Availability and Coordination, Logit Models of Appropriate Care and Almost 
Certain Overtreatment in BP Control, Equation 6 
 
* p < 0.10.  ** p < 0.05.  Additional control variables (results not shown) include Female, Age 18-40, Age 41-65, Age 
66-80, Age 81+, Facility's PCPs Also Make Rounds, Facility's PCPs Also Attending Physicians, Facility's Clinicians 
Express Feeling Overwhelmed, Residents Trained On-site (Academic Facility), Total Episodes (1,000s) at Facility, 
County's Veteran Population in 2010, County's Veteran Hospital Beds in 2008, Health Professional Shortage Area, 
County's PCPs in Patient Care in 2010, County's Diabetes Deaths in 2004-2006, County's Per Capita Income in 2008 
($1,000s), County's Medicaid Eligible Population in 2007, and year fixed effects. 
 
Panel Data Analysis Results 
In Table 26 and Table 27 I present the results of the fixed effects models estimated to 
further test the Resource Availability and Coordination framework’s relevance in the context of 
BP control for veterans with diabetes.  Results for models of the overall BP control measure as 
well as almost certain undertreatment, appropriate care, and almost certain overtreatment are 
presented in both tables. 
The results in Table 26 pertain to the models described in Equations 7 and 8, which 
include resource availability measures but no coordination measures among their independent 
variables; those in Table 27 pertain to the models described in Equations 9 and 10, which 
include both resource availability measures and coordination measures as well as their 
interactions.  The results in Table 26—for models using broad scales, clinical and non-clinical 
Interaction Effects Est. SE Est. SE
RA × Pre-Authorization for Select Rx (CM) -0.003 (0.011) 0.014 (0.044)
RA × No Difficulties Coord. With Endocrinology (CF1) -0.012 (0.011) 0.061 (0.040)
RA × Service Agreement with Endocrinology (CF2) 0.004 (0.010) -0.029 (0.033)
RA × Coordination as Both Scale (CB) -0.018 (0.026) 0.023 (0.089)
RA Clinical Resources Subscale × CM -0.019 (0.016) 0.055 (0.055)
RA Non-clinical Resources Subscale × CM 0.012 (0.014) -0.048 (0.060)
RA Clinical Resources Subscale × CF1 0.028 (0.012)** -0.076 (0.037)**
RA Non-clinical Resources Subscale × CF1 -0.017 (0.011) 0.073 (0.040)*
RA Clinical Resources Subscale × CF2 0.042 (0.014)** -0.114 (0.044)**
RA Non-clinical Resources Subscale × CF2 -0.002 (0.009) 0.005 (0.030)
RA Clinical Resources Subscale × CB 0.001 (0.015) -0.024 (0.043)
RA Non-clinical Resources Subscale × CB 0.001 (0.018) -0.001 (0.055)
n
Logit Models of BP 
Control Measure = 3 
(Appropriate Care)
Logit Models of BP 
Control Measure = 5 
(Overtreatment)
966,632 966,632
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subscales, and regression-based factor scales to specify resource availability—are inconsistent 
across specifications and models.  The only (marginally) statistically significant estimates are the 
negative estimated effect of the non-clinical resources subscale on the probability of almost 
certain overtreatment and the large positive estimated effect of the first resource availability 
factor scale on the probability of appropriate care.  Likewise, as shown in Table 27 for the 
clinical and non-clinical resource availability subscales, there is little evidence of a meaningful 
interaction effect of resource availability and coordination in models of different measures of 
BP control.  Results were similar for other specifications of resource availability. 
Like the cross-sectional model results presented above, these fixed effects model 
estimates offer no consistent evidence of meaningful relationships between resource 
availability and BP control or between resource availability and coordination.  There is even less 
evidence of relationships consistent with those predicted in the Resource Availability and 
Coordination theoretical framework. 
Table 26: Effects of Resource Availability on BP Control Measures, Fixed Effects Models, Equations 7 and 8 
 
* p < 0.10.  ** p < 0.05.  Additional control variables included in models (results not shown) include Female, Age 
18-40, Age 41-65, Age 66-80, Age 81+, Facility's PCPs Also Make Rounds, Facility's PCPs Also Attending Physicians, 
Facility's Clinicians Express Feeling Overwhelmed, Residents Trained On-site (Academic Facility), Total Episodes 
(1,000s) at Facility, County's Veteran Population in 2010, County's Veteran Hospital Beds in 2008, Health 
Professional Shortage Area, County's PCPs in Patient Care in 2010, County's Diabetes Deaths in 2004-2006, 
County's Per Capita Income in 2008 ($1,000s), County's Medicaid Eligible Population in 2007, and year fixed 
effects. 
Variable Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE
Resource Availability Scale 0.099 (0.108) 0.006 (0.021) 0.028 (0.092) -0.002 (0.045)
Clinical Resources Subscale 0.102 (0.103) -0.031 (0.024) -0.028 (0.057) 0.005 (0.040)
Non-clinical Resources Subscale -0.015 (0.058) -0.016 (0.018) 0.051 (0.038) -0.042 (0.025)*
RA Factor 1 0.147 (0.501) -0.076 (0.120) 0.394 (0.223)* -0.094 (0.136)
RA Factor 2 0.033 (0.080) -0.032 (0.026) 0.003 (0.044) -0.015 (0.021)
RA Factor 3 -0.046 (0.028) 0.009 (0.009) -0.019 (0.023) 0.000 (0.010)
n
Models of Overall BP 
Control Measure
1,016
Models of BP 
Control Measure = 1 
(Undertreatment)
Models of BP 
Control Measure = 3 
(Appropriate Care)
Models of BP 
Control Measure = 5 
(Overtreatment)
1,016 1,016 1,016
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Table 27: Effects of Resource Availability and Coordination on BP Control Measures, Fixed Effects Models, 
Equations 9 and 10 
 
The results presented in Table 28 pertain to the models described in Equations 11 
through 14, which are intended to test the principal hypothesis of the Physician Learning and 
Peer Effects framework, hypothesis H7.  I present in parallel the results of the cross-sectional 
models of physician-year-level BP control measure performance as a function of facility (index 
physician-exclusive) average BP control measure performance in the same year—for all 
physician-years in my sample (N = 90,984) and for all physician-years for physicians who moved 
between facilities during my study period (N = 1,945).  I also present the corresponding results 
Interaction Effects Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE
RA Clinical Resources Subscale × 
Pre-Authorization for Select Rx 
(CM)
0.109 (0.070) -0.013 (0.015) -0.021 (0.031) 0.035 (0.029)
RA Non-clinical Resources 
Subscale × Pre-Authorization for 
Select Rx (CM)
0.010 (0.026) -0.007 (0.006) 0.013 (0.015) -0.002 (0.010)
RA Clinical Resources Subscale × 
No Difficulties Coord. With 
Endocrinology (CF1)
0.022 (0.071) 0.006 (0.013) -0.003 (0.020) 0.010 (0.023)
RA Non-clinical Resources 
Subscale × No Difficulties Coord. 
With Endocrinology (CF1)
0.050 (0.047) -0.006 (0.005) -0.048 (0.021)** 0.021 (0.018)
RA Clinical Resources Subscale × 
Service Agreement with 
Endocrinology (CF2)
-0.134 (0.104) 0.007 (0.015) -0.005 (0.041) -0.055 (0.039)
RA Non-clinical Resources 
Subscale × Service Agreement 
with Endocrinology (CF2)
-0.031 (0.027) 0.003 (0.004) 0.018 (0.017) -0.017 (0.011)
RA Clinical Resources Subscale × 
Coordination as Both Scale (CB)
-0.219 (0.134) 0.018 (0.028) 0.053 (0.047) -0.085 (0.049)
RA Non-clinical Resources 
Subscale × Coordination as Both 
Scale (CB)
-0.049 (0.132) 0.015 (0.021) -0.020 (0.045) -0.013 (0.056)
Models of Overall 
BP Control 
Measure
Models of BP 
Control Measure = 
1 
(Undertreatment)
Models of BP 
Control Measure = 
3 (Appropriate 
Care)
Models of BP 
Control Measure = 
5 (Overtreatment)
* p < 0.10.  ** p < 0.05.  In addition to the main effects of resource availability and coordination, these models also include 
provider-year-level averages of the following control variables: Female, Age 18-40, Age 41-65, Age 66-80, Age 81+, Facility's 
PCPs Also Make Rounds, Facility's PCPs Also Attending Physicians, Facility's Clinicians Express Feeling Overwhelmed, 
Residents Trained On-site (Academic Facility), Total Episodes (1,000s) at Facility, County's Veteran Population in 2010, 
County's Veteran Hospital Beds in 2008, Health Professional Shortage Area, County's PCPs in Patient Care in 2010, County's 
Diabetes Deaths in 2004-2006, County's Per Capita Income in 2008 ($1,000s), County's Medicaid Eligible Population in 2007, 
and year fixed effects.  Results not shown.
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of the fixed effects models of physician-year-level BP control measure performance (among 
moving physicians, N = 1,26114) as a function of the difference in facility-year-level measure 
performance between the current facility-year and the last pre-move facility-year. 
All results presented are consistent with hypothesis H7 that physicians’ performance on 
the BP control measures will track with the performance of their peers at the same facility.  The 
fixed effects model results—shown in row (iii)—are the largest estimates of peers’ influence on 
the index physicians’ performance.  These constitute my principal results in this analysis.  The 
second of these estimates, for example, suggests that for every one percentage point increase 
in the physician’s current facility’s probability of almost certainly undertreating a patient in the 
index year, relative to the physician’s pre-move facility’s performance in the physician’s pre-
move year, the physician’s own probability of almost certainly undertreating a patient rises 
0.335 percentage points in the index year.  This is a very strong peer effect, especially 
considering that these results are for physicians less than three years removed from their 
previous facility.  Previous evidence has suggested that physician peer effects may be small 
initially and develop slowly over time (Epstein & Nicholson, 2009).  Moreover, that my results 
are comparable in magnitude for the probability of appropriate care versus other measure 
specifications suggests that these estimates should be interpreted primarily in terms of 
differences in facility characteristics (e.g., organizational structures and incentive programs). 
A comparison of rows (i) and (ii)—the results of the cross-sectional models of peer 
effects—indicates that the sample of physician movers may be more easily influenced by their 
care environments than the general population of physicians treating veterans with diabetes.  
Still, if average peer effects for all physicians were only as large as those estimated using the full 
sample of physicians, my results would constitute evidence of meaningful, if smaller, peer 
effects consistent with the predictions of the Physician Learning and Peer Effects framework. 
                                                     
 
 
14
 This sample of 1,261 physician-years is larger than the sample of 1,016 physician-years used in previous fixed 
effects models.  This is because the models with results presented in Error! Reference source not found. do not 
nclude the measures of resource availability and coordination that are not available for all facilities. 
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Table 28: Peer Effects in Quality of BP Control, OLS and Fixed Effects Models, Equations 11-14 
 
* p < 0.10.  ** p < 0.05.  Additional control variables used in models (results not shown) include provider-year-level 
averages of the following variables: Female, Age 18-40, Age 41-65, Age 66-80, and Age 81+.  Other controls include 
Facility's PCPs Also Make Rounds, Facility's PCPs Also Attending Physicians, Facility's Clinicians Express Feeling 
Overwhelmed, Residents Trained On-site (Academic Facility), Total Episodes (1,000s) at Facility, County's Veteran 
Population in 2010, County's Veteran Hospital Beds in 2008, Health Professional Shortage Area, County's PCPs in 
Patient Care in 2010, County's Diabetes Deaths in 2004-2006, County's Per Capita Income in 2008 ($1,000s), 
County's Medicaid Eligible Population in 2007, and year fixed effects. 
 Finally, to support a direct test of hypothesis H8, I estimated regressions similar to those 
presented in Table 28 but with measures of resource availability added along with interactions 
between resource availability and self-exclusive facility BP control measure means.  These 
models consistently showed statistically insignificant mediation of facility peer effects by 
resource availability (results not shown).  It appears there are other facility-level factors 
substantially more important than resource availability driving the above results. 
 
Discussion 
The VA is engaged in many longstanding performance measurement and quality 
improvement efforts focused on standard quality measures, which typically target individual 
care processes (i.e., that should always or never be rendered) or individual biological measure 
thresholds.  This study quantifies variation in the quality of care delivered in terms of evidence-
based guideline adherence, as the ordinal BP control measure I use supports.  I extend this 
exploration of variation in the VA’s diabetes care quality in two ways, relying on the geographic 
variation literature to develop underlying theoretical frameworks.  First, I use measures of 
resource availability and coordination to study how a facility’s available resources affect care 
N Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE
(i)
Current Facility-year-level (self-
exclusive) Measure Performance, 
All Physicians
90,984 0.092 (0.020)** 0.121 (0.029)** 0.096 (0.018)** 0.087 (0.020)**
(i i)
Current Facility-year-level (self-
exclusive) Measure Performance, 
Moving Physicians
1,945 0.254 (0.066)** 0.264 (0.119)** 0.169 (0.091)* 0.181 (0.065)**
(i i i)
Difference in Facility-year-level 
(self-exclusive) Measure 
Performance, Current Facility-year 
Minus Pre-move Facility-year
1,261 0.263 (0.101)** 0.335 (0.121)** 0.493 (0.109)** 0.394 (0.104)**
Model
Model of Overall 
BP Control 
Measure (1-5)
Model of BP Control 
Measure = 1 
(Undertreatment)
Model of BP Control 
Measure = 3 
(Appropriate Care)
Model of BP Control 
Measure = 5 
(Overtreatment)
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quality and how much coordination structures mediate this relationship.  And second, I assess 
the extent to which these and other facility-level structures and peer effects affect local 
patterns of practice. 
In my analyses of variation in BP control measures of diabetes care quality, I find 
meaningful variation across VA facilities, though this variation is relatively less overall than has 
been observed outside the VA or using other quality measures.  In particular, I find remarkably 
little variation across regions in performance despite meaningful variation in other observable 
facility characteristics.  While the BP control measure used in this study is distinct from the 
diabetes care quality measures used in the VA’s EPRP performance measurement system, it is 
possible that the regular calculation and reporting of those EPRP measures over the last fifteen 
years has led many facilities and clinicians to emphasize diabetes care evidence based 
guidelines in their practices more than they would without the EPRP system.  Such focus could 
have reduced the variation I observe; variation may be greater for quality measures less related 
to any existing EPRP measures.  In addition, I note there is greater variation across VA facilities 
in rates of almost certain overtreatment of veterans than there is in almost certain 
undertreatment of veterans, though this is not unexpected given the negative correlation I find 
between these two measures and the greater likelihood that almost certain undertreatment 
rates will be compressed due to floor effects. 
Throughout my analyses of facilities’ available resources and coordination structures 
and their relationship to local physicians’ BP control measure performance, the evidence I find 
is limited and inconsistent with the predictions of the framework of Resource Availability and 
Coordination.  These findings persist across three specifications of resource availability—as a 
single broad scale, as two subscales of clinical and non-clinical resource availability, and as 
three regression-based factor scales developed through a principal factor analysis—across both 
cross-sectional and panel data models, and across four related measures of quality in BP 
control.  I find similar inconsistencies for each set of coordination measures that I analyze—
coordination as management, coordination as facilitation, and coordination as both—as well.  I 
conclude that facility resources and coordination structures do not meaningfully affect the 
quality of BP control management for veterans with diabetes. 
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This conclusion appears to stand opposed to the conclusions drawn by Soban and Yano 
(2005) and Yano and colleagues (2007b), who found primary care practice resources were 
positively associated with performance on various preventive care quality measures.  Soban 
and Yano, who studied effects of resources on multiple preventive care quality measures, did 
not find positive associations for all of the measures they studied, and they did not include BP 
control for veterans with diabetes among the measures they examined.  As such, it not 
necessarily surprising that my work identifies one measure on which primary care-related 
resources have little effect.  The sets of resource measures used in these three studies are 
distinct as well; this too may contribute to differences in our findings. 
My examination of the Resource Availability and Coordination framework has three key 
limitations.  First, the set of resource availability and coordination measures available for VA 
facilities is somewhat limited in that the measures are largely time-invariant and tend to reflect 
the subjective opinions of the facility’s chief of staff or primary care director.  More objective, 
regularly captured measures might be less subject to measurement error.  Moreover, I selected 
a set of resource availability and coordination measures anticipated to be diabetes care-related 
for my analyses.  This selection process may have overlooked important measures or included 
measures unrelated to diabetes care quality, further obscuring what relationships may exist. 
The second key limitation of this analysis is the low internal consistency of the scales I 
use to condense the information in these resource availability and coordination measures into 
more consumable measures.  The resource availability scales’ low internal consistency, for 
example, makes it more difficult to ascribe my findings to the broader concept of resource 
availability to which the Resource Availability and Coordination framework refers.  On the other 
hand, given how broad the concept of resource availability is in general, it is not surprising that 
the heterogeneous set of measures I use to represent it in this analysis should fall below the 
0.70 threshold for Cronbach’s α statistics commonly used in the social sciences.  Moreover, that 
I have focused my analysis more on the scales with higher Cronbach’s α statistics rather than all 
scales generated strengthens my inferences. 
Finally, despite my large episode-level datasets, my analysis of the Resource Availability 
and Coordination framework’s hypotheses is limited by the fact that much of the variation I use 
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to identify the effects of resource availability and coordination on quality is derived from cross-
sectional differences among 84 VA facilities.  This limitation could lead to concerns of 
simultaneity bias in my cross-sectional model estimates.  Both how decoupled the VA’s 
resource allocation processes at the facility level were from facilities’ diabetes care burdens 
during this study period and the consistency of my findings between these cross-sectional 
models and fixed effects models, which identify effects using differences in facility exposures 
for moving physicians, alleviate much of these concerns.  However, a related concern that there 
is not enough variation among these 84 facilities to identify effects may be valid.  Efforts to 
develop and use richer data sets consisting of time-varying, objectively measured facility 
characteristics or to employ other analytic approaches may be valuable in further testing the 
relationships between facility characteristics and quality measure performance. 
My analyses of the Physician Learning and Peer Effects framework’s hypotheses, by 
contrast, reveal a strong relationship between a physician’s BP control quality measure 
performance and that of his peers at the same facility.  This result is robust to analysis of 
different BP control measures (the overall measure and outcome specific measures of 
appropriate care, almost certain undertreatment, and almost certain overtreatment) and is 
consistently strong and positive in both cross-sectional and fixed effects models.  This finding 
supports the validity of efforts to identify determinants of care quality at the facility level.  It 
should also encourage future investigations of facility-level or physician team-level factors that 
may affect physician learning when physicians are exposed to new facilities or, perhaps, 
substantially new care delivery structures or incentive programs implemented at the same 
facility. 
The potential for differences in findings in my fixed effects models, relative to cross-
sectional estimates, due to selection bias is highlighted in this analysis.  My cross-sectional peer 
effects model results for all physicians and for physician movers are significantly different from 
one another, but physician-level data to support exploring these differences in greater detail 
are not available.  If physicians are more likely to move if they are uncomfortable with the 
constraints or practice norms in their pre-move facilities, or if they are younger and less fixed in 
their patterns of practice, then my fixed effects models may overestimate the magnitude of the 
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positive peer effects I observe in diabetes care quality, and the true peer effects in this context 
may be more comparable to the smaller estimates I generate in my cross-sectional models.  On 
the other hand, I may underestimate these peer effects if physicians are more likely to move, 
for example, when they are offered new responsibilities at other facilities that would divert 
their attentions from diabetes care.  However, such transitions might also make these 
physicians less likely to be included in my sample, given my diabetes care episode minimum 
requirements.  Other panel study designs relying on physician responses to within-facility 
changes over time (see, for example, Hysong et al., 2012) may be helpful in addressing some of 
these concerns if the changes were largely unforeseen, though such conditions are almost 
certainly uncommon. 
The differences between the VA and non-VA health care sectors, which make the VA a 
useful setting in which to examine some statistical relationships between facility characteristics 
and care quality (e.g., largely homogeneous reimbursement structures and central governance 
within the VA), also make it difficult to assess how externally valid my findings are in non-VA 
settings.  In particular, the robustness of the VA’s performance measurement and quality 
improvement enterprises may affect the relationships among resource availability, 
coordination, and quality in ways that the non-VA health care sector cannot realize at present.  
However, as non-VA health care providers further integrate vertically and horizontally, make 
increased use of electronic medical records, and build their performance measurement 
capabilities, the experiences of VA facilities may become increasingly relevant outside the VA as 
well. 
 
Conclusion 
This study makes three key contributions to the literature on geographic variation in 
quality and to the literature on quality of care in the VA.  I examine variation in and explore the 
determinants of a new, ordinal measure of BP control for patients with diabetes that is tightly 
linked to evidence-based practice guidelines.  I develop and apply two frameworks from the 
geographic variation literature in ways that have not previously been applied in the VA context.  
And I employ both cross-sectional and panel data models to validate and reinforce my findings. 
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Ultimately, I find that there is meaningful variation in BP control quality across VA 
facilities, though there is less variation here than has been shown for other measures and 
outside the VA.  I also find that the resource availability and coordination structures, broadly 
defined, at the VA facility level have little effect on diabetes care quality within the facility, 
while there is marked evidence supporting a framework of Physician Learning and Peer Effects.  
The peer effects I identify support the persistence of variation in care quality across facilities, 
and they suggest that physicians’ performance on quality metrics can be influenced by their 
local care environments. 
Further work is needed to describe variation in quality across VA facilities using other 
measures, particularly those with fewer well-established, related measures in the EPRP 
performance measurement system.  And as non-VA facilities increase their use of robust 
electronic health record systems or other systems recording detailed clinical information about 
patients, it will also be important to explore variation in the quality of care delivered to non-VA 
patients using clinically enriched measures tightly linked to evidence-based guidelines.  
Advances in both of these literatures will be valuable for identifying the modifiable 
organizational and market characteristics that can improve evidence-based quality both within 
the VA and without. 
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Chapter Three Appendix 
Figure 14 is a map of the VA’s 21 VISNs.  Although they are numbered to 23, there 
remain only 21 VISNs, as VISNs 13 and 14 were collapsed to become VISN 23. 
Figure 14: VA Veteran's Integrated Service Networks (VISNs) 
 
Source: VHA, December 2009. 
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Table 29, Table 30, Table 31, and Table 32 present complete lists and descriptive 
statistics for the individual variables used in measuring resource availability, coordination as 
management, coordination as facilitation, and coordination as both, respectively. 
Table 29: Data Items Used to Measure Resource Availability 
  
* Data item available in previous surveys as well as source listed. 
 
Data Item Source Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Resource Availability Subscale 1: Clinical Staff Resources
Generalist physician staff mostly or completely sufficient 
to meet PC program’s current goals
VHA Primary Care 
Survey
56.3% 59.5%
Insufficient numbers of PCPs not a barrier or only a small 
barrier to improving performance at the facil ity
CPOS, Chief of 
Staff Module
69.6% 74.5%
Total primary care physicians with 20+ visits at site during 
January
VA CDW
81.9 (39.7) 75.1 (48.8)
No more than 20% of facil ity’s physicians are part-time CPOS, Chief of 
Staff Module
37.6% 30.5%
Has trained endocrinology/diabetology specialists on site CPOS, Chief of 
Staff Module
84.1% 83.5%
PC program patients typically get same-day laboratory 
services on site in primary care
CPOS, PC Director 
Module
32.5% 41.3%
PC program patients typically get disease management 
program support for a metabolic syndrome (e.g., diabetes) 
on site in primary care
CPOS, PC Director 
Module
44.4% 42.2%
Nurse staff mostly or completely sufficient to meet PC 
program’s current goals
VHA Primary Care 
Survey*
40.9% 41.1%
Insufficient numbers of outpatient nurses not a barrier or 
only a small barrier to improving performance at the 
facil ity
CPOS, Chief of 
Staff Module
79.5% 84.5%
Resource Availability Subscale 2: Non-Clinical Resources
Total FTE clinic officers, administrators, and supervisors CPOS, PC Director 
Module
1.1 (0.9) 1.2 (1.1)
Total FTE clerks and receptionists CPOS, PC Director 
Module
3.1 (4.7) 3.3 (3.5)
Appropriately equipped exam rooms usually or always 
sufficient to meet PC program’s needs
VHA Primary Care 
Survey*
58.5% 54.8%
Total exam rooms available per PCP when seeing patients 
(per 1,000 cases)
CPOS, PC Director 
Module
1.0 (3.3) 1.9 (5.3)
Clinical space usually or always sufficient to meet PC 
program’s needs
CPOS, PC Director 
Module*
33.0% 31.1%
Personal computers or workstations usually or always 
sufficient to meet PC program’s needs
VHA Primary Care 
Survey*
87.1% 88.2%
Access  to medica l  informatics  support usual ly or a lways  
sufficient to meet PC program’s  needs
VHA Primary Care 
Survey*
37.8% 38.6%
Cross-sectional Sample
(episode level)
Longitudinal Sample
(episode level)
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Table 30: Data Item Used to Measure Coordination as Management 
 
Table 31: Data Items Used to Measure Coordination as Facilitation 
 
* Data item available in previous surveys as well as source listed.  
Table 32: Data Items Used to Measure Coordination as Both 
 
Data Item Source Mean Mean
PCPs are required to obtain pre-authorization for specified 
medications
CPOS, PC Director 
Module
87.3% 83.6%
Cross-sectional Sample
(episode level)
Longitudinal Sample
(episode level)
Data Item Source Mean Mean
PCPs never or rarely have problems coordinating care with 
endocrinology specialists when caring for patients with 
multiple chronic i l lnesses
CPOS, PC Director 
Module
37.3% 35.7%
Service agreements fully or partially implemented between 
PCPs and endocrinologists/diabetes clinics for 
coordinating specialty services
CPOS, PC Director 
Module*
37.9% 36.3%
Cross-sectional Sample
(episode level)
Longitudinal Sample
(episode level)
Data Item Source Mean Mean
Facility systematically identifies patients with diabetes 
using registries or panels
CPOS, Chief of 
Staff Module
62.3% 64.6%
Facility employs performance profil ing and provider 
feedback to promote adherence to guidelines or initiatives
CPOS, Chief of 
Staff Module
78.6% 85.2%
Facility employs incentives to promote adherence to 
guidelines or initiatives
CPOS, Chief of 
Staff Module
24.2% 19.1%
Facility employs incentives to promote adherence to 
cholesterol screening guidelines or initiatives
CPOS, PC Director 
Module
23.1% 23.9%
Always or most of the time, PCPs are notified promptly 
following the delivery of their patients’ subspecialty 
consultation results
CPOS, PC Director 
Module
85.0% 68.9%
Designated support staff (e.g., RN) can adjust medications 
between PCP visits for patients with diabetes
CPOS, PC Director 
Module
54.7% 56.0%
Nurses, clerks, or medical assistants routinely order or 
make referrals for HbA1c tests without a separate order 
CPOS, Chief of 
Staff Module
32.7% 32.6%
To a great or very great extent, facil ity has provided visible 
support for clinical guideline implementation within the 
facil ity
CPOS, Chief of 
Staff Module
53.0% 40.7%
To a great or very great extent, facil ity has established 
teams to work on specific diseases/conditions covered by 
VA performance measures
CPOS, Chief of 
Staff Module
70.1% 77.8%
To a great or very great extent, facil ity has implemented a 
program to enhance cooperative culture
CPOS, Chief of 
Staff Module
52.1% 40.1%
To a great or very great extent, teamwork existed at the 
facil ity in implementing guidelines
CPOS, Chief of 
Staff Module
73.7% 77.2%
Cross-sectional Sample
(episode level)
Longitudinal Sample
(episode level)
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Conclusion 
 
The expansive literature on decision-making by physicians, including both organizational 
and medical care decisions, has historically dedicated greater efforts to exploring the effects of 
financial incentives rather than organizational factors, interpersonal dynamics, policy changes, 
and other non-financial factors.  In the three chapters of this dissertation, I examine these non-
financial factors intently and identify the roles select non-financial factors play in affecting the 
decisions of primary care practice managers, specialist consultants, and Veterans Health 
Administration (VA) clinicians serving veterans with diabetes. 
First, in my study of the laws and regulations governing the practices of non-physician 
clinicians and how they affect physician practice decisions about Medicaid participation, I find 
interesting heterogeneity in regulatory effects across non-physician clinician types and across 
practices.  Relaxing regulations on physician assistants leads to small increases in Medicaid 
participation among many primary care practices.  However, relaxing regulations on nurse 
practitioners leads to a reduction in Medicaid participation among practices that have seen 
relatively few Medicaid patients historically and an increase in Medicaid participation among 
practices that have seen relatively more Medicaid patients historically.  These findings suggest 
that policymakers should not take it for granted that relaxed NPC regulations will have little 
effect on current Medicaid participants’ willingness to see Medicaid patients and lead to 
improvements in access overall. 
Second, in my study of medical consultations provided to complex surgical inpatients, I 
find that the decisions of previous consultants can significantly affect the next consultant’s 
decisions about how many visits to pay a patient.  These consistent findings reflect a dual-role 
of medical consultants not widely recognized previously: they provide active management care 
support to the attending physician while also answering questions specific to their specialties.  I 
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also find that the patterns of consultants’ responses to other consultants’ care decisions are 
consistent with a framework of Diminishing Marginal Productivity.  This suggests that many 
consultants are aware of this role of active management and calibrate the intensity of their 
consult provision to meet what they perceive to be the patient’s needs.  In this case, the 
appropriateness of consultants’ decisions about their roles as active managers of care may be 
increased by ensuring the case information available to them at the time of their initial 
involvement is as complete as possible. 
Finally, in my study of variation in the quality of care delivered to veterans with 
diabetes, I find moderate variation in blood pressure control effectiveness across VA facilities.  
Moreover, I find no consistent evidence that the facility’s available resources and coordination 
structures affect quality measure performance, and yet there is strong evidence that physicians’ 
quality measure performance is significantly influenced by their peers and their local care 
environments.  These findings help to fill important gaps in the geographic variation literature 
and offer valuable insights to VA administrators evaluating alternative strategies for improving 
diabetes care quality both within individual facilities and across the VA health care system.  
These three studies contribute a more complete understanding of several non-financial 
factors that influence medical decision-making and care delivery by physicians.  Through further 
analysis building on this work and by infusing key findings into policy and organizational 
structures at different levels of the health care system, meaningful steps can be taken to 
modify the environments in which physicians practice, facilitating the decisions that promote 
health and efficient use of medical care resources. 
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